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The institution of adjudication is in a state of great upheaval to-
day. Mounting case backlogs and the litigation challenge posed by mass
torts are pressuring Congress and courts to experiment with novel adju-
dication techniques. Some of the results are well-known-case tracking,
alternative dispute resolution, greater reliance on settlement, and
tighter pretrial screening of cases. Taken together, these changes fore-
shadow a major transformation in the practice and theory of
adjudication.
This Article focuses on one particularly remarkable proposal for
handling large-scale litigation: adjudication by sampling. This approach
uses statistical methods to adjudicate a large population of similarly sit-
uated cases. Rather than decide each individual case separately, the
court aggregates all the cases and selects a random sample. The court
then adjudicates each sample case and statistically combines the sample
outcomes to yield results for all cases in the larger population.
The sampling procedure is nicely illustrated by the most recent
chapter in Judge Robert Parker's struggle with asbestos litigation,
Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc.1 After certifying a class action and
adjudicating liability, Judge Parker faced the daunting prospect of 2298
hotly contested damage trials. Settlement negotiations had broken
down, and defendants made credible threats to contest each case vigor-
ously.' Judge Parker worried about the consequences in Cimino as well
as in the thousands of pending and future cases that would have to be
tried individually at the damages stage unless some aggregative proce-
dure could be devised.
Judge Parker solved the problem by using stratified sampling.3 He
first divided the population of 2298 cases into five disease categories
and selected random samples from each category for a total of 160 sam-
ple cases.4 He then held jury trials of the damages issues for each of the
1. 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (appeal pending).
2. Judge Parker described defendants as having adopted a "fortress mentality" with the goal
of avoiding liability "by obstructing the Court's ability to provide a forum in these cases." Id. at
651. These threats were credible in view of the potentially crippling effect of massive liability and
the substantial benefit to defendants from delaying recovery.
3. For a description and defense of this procedure, see id. at 653, 657-66.
4. The disease categories, sample sizes, and total population sizes are as follows:
Disease Sample Size Total Population
Mesothelioma 15 32
Lung Cancer 25 186
Other Cancer 20 58
Asbestosis 50 1050




sample cases. Finally, he combined the sample verdicts to arrive at a
total damage award for each case in the overall population. He gave
each sample case the actual verdict it received in its own trial, after
remittitur in some cases, and he gave each of the remaining 2138 cases
the average of the post-remittitur sample verdicts for its disease
category.5
Judge Parker's statistical procedure has two crucial features. First,
parties receive average outcomes rather than outcomes tailored to the
specific facts of their individual cases. Second, not all parties receive
their own day in court. Only the parties to the sample cases have a
chance to litigate the issues personally.'
Cimino-style sampling is not the only procedural innovation with
these two problematic features. All proposals that substitute statisti-
cally generated average verdicts for individualized tort judgments
smooth over case-specific variation and sacrifice individual participa-
tion, at least to some extent. A recent proposal by Professors Kenneth
Abraham and Glen Robinson is illustrative.7 Under the Abraham-
Robinson proposal, a tort plaintiff receives a verdict equal to the aver-
age of all past settlements and trial verdicts in similar cases, with case
similarity defined by statistically generated claim profiles. Whereas
Cimino's procedure averages over a sample of concurrently litigated
cases, the Abraham-Robinson proposal averages over a set of historical
cases, those that have already been resolved by settlement or fully liti-
gated judgment. Both approaches, however, award average rather than
See id. at 653.
Judge Parker also tried the cases of the nine class representatives.
5. To illustrate Judge Parker's sampling procedure, suppose the total population consisted of
100 cases falling into two disease categories: 50 asbestosis cases and 50 lung cancer cases. Suppose
further that the court decided to use a sample of ten cases drawn equally from each disease cate-
gory-five from the asbestosis category and five from the lung cancer category. Assume the five
sample asbestosis cases returned verdicts (in millions of dollars) of .5, .25, 1.5, .75, and .5, and the
five lung cancer cases returned verdicts of .8, 1.5, 1.8, 2.0, and .8. Assuming no remittitur adjust-
ments, Judge Parker's procedure would award the sample cases their actual verdicts, the remaining
asbestosis cases $700,000 each (the average of .5, .25, 1.5, .75, and .5 million), and the remaining
lung cancer cases $1,380,000 each (the average of .8, 1.5, 1.8, 2.0, and .8 million).
6. Although all 2298 plaintiffs in Cimino agreed to the court's sampling procedure, defend-
ants did not agree, and more importantly, there is reason to question plaintiffs' consent under
these circumstances as well. See notes 110-20, 181-91 and accompanying text.
7. Glen 0. Robinson and Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 Va. L.
Rev. 1481 (1992); see also Kenneth S. Abraham and Glen 0. Robinson, Aggregative Valuation of
Mass Tort Claims, 53 L. & Contemp. Probs. 137 (Autumn 1990). While Robinson and Abraham
believe their approach can help deal with the mass tort litigation crisis, this is not the primary
purpose of their proposal. They seek more fundamental change in the common-law system, a shift
away from what they believe is a misplaced preoccupation with individualism toward a more col-
lectivist approach. See Robinson and Abraham, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 1488-96; Abraham and Robinson,
53 L. & Contemp. Probs. at 137-41.
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individualized verdicts, and both distribute full litigation opportunities
to fewer than all the plaintiffs.
Given the enormous volume of mass tort and mass accident litiga-
tion, it is understandable that judges, lawyers, and commentators find
statistical modes of adjudication attractive. Although Cimino is the first
case to award damages to individual tort victims based on a case sam-
ple, it is certainly not the last. Indeed, another federal district court
judge, inspired by Cimino, has already indicated a willingness to use
sampling to calculate a classwide punitive damages award." Moreover,
the Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation, a group of judges ap-
pointed by the Judicial Conference to propose solutions to the asbestos
tort crisis, recommended sampling in an early draft report." Although
the Committee did not include this recommendation in its final report,
it did take note of the use of sampling in Cimino and proposed that
Congress authorize "consolidation and collective trial of asbestos
cases."
10
Nor is sampling's appeal confined to tort litigation. In a pending
case seeking recoupment of mistaken Medicare payments," for exam-
ple, the United States government is advocating judicial use of sam-
pling instead of individualized adjudication to resolve the several
8. See In Re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 588 (E.D. La. 1991), aff'd sub. nom. Watson v.
Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1992) (class action to recover damages from an oil refinery
explosion).
9. See Letter from Judith Resnik and Thomas Rowe to The Honorable Thomas M. Reavley,
Chair, Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation at 16 (March 8, 1991) ("Resnik and Rowe Let-
ter") (noting that Committee Report recommended Congressional approval of "plaintiff sampling
techniques") (on file with author). See also Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee
on Asbestos Litigation 41 (March 1991) ("Ad Hoc Committee Report") (Judge Hogan, dissenting,
notes that Committee recommended sampling).
10. Ad Hoc Committee Report at 21, 36.
11. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. United States, 772 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. Tenn.
1991). The United States brought suit against Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company to
obtain reimbursement for Medicare payments that the United States erroneously made for items
or services that were insured by Provident. The Medicare as Secondary Payer Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1395y(b)(2)(A) (1992), coordinates Medicare with coverage under other insurance programs. The
statute does this by assigning primary coverage responsibility to insurers like Provident. When the
United States government erroneously makes Medicare payments that should have been made by
the primary insurer, the statute authorizes the government to bring an action against the insurer
for reimbursement. Id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii).
The Provident case includes as many as four million individual recoupment claims that may
have a total value close to $223 million. The district court granted partial summary judgment to
the United States on liability, Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. United States, 740 F. Supp.
492 (E.D. Tenn. 1990), and referred the damages issues to a special master. The special master
rejected the government's sampling approach, choosing instead to adjudicate damages on a claim-
by-claim basis. See Special Master's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Initial
Designation and Statistical Approach Hearing 124-36 (May 8, 1992). The district court judge
adopted the special master's recommendation, and the government appealed the ruling on the
sampling issue to the Sixth Circuit. The appeal is now pending.
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million claims at stake.12 Furthermore, Abraham and Robinson are not
the only scholars urging the benefits of statistically based procedures."
In a recent article, Professors Michael J. Saks and Peter David Blanck
defend Cimino's sampling approach, arguing that sampling can produce
more accurate decisions and enormous cost savings with only
slight-and in their view eminently justifiable-sacrifices of individual
participation opportunities. 14
Despite this growing interest, many of the important normative is-
sues raised by sampling have yet to be fully addressed.' 5 These issues
are complex; they implicate the most basic features of American adjudi-
cation and demand answers to some of the most challenging questions
of procedure theory. This Article examines the normative stakes more
closely."6 Although the Article focuses primarily on Cimino-style sam-
12. In fact, this case involves a much less problematic use of sampling than Cimino because
all the recoupment claims involve the same plaintiff and the same defendant. As a result, sam-
pling's effect on liability and entitlement is much less serious; in fact, as we shall see, sampling in a
case with one plaintiff and one defendant can produce a more accurate total award than case.by-
case adjudication. Furthermore, unlike Cimino, all parties in Provident have a chance to litigate
the issues that arise in the sample cases.
Despite these differences, the Provident case still presents the thorny problem of mixing ag-
gregative statistical techniques with an historically individualistic system of court adjudication.
Indeed, the fact that Provident is a judicial proceeding against a party that itself is not a benefi-
ciary of the regulatory scheme distinguishes it from precedents upholding an agency's use of sam-
pling in an administrative setting to audit for overpayments or misuse of government funds. See,
for example, Chaves County Home Health Services, Inc. v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914, 916-19 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (upholding agency's use of a sampling audit to identify overpayments in more than
13,000 Medicare claims); Michigan Dep't of Educ. v. United States Dep't of Educ., 875 F.2d 1196,
1204-06 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding agency's use of sampling to audit more than 60,000 payments
for misuse of vocational rehabilitation grants).
13. For a proposal that is quite similar to the Abraham-Robinson approach, see James F.
Blumstein, Randall R. Bovbjerg, and Frank A. Sloan, Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better
Tools for Assessing Damages for Personal Injury, 8 Yale J. Reg. 171 (Winter 1991) (emphasizing
the benefits of increased outcome predictability and greater uniformity across cases rather than
reduction in litigation and delay costs).
14. Michael J. Saks and Peter D. Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of
Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 815 (1992). See also Ste-
phen Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for Comprehensive Re-
vision of the Class Damage Action, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 299, 340-41 (1980) (recommending sampling
to calculate individual damages in small-claimant, and to a lesser extent in large-claimant, class
actions); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A Public Law Vision
of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 917-919 (1984) (recommending sampling to calculate
damages in small-claimant class actions); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing
Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 Ind. L. J. 561, 586-93 (1987) (recommending sampling
to calculate damages in large-claimant class actions).
15. There are helpful treatments of some of these issues in the literature. For the most recent
examples, see Robinson and Abraham, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 1481 (cited in note 7), and Saks and
Blanck, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 815.
16. This Article offers a policy analysis with relevance for the constitutionality of sampling
under due process norms and for the legislative design of an optimal sampling procedure. Even so,
the Article's scope is limited. For example, I do not discuss (1) whether sampling in federal court
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pling, its analysis applies more generally to all statistical ap-
proaches-including the Abraham-Robinson proposal-that award
average rather than individual verdicts and deny full participation op-
portunities to at least some parties. Indeed, on the most general level,
the analysis addresses a fundamental issue of procedural justice: the
limits on judicial creativity in devising procedures under conditions of
severe process scarcity. When there are not enough resources to provide
each party with an individual trial, how should a court go about adjudi-
cating the cases before it?
My argument proceeds in three stages. In Part II of the Article, I
first evaluate the novelty of sampling and identify those factors that
make the procedure so troubling. The analysis compares Cimino-style
sampling, in which trials of sample cases determine individual issues for
each case in a larger population, with two more commonly accepted ag-
gregation techniques, class actions and mass tort settlements, that also
rely on a few parties or cases to generate outcomes for a much larger
group.17 1 conclude that sampling differs from these alternatives in criti-
cal ways demanding special justification, but I also suggest that recent
alters state substantive law inconsistent with the commands of Erie and the Rules of Decision Act;
compare In re Fibreboard, 893 F.2d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a lump-sum damages
approach implemented by Judge Parker ran afoul of Erie); (2) whether sampling denies parties
their constitutional rights to trial by jury; compare id. at 712 (holding that a lump-sum damages
trial violates defendant's jury trial right); and (3) whether sampling is expressly or implicitly pro-
hibited by existing procedural rules. As to the first question, it is clear that Erie poses no obstacle
to the use of sampling in state court. The second issue, sampling's impact on jury trial, is more
troubling. But see Robinson and Abraham, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 1498-99 (cited in note 7) (arguing that
the Seventh Amendment guarantee of jury trial is not offended by a procedure, such as sampling,
that in effect holds a jury to determinations of issues previously made). Even so, sampling does not
affect jury trial as seriously as the lump-sum damages procedure rejected by the Fifth Circuit in
Fibreboard. Under sampling, some cases receive full jury trials, all defendants receive at least one
trial of the legal and factual issues, and each case receives a verdict extrapolated from actual jury
awards. Finally, if resolution of the third issue suggests that existing procedural rules bar sam-
pling, then those rules can be changed to accommodate the procedure, provided, of course, that
sampling is consistent with due process, separation of powers, and Article III principles. See gener-
ally Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary K. Kane, 7B Federal Practice and Procedure,
§ 1784 at 86-88 (West, 2d ed. 1985) (arguing that federal courts have broad equitable power to
devise novel remedial approaches in class actions). For an analysis of some of the legal objections
to sampling, see Resnik and Rowe Letter (cited in note 9).
17. These two procedures incorporate the main elements of current aggregation practice. The
class action relies on consolidation and preclusion, and court-supervised settlement relies on con-
sent. There are other devices for handling large-scale litigation, but these also differ from sampling
in major respects. For example, multidistrict litigation uses interdistrict transfer and consolidation
to adjudicate related suits, but it is supposed to apply only at the pretrial phase. See 28 U.S.C. §
1407 (1976). But see Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation", 54 L. & Contemp. Probs. 5, 29-
35 (Summer 1991) (noting that transferred cases are seldom remanded to their original districts for
trial). Furthermore, nonparty preclusion can prevent relitigation of common issues, but its scope
under current law is extremely limited. See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal
and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 193 (1992). Sampling is not confined to the pretrial
phase, nor is it limited to common issues.
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expansions of more established techniques raise similar justificatory
problems.
Part III then examines the arguments for and against sampling
from an outcome-oriented perspective, which assumes that the value of
adjudication lies solely in the quality of the outcomes it produces as
measured by closeness of fit with the substantive law and facts. I con-
clude, contrary to claims made by Professors Saks and Blanck, s that
the use of sampling entails a significant sacrifice of outcome accuracy.
But I also conclude that sampling can still be justified on outcome-ori-
ented grounds in some situations, and I identify factors that should be
considered in any outcome-oriented evaluation of sampling in a particu-
lar case.
Finally, Part IV examines the arguments from a process-oriented
perspective, which assumes there is intrinsic value to adjudicatory par-
ticipation inhering in the opportunity for individual input and control
that participation makes possible. I assume, along with others, that trial
opportunities for plaintiffs in large-scale mass tort cases are extremely
scarce. By this, I mean that litigation and delay costs are so high that it
is not possible to guarantee each plaintiff with a meritorious case an
individual trial early enough to assure a positive net recovery or an
amount of compensation above a minimally acceptable level."9 Whereas
previous commentators have assumed that scarcity itself justifies sam-
pling's inroads on participation, I take scarcity as the starting point for
an analysis of distributive justice. The critical question is how to dis-
tribute fairly a limited number of process opportunities among persons
with equal participation rights.
Because it distributes by lottery, random sampling is justifiable on
process-oriented grounds only if a lottery is a fair distributional scheme.
This requires some argument, and the argument shows that sampling
creates much greater tension between process and outcome values than
previous commentators have realized.
18. Saks and Blanck, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 833 (cited in note 14).
19. For a more precise definition of scarcity, see notes 219-28 and accompanying text. Many
believe that asbestos litigation has reached a condition of extreme scarcity. The Judicial Confer-
ence Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation recently concluded: "It is unrealistic to believe
that individual trials can provide relief. The local trial of an individual asbestos claim takes so long
that trying each claim separately would require all the civil trial time for the foreseeable future to
the exclusion of all other cases in districts with heavy asbestos caseloads." Ad Hoc Committee
Report at 19 (cited in note 9); accord Jack B. Weinstein and Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of
Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 269, 295-96, 317. See also Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at
651 (noting that "[t]ransaction costs consumed $.61 of each asbestos litigation dollar" and that
"the plaintiffs receive only $.39 from each litigation dollar") (citing Institute for Civil Justice, An-
nual Report (April 1, 1990-March 31, 1991)). For a description of the private and social costs of
asbestos litigation and the inability of conventional procedures to cope with the problem, see Ad
Hoc Committee Report at 7-27 (cited in note 9).
568 [Vol. 46:561
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In the end, I do not reject sampling. Nor do I fault Judge Parker
for using the procedure. Asbestos litigation and the mass tort phenome-
non present horrendous problems for a heavily burdened judiciary. In-
deed, Judge Parker may well be correct that sampling is the best way to
handle this difficult situation within the constrained set of options
available to district courts. My objective is to chart the normative land-
scape-to identify sampling's costs as well as its benefits and to suggest
guidelines for deciding when a sampling procedure is appropriate and
how it should be designed to work an acceptable compromise between
outcome and process values.
II. SAMPLING IN PERSPECTIVE: JUST How RADICAL Is IT?
A. Sampling Compared to the Class Action
Sampling shares much in common with class actions brought under
Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.20 In both proce-
dures, the outcome of litigation involving a few parties is imposed on a
larger group. In both, the purpose of adjudicating on a groupwide basis
is to reduce the social and private costs of litigation and to facilitate
suits that might not be cost-effective if brought separately.2 1
Moreover, when factual issues are identical throughout the class,
the class action functions as a trivial form of sampling. The court in
effect relies on a sample of one case, that of the representative plain-
20. See F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3). In a sense, sampling bears some resemblance to the mandatory
class action under Rule 23(b)(1) in that both respond to a felt necessity for aggregative treatment.
But the two procedures involve different kinds of necessity. Rule 23(b)(1) seeks to avoid special
unfairness associated with certain types of remedial externality, whereas sampling is designed to
achieve judicial economy gains and facilitate lawsuits by reducing transaction and delay costs. This
makes sampling a closer cousin of the Rule 23(b)(3) class action, which is also designed to promote
judicial economy and facilitate non-cost-justified suits for individual damages.
It is also worth noting the similarity between sampling in a case like Cimino and a Rule
23(b)(2) class action for structural relief, such as a school desegregation or institutional reform
suit. Although liability issues are common to the class in structural relief cases, there can be seri-
ous class conflict at the remedy stage. See, for example, Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflict in Class
Actions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1183, 1188-91 (1982). When a court invites intervention to canvas class
members' views on relief, the court in effect uses a crude (and nonrandom) form of sampling. Even
so, Rule 23(b)(2) provides little support for sampling in mass tort suits. In a Rule 23(b)(2) class
action seeking structural relief, the legal wrong is a group wrong (the defendant must have acted
on grounds generally applicable to the class), and the legal remedy is a group remedy (there can be
only a single, unitary injunction that must direct its benefits toward the class qua class). Thus,
even with the risk of intraclass conflict, the Rule 23(b)(2) class is a strongly homogeneous unit as a
legal matter; all class members stand or fall together. By contrast, sampling is applied to damage
actions which have traditionally been considered the quintessential form of individual suit; damage
awards vary in amount across different plaintiffs and benefit each plaintiff as an individual rather
than as a member of a group. Thus, once again, the better analogy is to the Rule 23(b)(3) class
action for damages.
21. See Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7A Federal Practice and Procedure § 1777 at 517-18 (cited
in note 16) (discussing policies behind F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3)).
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tiff's, to adjudicate liability for the entire class."2 And when issues vary
but fall into a small number of homogeneous groupings, subclassing
serves as a trivial form of stratified sampling. Each representative is in
effect a sample from the subclass that she represents.2"
Nevertheless, there is an important difference between the two pro-
cedures. The Rule 23(b)(3) damages class action is supposed to adjudi-
cate only those questions of law and fact that are identical for all cases.
As a result, large-damage class actions usually break up into separate
suits after the liability phase unless individual damages can be deter-
mined within the class action structure.4
By contrast, sampling is useful precisely because it adjudicates is-
sues that vary substantially over all group members. In Cimino v.
Raymark Industries, for example, the amount of damages to which
each plaintiff was entitled depended on a host of factors specific to her
case, including the extent of the injury and its physical effect, the rea-
sonable medical expenses incurred, the effect of the injury on employ-
ment opportunities and future earnings, and the degree of pain and
suffering.2 5 Judge Parker's stratified sampling procedure preserved
gross distinctions of disease type, but averaged over all other variables.
It is true that courts occasionally determine damages on a class-
wide basis, but these situations provide little support for sampling.26 In
some cases a court can determine individual damages with reasonable
accuracy from defendant's records without much evidentiary input
from individual plaintiffs. For example, in a price-fixing case, the court
frequently is able to determine aggregate damages, as well as individual
awards for each plaintiff, by relying on defendant's records, sometimes
22. Of course, under the current federal class action rule, the class suit would have to satisfy
other requirements, including typicality and adequacy of representation. See F.R.C.P. 23(a)(3), (4).
23. See F.R.C.P. 23(c)(4)(B).
24. See Herbert B. Newberg, 2 Newberg on Class Actions § 9.53 at 319-20 (McGraw-Hill, 2d
ed. 1985); Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7B Federal Practice and Procedure § 1784 at 78-79 (cited in
note 16).
25. 751 F. Supp. at 659, 665 (noting that a plaintiff's individual smoking history is relevant
to damages because it affects factors such as quality of life and life expectancy, and listing a num-
ber of damage-related variables identified by defendants).
26. See Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 114 F.R.D. 587, 596 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (rejecting a collec-
tive damage award when damages were susceptible to individualized proof). For discussion of the
existing class action case law on the subject, see Samuel Issacharoff, Administering Damage
Awards in Mass-Tort Litigation, 10 Rev. Litig. 463, 470-80 (1991) (noting that "administrative
models" of damage assessment have seldom been used); and Newberg, 2 Class Actions § 10.02 at




supplemented by documentary evidence of purchases provided by
plaintiffs.
A few class actions have awarded a genuinely collective form of
monetary relief, but these also differ from Cimino-style sampling. One
example, on which Judge Parker relied in Cimino, is Pettway v. Ameri-
can Cast Iron Pipe Co.,2" a Title VII class action case.29 In Pettway a
class of 2242 black employees succeeded in proving discrimination over
an extended period with regard to promotion, tenure, and transfer op-
portunities. The problem for the court arose in the context of calculat-
ing backpay awards. The court was not able to determine the positions
that each class member would have qualified for and obtained in a hy-
pothetical workplace free of discrimination because all class members
competed among themselves as well as with the white employees for
scarce job opportunities. Calculating backpay awards on an individual-
ized basis was conceptually impossible; it required describing in detail a
counterfactual employment scenario in the face of complex interaction
effects that undermined any hope of determinate causation. 0 Thus, the
court had no choice but to use a collective, statistical approach.
The use of sampling in cases like Cimino responds to a different
concern. The injuries of the Cimino plaintiffs are not causally inter-
twined and there are no extraordinary proof problems or conceptual ob-
stacles to calculating damages on an individualized basis., The
problems are economic-high administrative costs and extreme delay
due to budgetary constraints-and their solution presents the hard
27. See Newberg, 2 Class Actions § 10.01 at 348; § 10.07 at 357; § 10.12 at 367-69 (cited in
note 24).
28. 494 F.2d 211, 258-63 (5th Cir. 1974) (Pettway III); accord Pettway v. American Cast Iron
Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1222 (5th Cir. 1978) (Pettway IV).
29. See Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 663 (discussing Pettway III).
30. Advocating a classwide approach, including use of a comparable set of white employees
as a reference group to calculate aggregate backpay, the Pettway III court of appeals summarized
the problem in the following way:
When a court is faced with the employment situation like this case, where employees start at
entry level jobs in a department and progress into a myriad of other positions and depart-
ments on the basis of seniority and ability over an extended period of time, exact reconstruc-
tion of each individual claimant's work history, as if discrimination had not occurred, is not
only imprecise but impractical
. . . While the district court is not limited to this particular alternative [i.e., actual ad-
vancement of a comparable group not discriminated against], it has more basis in reality than
an individual-by-individual approach.
494 F.2d at 261-63. See also Newberg, 2 Class Actions § 10.09 at 361-65 (cited in note 24) (discuss-
ing the unusual proof problems that prompt use of statistical techniques to distribute damages in
employment discrimination cases).
31. Compare Bower, 114 F.R.D. at 596.
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question of when economic constraints can limit substantive and proce-
dural rights.
Cimino-style sampling is also similar to fluid class recovery, an-
other collective form of classwide monetary relief. Fluid recovery is a
mechanism for distributing damages in small-claimant class actions,
where the small amounts at stake make it administratively impractical
to distribute on an individual basis.32 The idea is to distribute aggregate
damages in a less expensive way by distributing to a second-best class.
In this way small-claimant class actions become feasible and can be
used to hold defendants accountable for wrongdoing as well as to pro-
mote the deterrence goals of the substantive law.33 The problem with
fluid recovery, however, is that it tends to distribute damages imper-
fectly relative to individual entitlements. Persons who were never
harmed may receive a benefit, while some class members who were ac-
tually injured may receive nothing at all.
To illustrate, suppose an attorney files an antitrust suit on behalf
of a class of passengers overcharged by certain taxicab companies.3 4
Suppose further that the total overcharge for each plaintiff amounts to
only three dollars on average. The liability of defendants can be easily
adjudicated on a classwide basis, and aggregate damages for the entire
class can be accurately computed using taxi company records. Problems
will arise at the distribution stage, however. The costs of identifying
each class member, soliciting individual proof of injury, and mailing a
check for individual damages are bound to exceed the three dollar aver-
age recovery. As a result, a class action is impossible unless the court is
able to distribute damages in a less expensive way. Fluid recovery pro-
vides such an alternative. For example, the court might require that all
defendants reduce fares charged to future passengers until the class-
wide damage award is used up. This approach makes the class action
economically feasible, but it does so only by distributing damages im-
perfectly. The group of future passengers who benefit from the damages
award is not likely to match the class of passengers who were injured by
defendant's wrongful overcharge.
The similarity to sampling is obvious. As I discuss below, sampling
can yield an extremely accurate average damage figure and thus an ac-
curate total damage figure for the whole aggregation when the sample
32. See Newberg, 2 Class Actions §§ 10.16-10.19 at 373-82 (cited in note 24) (discussing cy
pres principles of damages distribution, which include fluid recovery); Wright, Miller and Kane, 7B
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1784 at 81-85 (cited in note 16) (discussing fluid recovery).
33. See generally Berry, 80 Colum. L. Rev. at 299-300 (cited in note 14) (noting that small-
claimant class actions serve deterrence rather than compensation goals).
34. This hypothetical is based on Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal.2d 695, 433 P.2d 732 (1967).
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average is multiplied by the total number of plaintiffs.3 5 Like fluid class
recovery, however, sampling imperfectly distributes this total relative to
the expected outcome of an individual trial, giving some plaintiffs more
and some less than their individual entitlements.
Fluid recovery is a highly controversial procedure in part because
of its skewed effect on compensation, and sampling shares this fea-
ture."6 Moreover, sampling has other characteristics that render it even
more problematic than fluid recovery. Fluid recovery applies to class
actions in which individual class members have only small amounts at
stake and little interest in receiving compensation. Sampling, on the
other hand, applies to mass tort cases in which individual plaintiffs
have a great deal at stake and compensation entitlements are strong.
Sampling also has a more serious impact on participation values.
Fluid recovery is used in class actions that have numerous common is-
sues. Even the determination of aggregate damages involves issues that
are the same for all class members. As a result, class representatives
stand in for absentees in the strong sense of litigating the same issues
with the same evidence as in an individual suit.3 7 Furthermore, individ-
ual participation values are not particularly compelling in these cases
because absentees have little, if any, interest in litigating their small
claims separately. "
Sampling is different. Because factual issues vary among class
members and cases are not homogeneous with respect to damages, sam-
ple plaintiffs do not represent those not sampled in the same way that
plaintiffs in a small-claimant class represent absentees. Moreover, the
amounts at stake are large, and participation values may be strong.
35. See notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
36. Critics complain that fluid recovery sacrifices compensation to regulatory goals, while
supporters point to the minimal compensation interest at stake and the deterrence benefits the
procedure makes possible. See, for example, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172 n.10
(1974); Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 675 (7th Cir. 1981); State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal.3d 460,
715 P.2d 564 (1986); Newberg, 2 Class Actions §§ 10.20-10.24 at 382-92 (cited in note 24); Kenneth
W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. Legal
Stud. 47, 63 (1975). Sampling is less troubling than fluid recovery in one respect: because mass tort
cases like Cimino involve large damages, sampling achieves significant compensation goals for all
plaintiffs.
37. Even so, the representation involved in the small claimant class action with fluid recovery
differs from the type of representation that supported the class action historically. See Robert G.
Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Rep-
resentation, 70 B.U. L. Rev. 213 (1990). Indeed, modern Rule 23(b)(3) was created with the 1966
revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and has been a source of much controversy ever
since its adoption-in large part because it aggregates damages suits that have a distinctly individ-
ualistic quality. See id. at 290-304.
38. See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1, 27-31 (1991).
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These facts suggest that each plaintiff may have a powerful interest in
litigating her own case in her own way.
B. Sampling Compared to Mass Tort Settlements
Settlement in mass tort cases resembles sampling in an important
respect. Both procedures extrapolate from a subset of cases to generate
outcomes for all cases in the larger population. The outcomes of mass
tort cases that happen to settle or reach final judgment first shape fu-
ture settlements by defining how much a plaintiff is likely to receive
from trial, her so-called "nonagreement baseline," and by focusing par-
ties on reasonable bargaining outcomes.3 9
Judges often exploit this settlement dynamic to facilitate-some
would say engineer-settlements in large-scale mass tort and mass acci-
dent litigation. For example, in a currently pending class action involv-
ing nearly 20,000 victims of an oil refinery explosion in Louisiana, a
federal district court judge plans to try cases in stages in order to gener-
ate a "reasonable judgment value for each category of claims that can
facilitate settlement.' 40 In some cases judges, with the help of special
masters, have even compiled data on prior settlements and trial ver-
dicts in order to provide the parties with information to assist in formu-
lating reasonable settlement values.41
The similarity to Cimino-style sampling is obvious. The set of early
cases constitutes a kind of sample (although not necessarily a random
sample) of the overall population, and attorneys in later cases use a
39. Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 L. & Contemp. Probs. 79,
107-09 (Autumn 1990). See Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Reali-
ties, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 89, 102; Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L.
Rev. 659, 692-93 (1989). For a discussion of nonagreement baselines and bargaining theory, see
Brian M. Barry, Theories of Justice, 3-142 (Univ. of Cal., 1989). For a mathematical treatment of
two-player bargaining games, see Roger B. Myerson, Game Theory: An Analysis of Conflict, 370-
416 (Harv., 1991).
40. In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 588, 596 (E.D. La. 1991), aff'd sub nom. Watson v.
Shell Oil Co. 979 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1992).
41. See, for example, Ad Hoc Committee Report at 16 (cited in note 9) (reporting favorably
on Judge Lambros's case management program in the Ohio Asbestos Litigation). See generally
McGovern, 69 B.U. L. Rev. at 670 n.55 (cited in note 39). Professors Abraham and Robinson would
take this approach one step further and apply it to determine the amount of liability at the trial
stage. See Robinson and Abraham, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 1489-90 (cited in note 7); Abraham and
Robinson, 53 L. & Contemp. Probs. at 140-52 (cited in note 7). Under their approach, data on
previous settlements and trial verdicts would be used to calculate damages by means of claim
profiles constructed from damage-related variables (severity of injury, type of disease, and the
like). The claim profiles would be used in one of two ways at trial: either as evidence of damages
subject to the usual jury weighing, or as the actual measure of damages conclusive on jury delibera-
tions. See Robinson and Abraham, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 1493-94. Both alternatives, and especially the




rough statistical method, such as weighted averaging, to infer settle-
ment information from this sample group. Thus, parties to later cases
receive settlements that depend on the statistical properties of a case
sample. Furthermore, because future plaintiffs have no chance to influ-
ence the litigation of earlier cases, they have as little power over the
nonagreement baseline or focal point that controls their settlement out-
comes as plaintiffs not included in an adjudicative sample have over the
outcomes of the sample cases that determine their verdicts.
Despite these similarities, sampling presents more serious problems
than settlement. Settlement always requires consent. Parties bargain
when they settle, and all must agree to the ultimate resolution. If a
party believes that previous case outcomes are not representative of her
case, all she need do is reject her opponent's offer and insist on a higher
settlement figure. In contrast, consent is not analytically essential to
sampling. A judge might require consent, as Judge Parker did for the
plaintiffs in Cimino, but he need not do so. Furthermore, as discussed
in Parts III and IV, consent to sampling, even when it is obtained, is
likely to be more apparent than real given the scarcity of trial opportu-
nities and the high delay costs in mass tort cases.
One should not make too much of this distinction between sam-
pling and settlements, however. The same delay costs that undermine
consent to sampling also undermine the consensual basis of settlements.
In mass tort cases plaintiffs who file later often confront much longer
trial delays and much higher delay costs. Higher delay costs reduce a
settling plaintiff's nonagreement baseline; at the limit delay costs ex-
ceed expected trial recovery, and plaintiff's baseline drops to zero. By
the same token, a defendant's baseline improves because a mass tort
defendant normally benefits from longer delays. Bargaining power
therefore becomes more asymmetric as delay increases, and a plaintiff
becomes more willing to accept a settlement based on previous case
outcomes even when she thinks that those outcomes do not accurately
reflect the merits of her own case.
An individual mass tort plaintiff is not responsible for long trial
delays, and she has no control over the length of the delay other than to
file early and hope others do not. As a result, there is reason to disap-
prove of a settlement baseline significantly skewed in the defendant's
favor by high delay costs. If one rejects the baseline, one must also re-
ject the bargaining outcome. Stated differently, consent cannot legiti-
mate a settlement when a plaintiff's falback position is itself
normatively flawed. 2
42. See Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The Policy Issues, 10
Rev. Litig. 231, 238-39 (1991).
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Once one discredits consent as a legitimating factor, however, mass
tort settlement takes on a coercive character similar to sampling. One
has to answer the following question for each process: What justifies
"forcing" case outcomes on a party who neither participated in litigat-
ing those cases nor effectively waived her participation right?
Even so, this question may pose more of a challenge for sampling
than for settlement. Sampling reflects a deliberate institutional decision
to impose outcomes on nonparticipants whereas settlement ordinarily
takes place incidental to the adjudicative process."3 It may be more
troubling when the state acts affirmatively to create a burden than
when the burden results incidentally from state decisions that are oth-
erwise proper. Nevertheless, the current trend toward institutionalizing
settlement in mass tort cases is undermining this distinction. If this
trend continues, courts will have to confront the participation question
with full force outside the sampling context."
III. SAMPLING WITHIN AN OUTCOME-ORIENTED VIEW
The previous discussion identified two features that are more seri-
ous for sampling than for more conventional aggregation procedures:
the systematic tendency to under- and overcompensate relative to sub-
stantive law entitlements and the adverse effect on participation values.
Because of these features, sampling can create substantial social costs.
The following discussion analyzes the costs associated with sam-
pling's impact on outcome. These costs fall into two categories: those
directly caused by the sampling procedure itself and those indirectly
caused by sampling's effect on litigation-related incentives.
43. But see Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 376 (1982) (discussing how
judges pressure parties to settle in ordinary litigation).
44. In defending his use of sampling in the Cimino litigation, Judge Parker noted the wide-
spread use of statistics to prove liability in many types of cases. His examples included projecting
premerger and postmerger market share in antitrust cases, proving secondary meaning and confu-
sion in trademark cases, proving discrimination in civil rights cases, and proving causation in tort
cases. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 661-62. He also noted the use of statistical evidence to assess dam-
ages for shortened life expectancy and lost future profits or earnings. Id. at 662-63. Judge Parker's
argument misses the point. The trouble is not that courts use statistical sampling; the trouble is
the way courts use it. In all the examples that Judge Parker cites, statistics are used either to
prove a liability element defined in aggregative statistical terms, such as in disparate-impact dis-
crimination claims, or to satisfy a probabilistic burden of proof, such as in the tort examples. In all
of these situations, the substantive right together with the burden of proof incorporates probabilis-
tic elements suitable for statistical evidence. Thus, the use of statistics follows logically from the
nature of the substantive right.
Sampling in a case like Cimino operates differently. Sampling is used as a trial technique, not
as a way to estimate probabilistic variables relevant to recovery. For example, when the sample
mean is less than the expected trial award, sampling in fact gives a plaintiff less than her substan-
tive entitlement. And it does so not because of uncertainties in proof but because of a deliberate
decision to forgo an individual trial in favor of an outcome averaged over the sample group.
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A. The Direct Effects of Sampling on Outcome Accuracy
1. The Sample Average as a Measure of True Damages
For the following analysis I adopt the conventional approach that
measures the quality of an outcome by its accuracy. By an "accurate"
outcome I mean one that reflects a correct determination of the facts
and the law and a correct application of law to fact. One outcome is
more accurate than another if the error risk associated with the former
is less than the error risk associated with the latter, where risk of error
measures the probability that the outcome is erroneous.
One can expand on the concept of accuracy for those outcomes,
such as damage awards, that vary across a continuous range. If a jury is
unbiased, its verdict is as likely to be high as low relative to actual dam-
ages; and the more competent the jury, the closer its verdict will be to
the correct amount. As a result, if the same case were tried to a jury
over and over again, one should expect the damages verdicts to fall on a
normal (that is, bell-shaped) distribution curve clustering more or less
closely about a mean equal to the correct damages award. I shall refer
to this distribution as the "error distribution" or "error curve" for the
case.
Professors Michael Saks and Peter Blanck have recently argued, in
defense of Cimino, that the average of sample case verdicts is likely to
be more accurate than an individual trial verdict for many mass tort
cases.45 If this argument is correct, it should allay much of the concern
about sampling. Unfortunately, however, the argument is flawed. Saks
and Blanck do well to remind us that the results generated by individ-
ual trials, like the results from sampling, are merely approximations of
actual damages for each case. But, as they also recognize, the important
question is which approach-sampling or individual trial-gives a bet-
ter approximation. The fact is that, in many mass tort aggregations, an
individual trial will give a more accurate verdict than sampling for at
least some cases. This is especially true for sample averaging discussed
in this section. But it is also true for the more powerful-and more
expensive-technique of regression analysis discussed in the following
section, since any cost-effective regression procedure has to ignore many
damage-related variables.
The normative significance of sampling's error depends, however,
on the goals of the substantive law and the function of procedure. For
example, if each plaintiff has a substantive right to compensation in the
amount of actual harm, then sampling must be justified even if it in-
creases error in only one case. These normative issues are addressed in
45. See note 14 and accompanying text.
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Part III.C. The purpose of the following discussion is to show that there
is reason to reach the normative issues because of sampling's effect on
the error rate.
The logic of the Saks and Blanck argument for the sample average
can be summarized in the following way:4
1. If all cases in the larger population are identical, that is, per-
fectly homogeneous with respect to damage-related variables, then try-
ing a sample of, say, 100 cases is equivalent to trying any individual
case in the larger population 100 times.
2. If the same case were tried 100 times, the average of the 100
verdicts would more closely approximate the correct damages figure
than any of the 100 verdicts taken separately. The reason is that the
averaging process cancels out much of the extreme variation, eliminat-
ing unusually high and unusually low verdicts.
3. It follows that if the population is perfectly homogeneous, the
average of the 100 sample verdicts will more closely approximate the
correct damages figure for any case in the population than the verdict
from an individual trial of that case.
4. If the case population is not perfectly homogeneous, the same
conclusion holds true so long as the variation is not too great and the
sample size is large enough. Furthermore, as a population's variance in-
creases, a larger sample size can help offset the larger error.4
The problem with this argument is easy to see. The first three pro-
positions, although true, are not significant because real case aggrega-
tions are not perfectly homogeneous and because sampling would be
unnecessary if they were.48 The fourth proposition does all the work,
but it is incomplete at best and in some respects flawed. For a
nonhomogeneous population, it does not take much variation before the
sample average is likely to give an estimate of actual damages that is
inferior to a trial verdict for at least one case.
This result follows from a straightforward statistical property of
sampling: a sample average lies close to the population mean, and the
46. For the clearest account, see Saks and Blanck, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 833-37 (cited in note
14).
47. Unfortunately, Professors Saks and Blanck are not as clear as they could be about the
precise effect of increasing sample size. They state that as population variance increases, sample
size should be increased in order to "reflect the population accurately." Id. at 842, 847. The prob-
lem is that the representativeness of a sample does not necessarily have anything to do with the
accuracy of the sample average as an estimate of actual damages. Nevertheless, in the context of
the argument as a whole, it seems fair to conclude that Saks and Blanck believe there is some
positive correlation between sample size and accuracy of estimate for heterogeneous populations.
48. If there were perfect homogeneity, there would be no problem with mass tort litigation
from the point of view of outcome accuracy. If all cases were identical, then the trial of any one
would be just as good as the trial of any other, and the aggregation could be easily adjudicated
with a simple class action.
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larger the sample size, the closer the average is to the mean.4 9 Thus, the
more distant a case is from the population mean on the distribution,
the more likely it is that a trial verdict in that case will be a better
estimate of actual damages than the sample average. A larger sample
size makes matters worse by driving the sample average closer to the
population mean and further from cases not lying at the mean.50
Courts can address this problem to some extent by sampling from
more homogeneous subgroups and eliminating extreme cases from the
aggregation. Gathering the necessary information is costly, however,
and there are limits to how well a judge can determine actual damages
and identify extreme cases without a trial. Thus, no matter how careful
a judge is-and costs limit how careful she can be-she will seldom be
able to guarantee that the sample average is at least as accurate as an
49. For a discussion of the statistical properties of a sample average, see Paul G. Hoel, Intro-
duction To Mathematical Statistics 101-08 (Wiley, 2d ed. 1954).




In this graph, "u" is the population mean, and "x" is the actual damages figure for a case
having damages above the population mean. "S" is the distribution curve of sample averages. The
mean of the curve S is at y, and the curve shows the probability of any sample average lying within
a specified range of p. S hugs the population mean, as it should for any sizable sample. "E" is the
error distribution curve of trial verdicts for the case with actual damages x. In other words, E
shows the probability of obtaining a verdict within any specified range of x.
A quick look at the graph clearly shows that a trial verdict in a case x is much more likely to
come close to actual damages than the sample average. The area B under the curve S represents
the probability that any sample average will fall somewhere between x - a and x+a. The area A
under the curve E represents the probability that a trial verdict will fall somewhere in the same
interval, x - a to x+a. Obviously, area A is much larger than area B, showing that an individual
trial verdict is a much better estimate of actual damages than the sample average.
As sample size increases, S hugs u ever more closely, which means that the area B gets smaller.
The area A stays the same, however. Thus, the superiority of a trial verdict increases as sample
size increases.
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individual trial verdict for every case in the population. For sampling to
be useful in large-scale litigation, therefore, its tendency to under- and
overcompensate must be justified.
Saks and Blanck recognize this problem. They note that "at some
point along the heterogeneity-homogeneity continuum, aggregation
ceases to improve the accuracy of individual trials and becomes a vitia-
tion."51 Given their broad accuracy claims, however, Saks and Blanck
must believe that few aggregations will reach this cutoff point and,
more importantly, that courts will be able to determine reliably and at
reasonable cost which cases do and which do not. But they give no rea-
son to accept these assumptions, and there are reasons to doubt that
the assumptions hold true very often.
To illustrate, suppose that there are 1000 cases in the total popula-
tion and that average damages equals $500,000 with actual damages
distributed as follows:5 2
Actual Damages Number of Cases









Suppose further that there is a ninety-five percent chance that a jury
verdict in any individual case will deviate from true damages by less
than $80,000 (that is, that the standard deviation of the error distribu-
51. Saks and Blanck, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 837 (cited in note 14); see also id. at 845-46 (offering
a more detailed discussion of this point).
52. This example assumes that all cases have nonzero damages. It is worth recalling, how-
ever, that Judge Parker in Cimino allowed the.juries in the sample cases to adjudicate contributory
negligence issues, and he treated cases of contributory negligence as zero-damage cases when calcu-
lating the sample average. See 751 F. Supp. at 658-59. Including zero-damage cases reduces the
average and increases the variance, which further undermines sample accuracy. For example, sup-
pose that a population of 1000 cases includes two types of cases: 900 cases with true damages of
$500,000, and 100 cases with true damages of zero dollars due to contributory negligence. In this
example, the population is perfectly homogeneous but for the presence of 100 zero-damage con-
tributory negligence cases. Assuming a $40,000 standard deviation for the error distribution and a
sample size of 100 (the same assumptions used in the example given in the text), the probability
that a trial verdict in a $500,000, case will lie between $465,000 and $535,000 is roughly .61, and
the probability that the sample average will lie in the same range is only .16. Thus, the odds are
about eight times greater that the trial verdict will fall in this range. (Odds equal the ratio of the
probability of an event happening to the probability of it not happening.)
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tion equals $40,000).2 If a sample of 100 cases is drawn randomly from
this population and each case is tried, it is extremely likely that the
average of the trial verdicts will lie somewhere between $485,134 and
$514,866.5" This implies that there is a ninety-five percent chance that
the sample average will be less accurate than an individual trial verdict
for 250 cases-those with damages less than or equal to $400,000 and
53. I also assume that error is distributed independently of true damages so that the error
distribution is the same for all cases. If this were not so-if, for example, a jury was able to deter-
mine damages more accurately in extreme cases-the risk of error would be lower for cases at the
tails of the distribution and the superiority of an individual trial verdict would be even more pro-
nounced for those cases than it is in my hypothetical.
My assumption of $40,000 for the standard deviation is to some extent arbitrary, but nothing
much turns on the choice. As the analysis in this Part shows, even if the actual standard deviation
is much larger than $40,000, there is still a significant probability that in many case populations an
individual trial verdict will be more accurate than the sample average for at least one case, espe-
cially in view of the practical impediments to assuring population homogeneity. See notes 57-64
and accompanying text. In any event, a $40,000 standard deviation is intuitively plausible for a
reasonably accurate factfinder. Although we do not know very much about jury performance, the
evidence indicates that juries make a concerted effort to reach an accurate result and do a pretty
good job in the process. See Kevin M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge:
Transcending Empiricism, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1124, 1151-55 (1992) (stating that "evaluated over
the run of cases, juries are good factfinders"); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything
About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1147, 1236-
39 (1992) (reviewing the data and concluding that "juries are one of our society's most reliable
decision-making institutions"). While empirical evidence points to wide variation in jury verdicts
and suggests that error is responsible for some of -that variation, none of the evidence quantifies
the precise magnitude of error in the sense that interests us-namely, the risk of deviating from
"true" damages. See Blumstein, Bovbjerg, and Sloan, 8 Yale J. Reg. at 174-76 (cited in note 13);
Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan, and James F. Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb in Tort:
Scheduling "Pain and Suffering", 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 908, 919-24 (1989). See also Randall R.
Bovbjerg, Juries and Justice: Are Malpractice and Other Personal Injuries Created Equal?, 54 L.
& Contemp. Probs. 5, 35-39 (Winter 1991) (concluding that some of the variation in damage
awards as between medical malpractice and other types of torts is due to "sympathy" factors);
James K. Hammitt, Stephen J. Carroll, and Daniel A. Relles, Tort Standards and Jury Decisions,
14 J. Legal Stud. 751, 753-56 (1985) (concluding that juries return larger awards against "deep
pocket" defendants). For example, a frequently cited study shows rather extreme variation con-
trols for only one variable, severity of injury, and averages over other relevant factors such as age,
jurisdiction, pre-injury earnings and the like. Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. at
923-24, 929, 938.
54. Using the formula for calculating standard deviation, it is easy to verify that the standard
deviation of damages for the total population, call it a., equals $62,650. Moreover, my hypothe-
sized 95% accuracy rate for an individual trial verdict lying within $80,000 of the true figure im-
plies that the trial error distribution has a standard deviation, call it a, equal to $40,000. Part A of
the Mathematical Appendix shows that the standard deviation of the distribution of sample aver-
ages, call it as, is given by the following formula, where m is the sample size:
2 x + _ 2
m
Applying this formula to the hypothetical, in which m=100, gives a standard deviation of $7433
for the average of 100 sample verdicts. This implies that there is a 95% chance that the average of
any set of 100 sample verdicts will lie somewhere between $485,134 and $514,866.
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those with damages greater than or equal to $600,000. 55 In particular,
this means that the sample average will almost certainly undercompen-
sate those plaintiffs with $600,000 and $700,000 actual damages as com-
pared to an individual trial verdict. Indeed, even if trial error increases
from $80,000 to $178,000 (that is, the standard deviation of the error
distribution increases from $40,000 to $89,000), there is still a ninety-
five percent chance that a trial verdict will be more accurate for each of
the ten cases at the extreme ends of the distribution. 6
If one allows probabilities lower than ninety-five percent, the con-
clusion holds true for an even larger number of cases. For example, if
one required only that it be more likely than not-i.e., greater than fifty
percent-that a trial verdict be superior to the sample average, all the
$450,000 and $550,000 cases would be included at the $80,000 error
level. 5 7
Because of uncertainty about the precise distribution of actual
damages, one can never be absolutely certain that an aggregation is free
of extreme cases. As a result, even for nearly homogeneous populations
and very large trial error, there normally will be some positive
probability that a trial verdict would be more accurate than the sample
average for at least one case. Even a small probability means that par-
55. The $40,000 standard deviation for the error distribution implies that there is a .9545
probability that an individual trial verdict will be within $80,000 of the true figure. Consider the
cases with actual damages of $600,000. The probability of the sample average falling below
$520,000 (and thus being more than $80,000 from the true damages figure) is about .9954. Thus,
the probability of both events occurring, that is, the sample average being less than $520,000 and
an individual trial verdict falling within $80,000 of the true damages figure (and thus being a
better estimate than the sample average) is the product of the separate probabilities-.9545 x
.9954 = .95 or 95%. Because the distribution is perfectly symmetric, the same is true for the
$400,000 cases. Furthermore, in a similar manner one can calculate the corresponding probabilities
for the $300,000 and $700,000 cases, which exceed .9999 or 99.99%.
Stated differently, for 250 cases, it is more than 200 times more likely that an individual trial
verdict will fall somewhere within $80,000 of actual damages than that the sample average will.
56. As I am using the concept, a trial error of $178,000 for a $300,000 case means that there
is a 95% chance that a jury will return a verdict somewhere between $122,000 and $478,000. In
fact, even if trial error increases to $300,000, it will be roughly 12 times more likely that an individ-
ual trial verdict will fall within $175,500 of actual damages than the sample average for the ten
extreme cases.
For this hypothetical I have chosen a distribution of cases that is reasonably homogeneous.
The argument for using the sample average only gets weaker as the population variance increases
and as sampla size increases for any given population variance.
57. This means that individual trials would be superior for a total of 700 cases or 70% of the
original population. Furthermore, trial error could increase to $177,540 (i.e., the standard deviation
of the error distribution could increase from $40,000 to $88,770) without altering the superiority
conclusion for 250 cases-those with actual damages greater than or equal to $600,000 and less
than or equal to $400,000. The error risk could increase even more, of course, if we were concerned
only about the 10 cases at the extreme ends of the distribution.
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ties face a risk they would not have to face without sampling, and im-
posing that risk requires justification.5
Increasing sample size only exacerbates these problems by driving
the sample average closer to the population mean. For example, if sam-
ple size is increased from 100 to 400 in our hypothetical, there is a sev-
enty percent chance that an individual trial verdict would do better
than the sample average for a total of 700 cases, including those with
actual damages of $450,000 and $550,000. 5'
These problems can be reduced to some extent by the use of strati-
fied sampling.60 As Judge Parker did in Cimino, a court could divide
the population into subgroups selected to minimize intragroup variance
and sample from each subgroup separately.6' Stratified sampling cannot
cure all problems, however. As Saks and Blanck recognize, the approach
requires a great deal of information about the distribution of damages
in the overall population, and this information can be difficult and
costly to obtain.62 In our hypothetical, for example, a judge might be
58. Furthermore, it is doubtful that sampling in a case like Cimino will eliminate much of
the error caused by jury consideration of improper factors, such as deep pockets or sympathetic
plaintiffs. See generally Bovbjerg, 54 L. & Contemp. Probs. at 5 (cited in note 53) (concluding that
unobservable sympathy factors affect awards); Hammitt, Carroll, and Relles, 14 J. Legal Stud. at
751 (cited in note 53) (concluding that awards are larger for deep pocket defendants). These cases
all involve the same injurious agent, the same general type of conduct on the part of defendants,
and a similar set of causal events. Furthermore, all the defendants are major corporations with
insurance and potentially deep pockets, and jury sympathy is likely to favor plaintiffs in most
cases, although it might vary somewhat from case to case. This means that if improper factors
affect jury awards in the sample cases, those factors are likely to skew all the awards in the same
direction, thereby skewing the sample average as well. Thus, greater population homogeneity is
likely to exacerbate rather than eliminate the influence of improper factors.
59. Fixing the population standard deviation at $62,650 and setting the standard deviation of
the error distribution equal to $40,000, an increase in sample size from 100 cases to 400 cases
reduces the standard deviation of the sample mean, a., from $7433 to $3716. Furthermore, with a
$40,000 error standard deviation, there is a .7063 probability that an individual trial verdict for a
$550,000 case will fall somewhere between $508,000 and $592,000 (that is, fall within $42,000 of the
true figure). With a sample mean standard deviation of $3716, there is a .984 probability that the
sample average will be less than $508,000 (that is, fall short of true damages by more than
$42,000). Thus, the probability that both facts will hold true is .7063 x .984 = .695 or almost 70%.
By symmetry, the same is true for the $450,000 cases.
60. Saks and Blanck, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 844-47 (cited in note 14).
61. Saks and Blanck note the availability of statistical techniques such as cluster analysis
that can minimize variance through stratification. Id. at 845.
62. Id. at 844. Before deciding on sampling, Judge Parker attempted a lump-sum damages
procedure in the Cimino cases only to be reversed by the Fifth Circuit. See id. at 823 n.65 (describ-
ing these events). As a result, Judge Parker had collected extensive information on the characteris-
tics of the overall case population that he could use when considering an appropriate sampling
procedure.
At times, Saks and Blanck seem to assume that a court will be able to obtain extremely accu-
rate information about individual cases in the population without conducting trials. I am not con-
vinced. See, for example, id. at 845 n.190 (suggesting that zero-damage, no-liability cases could be
handled by grouping them into a separate subgroup but leaving unexplained how a court is sup-
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able to separate the $300,000 and $700,000 cases from the rest of the
population if she could obtain enough information on individual case
variables to identify extreme cases reliably, but she would have a great
deal of difficulty distinguishing the $400,000 from the $450,000 cases
and the $600,000 from the $550,000 cases.6 In addition, the more sub-
groups the court creates, the smaller each subgroup must be. And the
smaller a subgroup, the less reliable the sampling procedure and the
larger a sample has to be to provide reliable information about the
overall population."
In sum, sample averaging is not a costless way to handle the mass
tort litigation problem, even from the perspective of outcome quality.
This is not to say that for particular damage and trial error distribu-
tions sampling might not improve on accuracy. In more situations than
Saks and Blanck care to admit, however, sampling is likely to increase
the error risk significantly for at least one case and often for many
more. At the same time, of course, sampling reduces total litigation
costs. Whether sampling is desirable on balance is a normative question
that depends on the purpose of adjudication. I discuss this question in
Part III.C. below after examining other features of sampling.
2. Linear Regression Over a Sample as a Measure of True Damages
Statistical theory provides more powerful instruments than averag-
ing for extrapolating from a sample to a larger population. For example,
some commentators recommend using regression analysis.65 While it
tends to generate results closer to actual damages, regression is similar
to sample averaging in one respect: it purchases litigation economy at
the price of larger error.
The statistical details of regression analysis are quite complex, but
the basic concept is relatively simple." I shall focus on the most com-
posed to determine which of the cases are no-liability cases); id. at 843 (noting that the relevant
population parameters were known in Cimino and that they did not have to be inferred without
explaining why then there was any need to sample at all).
63. Nor does this consider the possibility that a single decisionmaker, such as a judge or
special master, might be less accurate than a multimember jury using a majority or consensus
decision rule. Compare Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96
Yale L. J. 82, 97-100 (1986) (showing that a majority vote rule can make multimember appellate
courts more accurate than single decisionmakers).
64. See Saks and Blanck, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 845 (cited in note 14).
65. Although Saks and Blanck defend use of the sample mean, they also note the availability
of regression techniques. See id. at 850-51. At the Litigation Section panel devoted to the Cimino
case and sampling, held at the 1992 AALS conference in San Antonio, one of the commentators,
Professor David Barnes, recommended using a regression model instead of sample averaging.
66. For a mathematical discussion of basic regression theory, see Hoel, Mathematical Statis-
tics at 125-36, 147, 152-60 (cited in note 49); D. L. Harnett and A. K. Soni, Statistical Methods
For Business and Economics, 443-84, 515-27 (4th ed. 1991).
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monly used model, linear regression. Linear regression uses sample data
to construct an equation that expresses a linear relationship between
one variable, such as the correct damages amount, and other variables
correlated with it, such as the plaintiff's age, previous health history,
future lost earnings, and medical expenses. For example, a linear regres-
sion equation relating actual damages ("y") to plaintiff's age ("x1 ") and
prior health history (indexed by the variable "x," with higher values
signifying better health) might look like this:
y = 50,000x2 - 750x1 + 125,000
According to this equation, actual damages decrease with increas-
ing age and increase with better pre-disease health records. For exam-
ple, assume that prior health is ranked on a scale from one to five and
that a hypothetical plaintiff is ranked at two. If this plaintiff were fifty-
five years old at the time her disease first appeared, the equation would
give damages equal to $183,750.7
There are two crucial points to realize about any regression equa-
tion: (1) it can give a less accurate estimate of actual damages than an
individual trial verdict; and (2) it works only if accurate values can be
assigned to the independent variables (x, and x. in the hypothetical).
Every regression equation contains two sources of error: sampling error
and unexplained error.68 Sampling error exists because regression relies
on a sample rather than the entire population, and this error ap-
proaches zero as sample size increases. Unexplained error, on the other
hand, is not affected by sample size. It exists because no set of indepen-
dent variables can possibly explain all of the relevant variation.6 9 One
can reduce unexplained error only by including more variables in the
regression equation. But there is a problem. The more variables one
67. In other words, (50,000 x 2) - (750 x 55) + 125,000 = $183,750.
68. Statisticians refer to sampling error as the "explained deviation" and to what I call unex-
plained error as the "unexplained deviation." The statistical measure of sampling error is known
as the "sum of squares regression" ("SSR") and the statistical measure of unexplained error is
known as the "sum of squares error" ("SSE"). Total variation, or the "sum of squares total," is the
sum of SSR and SSE. See, for example, Harnett and Soni, Statistical Methods at 465-69, 520-21
(cited in note 66).
69. As an example, consider our hypothetical regression equation. Because there are numer-
ous variables other than age and prior health history that affect damages, this equation is likely to
have a large unexplained error. In fact, there are two kinds of variables that can influence damages
verdicts: those that correlate with actual damages (such as age and prior health history) and those
that correlate with jury decisions in general (such as jury competence, attorney demeanor, and
maybe even courtroom temperature). Because the goal is to measure actual damages, one should
ignore the second set of variables when constructing a regression equation. If this is done, the
regression estimate will average over the legally irrelevant variance. One should try, however, to
include as many of the damage-related variables as possible. Ignoring even one of these variables
introduces an error risk the magnitude of which depends on how strongly the excluded variable
correlates with actual damages.
1993]
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includes, the more measurements one must make, and the more mea-
surements, the greater the measurement error and the higher the cost.
The fact that regression is not perfectly accurate is hardly signifi-
cant standing alone. In order to evaluate regression relative to individ-
ual trials, one must compare trial error to total regression error, which
includes sampling error, unexplained error, and measurement error. Be-
cause this comparison depends on the particular regression equation
and the distribution of damages and trial error in the population, it is
impossible to say with confidence that regression produces at least as
accurate an outcome as an individual trial for all case aggregations. Fur-
thermore, absent some way for a court to distinguish between those sit-
uations in which regression is at least as good and those in which it is
not, it is also impossible to defend regression as equivalent or superior
to individual trials for any particular case aggregation.
There is also reason to doubt the accuracy of regression in mass
tort cases. Any regression procedure that significantly reduces costs
would have to ignore variables that are difficult to measure without an
expensive factual inquiry. If variables of this kind correlate strongly
with actual damages-as is likely to be the case for serious forms of
injury in mass tort cases-the regression equation will have a large un-
explained error. In an asbestos case, for example, the amount of indi-
vidual damages depends on a number of complex and often hotly
contested variables, such as exposure to carcinogens other than asbestos
and the degree to which they contributed to the injury, the degree of
exposure to asbestos itself, the actual severity of the disease, the
amount of future lost earnings, and the degree of mental anguish suf-
fered by the plaintiff. If some of these variables are ignored because of
cost, the resulting unexplained error, combined with sampling and mea-
surement error, may well exceed individual trial error.
So far, we have examined regression in a case like Cimino, where
the sample is drawn from an aggregation of pending cases. Regression
can be performed on other databases as well. Whatever form it takes,
however, the use of regression involves a potential tradeoff between
economy and outcome accuracy.
For example, the proposal of Professors Abraham and Robinson7
regresses over historical data consisting of settlements and jury verdicts
reached in earlier cases. Once enough early cases have been adjudicated
to comprise a statistically significant sample, Abraham and Robinson
would construct claim profiles that specify damages (the dependent va-
riable) for different types of cases defined by severity of injury, type of
disease, type of occupation, and the like (the independent variables).
70. See notes 7, 41 and accompanying text.
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With claim profiles in hand, the task of a jury in a subsequent case
would be greatly simplified. Under one version of the Abraham-Robin-
son proposal, the jury need only determine the appropriate claim profile
for the particular case and then award damages equal to average or me-
dian damages for cases belonging to that profile. 1
This proposal has much to commend it. Nevertheless, as Professors
Abraham and Robinson themselves recognize,7 2 the approach can ad-
versely affect outcome accuracy compared to the result of an individual
trial.7 3 For example, there is no way to avoid the error inherent in mea-
suring independent variables for a particular case, especially if the ob-
jective is to reduce litigation costs. Furthermore, in order to make a
profile system workable, independent variables must be limited to a
small and relatively manageable set. But then unexplained error can be
quite large. 4
B. The Indirect Effects of Sampling on Outcome Accuracy
Cimino-style sampling also can indirectly produce adverse outcome
effects by distorting litigation incentives. Saks and Blanck ignore these
possible effects and thus overlook an important source of outcome er-
ror. The problems arise because sampling creates free-rider effects and
generates externalities that can affect litigation investment in an asym-
metric way. Assuming, as is common in the literature, that differences
in litigation investment favor the party who invests more, the resulting
71. This is the variant of their proposal that would make the claim profile conclusive on the
jury. See Robinson and Abraham, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 1494-95 (cited in note 7).
72. See id. at 1503-04, 1508-09.
73. Indeed, Abraham and Robinson defend their proposal on normative grounds that at-
tempt to account for the potential skewing effect on outcome. Id. at 1507-17. I shall examine some
of these arguments later in this Article.
74. The Abraham-Robinson proposal also suffers from some potential problems not shared
by Cimino-style sampling. For one thing, it is not clear that the early cases will necessarily reflect a
random sample of the larger case population. If factors such as severity of injury, amount of litiga-
tion resources, and likelihood of success correlate with early fling and disposition, then regression
could produce skewed damage awards. Furthermore, the defendant may have strong incentives to
skew the initial cases toward the low end, see note 76, thereby exacerbating the sampling problem.
In addition, mixing settlements and trial verdicts in the same database may create other
problems. See Abraham and Robinson, 53 L. & Contemp. Probs. at 145-46 (cited in note 7) (noting
some potential problems with mixing trial verdicts and settlements). Settlements are influenced by
a number of factors other than the expected trial verdict, including the transaction costs of trial
versus settlement and the parties' relative bargaining power and strategic skill. Thus, settlements
and trial verdicts measure different things, and it is not at all clear that the two should be com-
bined in the same database. But see Robinson and Abraham, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 1490-91 (cited in
note 7) (justifying combination as a way to generate a market value for the claims). Indeed, it can
be argued that the only proper measure of damages is the trial verdict because only the trial ver-
dict reflects the considered judgment of neutral decisionmakers about "true" damages, those corre-
sponding to the parties' legal rights.
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asymmetry will increase the error risk by systematically skewing the
outcome in favor of one side."
I assume for purposes of the following discussion that the judge has
decided to average sample verdicts, as Judge Parker did in Cimino. I
focus on sample averaging rather than regression for several reasons.
The points are easier to see with the more straightforward averaging
technique; courts may continue to use averaging in view of regression's
much higher costs, and as we shall see in Part III.C., some normative
theories call for the use of sample averaging rather than regression.
Nevertheless, regression also creates incentive problems. Although it
can reduce free-riding by giving verdicts closer to actual damages, re-
gression cannot eliminate free-riding completely, and it does nothing
about the adverse incentive effects of the different cost allocation
schemes discussed below. A court using regression over a Cimino-type
sample, therefore, should be sensitive to the same risks and follow the
same recommendations that are discussed below for sample averaging."
The severity of the litigation incentive problem depends on two
factors: whether the sampling procedure gives sample cases their own
trial verdicts or the sample average and how the procedure allocates the
total litigation costs incurred by sample plaintiffs. The following matrix
distinguishes four different arrangements:
75. For a general treatment of these effects, see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law 532-33, 543-44 (Little, Brown, 3d ed. 1986); Stephen J. Spurr, An Economic Analysis of Col-
lateral Estoppel, 11 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 47 (1991).
76. As Professors Abraham and Robinson recognize, their claim-profile approach can also
generate adverse incentives. See Abraham and Robinson, 53 L. & Contemp. Probs. at 145 (cited in
note 7). To see this, suppose that a company expects to be a defendant in most, if not all, asbestos
suits, and suppose that this same company also expects that a claim profile approach will be used
instead of individualized litigation, beginning at some future time. This company will have an
incentive to conduct the early litigation in a way that minimizes its liability under the anticipated
claim profiles. For example, the company will be inclined to delay high damage cases as long as
possible by insisting on trial and refusing settlement, while at the same time settling the low dam-
ages cases for as little as possible. Of course, the company will face attorneys who are also likely to
be repeat players with the opposite set of incentives. The resulting equilibrium is uncertain. The
opposing strategies might counteract each other, or the impact on claim profiles may be too atten-
uated to justify large investments in strategic behavior. See id. (making these points). But neither
of these results is certain. It is also possible that the equilibrium will result in claim profiles
skewed in a low direction, especially in view of litigation asymmetries (in both access to resources
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To begin the analysis, assume that sample plaintiffs are all repre-
sented by different attorneys and the attorneys litigate exclusively in
their clients' best interests. (We shall modify these assumptions later to
take better account of the realities of mass tort litigation.) Under these
simplifying assumptions, Arrangements I and II skew litigation invest-
ment choices strongly in defendant's favor, whereas Arrangement IV
skews the choices in plaintiff's favor. Arrangement III balances incen-
tives across the party line and is likely to be the best of the four alter-
natives. These results suggest that a sampling procedure should average
total litigation costs over the entire plaintiff population and give sample
plaintiffs the average verdict rather than their own trial verdicts.77
To see why Arrangement I creates asymmetry, consider the impact
of its damages and cost allocation rules on a plaintiff deciding how
much to invest in litigation. The plaintiff knows that she cannot cap-
ture the entire marginal benefit from a unit of litigation investment un-
less all other sample plaintiffs invest at a similar level. Because she
receives the sample average, any marginal increase in her own verdict
will be averaged over all sample cases. The plaintiff is also aware that
she benefits from investments made by other sample plaintiffs because
larger verdicts in other cases produce a larger sample average. As a re-
sult of these factors, the plaintiff is likely to invest at a lower level than
77. Although Judge Parker's opinion in Cimino makes clear that he gave each sample plain-
tiff her own trial verdict, see 751 F. Supp. at 653, the opinion does not reveal how the judge
distributed litigation costs. If he forced each litigating plaintiff to bear her own costs, his approach
would correspond to Arrangement H, which has serious drawbacks. On the other hand, spreading
litigation costs would identify his approach with Arrangement IV, which although much better
than II, may be inferior to Arrangement I, depending on contingency fee and multiple represen-
tation factors. See notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
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she would if her case were not tied to other cases in the sample. Fur-
thermore, the larger the sample, the lower her individual investment is
likely to be.
Although the defendant's marginal benefit in any one case is di-
luted through sample averaging in the same way as plaintiff's, the de-
fendant has an advantage. Because the defendant is a party to all the
cases, its marginal benefit from investment in any one case is multiplied
over all cases in the population. Thus, defendant should invest at a
higher level than plaintiff. 8
The precise magnitude of the investment differential depends on
the strategic interaction between the two parties, which in turn depends
on how the expected verdict varies with investment amount-in other
words, on each party's payoff from litigation investment. For a large
population these interaction effects should create one of two equilib-
rium outcomes depending on the payoff functions: (1) both parties in-
vest at a low level relative to the amount at stake, and defendant
invests more than plaintiff; or (2) plaintiff invests at a low level, and
defendant invests at a high level. 9 In either case the error risk is likely
to be much higher than it would be in an individual case not tied to
others through sampling.8 0
Arrangement III eliminates this asymmetry and creates incentives
in equilibrium for both parties to invest at a high level. To see why,
consider how the change in approach alters the marginal benefit analy-
78. The net effect is to increase defendant's marginal benefit relative to an individual trial by
a factor equal to the ratio of the total number of cases (which multiplies the marginal benefit) to
the number of cases in the sample (which divides the marginal benefit).
79. By "equilibrium" I mean the game theoretic concept of a Nash equilibrium, where each
party's investment strategy is a best response to the investment strategies chosen by all other
parties. See Myerson, Game Theory at 91-98 (cited in note 39). In the Mathematical Appendix, I
model the investment problem with a simple payoff function that makes the amount of the verdict
depend on plaintiff's fraction of total litigation investment. This model predicts that a defendant
operating under Arrangement I will invest an amount in equilibrium equal to n times plaintiff's
investment, where n is the total number of cases in the population. Thus, if there are 1000 cases,
defendant will invest 1000 times the amount plaintiff invests. Moreover, this analysis also shows
that, assuming all sample plaintiffs and the defendant are equally efficient and effective litigators
(i.e., that k = 1 as k is defined in the Appendix), plaintiff will invest in equilibrium approximately
1/nm of the total amount at stake, where n is the size of the population and m is the size of the
sample. Thus, for 200 cases each worth $1,000,000 and a sample size of 10, this analysis predicts
that each of the 10 litigating plaintiffs will invest $495, and the defendant will invest $99,000 in
each case. For a more extensive analysis of this example, see Part B of the Mathematical
Appendix.
80. If all plaintiffs are risk neutral, have the same actual damages at stake, and are equally
efficient litigators, they are identically situated and by symmetry they should all adopt the same
low-investment strategy in equilibrium. If plaintiffs have different actual damages, those with
more at stake ought to invest more in equilibrium, assuming that plaintiff and defendant have the
same information about actual damages. However, defendant will also invest more in those cases
that have more at stake, and therefore the asymmetry should persist.
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sis. Because sample plaintiffs continue to receive the sample average
and because the new cost allocation scheme does not affect the defend-
ant, defendant's marginal benefit remains the same as in Arrangement
I. Averaging litigation costs, however, multiplies plaintiff's marginal
benefit by the number of cases in the population, giving each plaintiff
exactly the same multiplier advantage as the defendant.
Furthermore, because each party receives more marginal benefit
from a unit of litigation investment than if the case were adjudicated in
isolation, each can expect the other to invest at a higher level than she
would if the case were not tied to other cases. If each party responds by
investing at a higher level, then expectations will match reality and the
strategies will be in equilibrium. Thus, both parties should invest at a
high level."1
The analysis changes when the initial assumptions about attorney
representation and plaintiff control are relaxed. In large-scale mass tort
litigation, attorneys take cases on contingency, and they are likely to
run the litigation primarily with an eye toward maximizing their own
fees net of costs, rather than their client's damage recovery.8 2 Further-
more, attorney representation of plaintiffs often overlaps, as attorneys
operating on contingency try to capitalize on expertise by taking large
numbers of clients."5 Thus, sample plaintiffs in these cases are likely to
fall into different groups characterized by common representation. In-
81. Using the same marginal benefit analysis, it is easy to see that Arrangement II skews
litigation incentives in defendant's favor although less severely than does Arrangement I and that
Arrangement IV skews incentives in plaintiff's favor. Even though both skew incentives, Arrange-
ment II may be more troubling than Arrangement IV because II's allocation rules can encourage
plaintiffs to invest at low levels relative to the amount at stake. By contrast, Arrangement IV's
rules should encourage both parties to invest at a high level under most sampling scenarios. Thus,
Arrangement IV's asymmetry may not seriously affect outcome accuracy if one assumes that litiga-
tion investment is subject to declining marginal returns. See Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257, 265 (1974); Thomas D. Rowe,
Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 L. & Contemp. Probs. 139, 143 (Winter
1984). If there is little to gain from more investment once one is already investing at a high level,
asymmetries ought not affect error rate significantly. For an analysis, see Part B of the Mathemati-
cal Appendix.
A high level of litigation investment is not always desirable, of course. Investment in litigation
is a social cost, and it is justified only to the extent it creates social benefits that exceed the cost.
The analysis presented here focuses on avoiding serious asymmetries and undesirably low levels of
litigation investment.
82. See Hensler, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 92-97 (cited in note 39); see also Macey and Miller, 58
U. Chi. L. Rev. at 12-27 (cited in note 38) (noting how attorneys control class actions as entrepre-
neurs furthering their own interests); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Liti-
gation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 883-
89 (1987) (same). Although the large amount at stake for each plaintiff makes client monitoring
more likely in mass tort cases than in small-claimant class actions, there are other obstacles that
make monitoring extremely unlikely even when the size of the claim is large. See id. at 877.
83. See Hensler, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 96-97 (cited in note 39).
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deed, the Cimino litigation almost certainly involved contingency fee
arrangements, and it was rife with multiple representation. 4
Taking account of contingency fees and multiple representation al-
ters the marginal cost-benefit analysis and thus also the relative merits
of the different allocation schemes. Nevertheless, it is not likely to dis-
turb the superiority of Arrangement III for many cases, and it certainly
does not change the basic conclusion that sampling rules must be
designed with incentive effects in mind.
To see these points, first consider the effect of adding only contin-
gency fees and attorney control to the analysis (in other words, assume
that all sample plaintiffs are represented by different attorneys). A con-
tingency fee makes the attorney's marginal benefit from a unit of litiga-
tion investment less than plaintiff's, and thus the attorney's investment
incentives lower. Lower attorney incentives have a different impact
under the different Arrangements. They exacerbate the adverse out-
come effects of Arrangement I and Arrangement II by enhancing de-
fendant-favoring asymmetries, and they break the symmetry of
Arrangement III, thereby giving an advantage to the defendant. But re-
duced incentives on plaintiff's side improve matters under Arrangement
IV by mitigating the plaintiff-favoring asymmetry.
Nevertheless, for most contingency arrangements and for samples
of a statistically significant size, Arrangement III should continue to be
superior to Arrangement IV. This is so because Arrangement IV's asym-
metry is a function of sample size reduced by the contingency factor,
while Arrangement III's newly created asymmetry depends only on the
contingency. With a sample size of sixty and a typical contingency of
one-third, for example, Arrangement IV's residual asymmetry should
depend on a factor of twenty (sixty multiplied by one-third), while Ar-
rangement III's newly created asymmetry should depend only on a fac-
tor of three.8 5
84. See Jack Ratliff, Special Master's Report in Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 10 Rev.
Litig. 521, 524 (1991) (observing that the Cimino cases were controlled by a few law firms).
85. In Part B of the Mathematical Appendix, I show how a focus on the attorney alters
incentives under a relatively simple litigation investment model. In particular, the model predicts
that a one-third contingency will cause a plaintiff to invest one-third of what defendant invests in
equilibrium if Arrangement III's rules are followed. However, under Arrangement IV, a plaintiff
will invest m/3 times the amount defendant invests, where m is the sample size. To illustrate,
suppose there are 1000 cases each worth $1,000,000 and a sample of 50 cases is drawn at random
from the population. Suppose further that all sample plaintiffs and the defendant are equally effi-
cient and effective litigators (i.e., assume k = 1, as k is defined in the Appendix). The model
predicts that a plaintiff acting under Arrangement I will invest $1.25 million while a defendant
will invest $3.75 million in equilibrium, and a plaintiff acting under Arrangement IV will invest
$17.8 million while a defendant will invest $1.07 million in equilibrium. In this example Arrange-
ment III encourages each party to invest at a high level and achieves greater equality across the
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Adding multiple representation to the mix, however, can make Ar-
rangement IV more attractive than Arrangement III for some cases. An
attorney representing more than one sample plaintiff will manage her
portfolio of sample cases as a unit and thus adopt a strategy that maxi-
mizes her expected net gain overall. This should not change the analysis
for Arrangement III because the increase in total costs should offset the
increase in stakes. But under Arrangement IV, multiple representation
should reduce investment incentives on plaintiff's side, further mitigat-
ing the plaintiff-favoring asymmetry.
It follows that if multiple representation is pervasive enough, a
combination of contingency fee and multiple representation might re-
duce Arrangement IV's asymmetry below that of Arrangement III with-
out sacrificing a high level of investment on both sides. For example,
assuming a sample size of 315 and a one-third contingency, Arrange-
ment IV might be superior to Arrangement III if twenty-one attorneys
each represented fifteen of the sample plaintiffs.8 6
In sum, the foregoing analysis suggests that for most large-scale ag-
gregations, a court using Cimino-style sampling should choose between
Arrangement III and Arrangement IV for its verdict and cost allocation
rules. Indeed, because of Arrangement III's superiority in many situa-
tions, it might make sense to recognize a presumption in its favor, sub-
ject to rebuttal if a party can persuade the court that Arrangement IV
would yield better results.
Litigation investment is not the only outcome-related variable
likely to be affected by sampling. For example, incentives to file frivo-
lous suits could increase if neither the defendant nor the court can de-
tect instances of frivolous litigation.8 7 Because a plaintiff can obtain
substantial recovery without participating actively in the litigation or
presenting anything about her case, sampling can make frivolous suits
seem quite attractive unless cases are screened in some way before final
party line than does Arrangement IV. For a more detailed discussion, see Part B of the Mathemat-
ical Appendix.
86. For an analysis, see Part B of the Mathematical Appendix.
87. The literature on frivolous litigation shows that a plaintiff has an incentive to bring a
frivolous suit in order to extract a favorable settlement, especially under conditions of asymmetric
information. See, for example, Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of
Litigation, 10 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 3 (1990); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settle-
ment Offer, 17 J. Legal Stud. 437 (1988); David Rosenberg and Steven Shavell, A Model in Which
Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 3 (1985). In the sampling
situation the frivolous plaintiff need not rely only on a settlement. She can also hope for a final
judgment in the amount of the sample average. In a case like Cimino, for example, a frivolous
plaintiff deciding whether to file suit will consider the possibility that she could proceed through
the liability phase as an inactive class member and through the damages phase as a nonparticipat-
ing member of the larger group.
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judgment."8 A rise in frivolous litigation adds to court costs and in-
creases the likelihood of erroneous outcomes.
C. The Case for Sampling
The discussion to this point has been descriptive: it has identified
possible effects on outcome and associated costs. The following analysis
is normative. It addresses the question whether sampling is justifiable
given the costs. The answer depends on one's theory of adjudication
and on a fundamental distinction between utilitarian and rights-based
modes of analysis. If the goal of adjudication were simply to maximize
utility, there would be little fuss about sampling. As discussed below,
sampling produces efficient outcomes, and the litigation cost savings it
creates should justify its frequent use on utilitarian grounds. Sampling
is troubling primarily because of its impact on rights. Sampling risks
giving plaintiffs with high damages less than their substantive entitle-
ments, and it denies many the process opportunities they claim as a
matter of right under the Due Process Clause.
The centrality of rights-based claims to adjudication complicates
the sampling analysis because claims based on individual right have pri-
ority over claims based on maximizing utility or furthering aggregative
social goals.89 In effect, a rightholder can demand that her individual
right be satisfied even if overall utility would suffer as a result. Thus,
arguments based on general cost savings and aggregative accuracy that
make sampling relatively easy to justify under a utilitarian theory have
no weight under a rights-based theory. This fundamental distinction
between right and utility is basic to the analysis that follows.
Another important distinction is between two different ways of jus-
tifying sampling. One approach shows that sampling is justified because
it achieves the normatively ideal state of affairs, however defined. The
other approach shows that sampling can be justified despite the fact
that it falls short of the ideal in major respects. The efficiency-based
88. Defendants could monitor for frivolous suits by conducting discovery in all cases. How-
ever, frivolous suits can be difficult to identify, and the cost of discovery might lead defendants not
to use it in all cases. In addition, the court itself might assume the task of weeding out frivolous
claims by, for example, appointing a special master to compile information on each case. Proof-of-
claim forms could be sent to all plaintiffs, requiring them to provide detailed case information
under oath. See, for example, In Re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 588 (E.D. La. 1991). This proce-
dure would increase court costs and erode some of the benefits of sampling, but it would also
reduce the incentive to file frivolous suits.
89. See, for example, Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions 112-15, 131-33 (Cambridge, 1979);
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 90-100 (Harv., 1977). This is not to say that rights-
based claims are necessarily incompatible with utilitarianism. Rule-utilitarian theories, for exam-
ple, justify rights by focusing on long-term utility maximization. My point is that the existence of
rights, however generated, rules out those utilitarian justifications that seek to maximize aggregate
or average utility at the expense of the rightholder.
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analysis and the moral rights analysis outlined below employ the first
approach and defend sampling as a means of achieving an ideal out-
come. The legal rights analysis, as well as the process-oriented analysis
in Part IV, are examples of the second approach. They justify sampling
despite its adverse effects on outcome and participation by showing
that sampling is a normatively defensible response to a condition of ex-
treme scarcity.
1. An Efficiency-Based Analysis
An efficiency-based theory of adjudication assumes that the sub-
stantive law is designed to create incentives for socially efficient behav-
ior and that the purpose of adjudication is to enforce the substantive
law.90 Under this view, accurate outcomes are important because they
further the incentives that the substantive law creates. Erroneous out-
comes distort incentives and can underdeter socially harmful or
overdeter socially beneficial activity. Thus, an efficiency-based theory of
adjudication is utilitarian in the sense that it focuses on aggregate wel-
fare rather than on individual rights.
Using the sample average to set damages, as the court did in
Cimino, is rather easy to justify within an efficiency framework.9 1 Sub-
stantive rules regulate behavior by adjusting the expected utility parties
gain from different activities, and expected utility is based on average
quantities. Whenever firms or individuals decide whether to market a
product and how much to invest in safety, they evaluate the anticipated
costs and benefits in light of the average case. By giving all plaintiffs
who establish liability the average damages verdict, sampling in effect
treats every case as an average case. As a result, sampling should have
no effect on expected utility payoffs in most situations and thus no ef-
fect on the ex ante investment choices of a risk-neutral firm or
individual.
Sampling may even have a beneficial effect on risk-averse defend-
ants by reducing the uncertainty associated with individual trial ver-
dicts (although costs may increase for risk-averse plaintiffs).92 Assuming
a case aggregation is reasonably representative of the range of mass tort
90. See, for example, Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal
Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. Econ. Lit. 1067, 1086-87 (1989); Richard A. Posner, An Eco-
nomic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1973).
91. Sample averaging should usually be preferred to regression on efficiency grounds. Regres-
sion is more costly than averaging, and by giving verdicts close to actual damages, it may also
undermine the benefit to risk-averse actors of giving ex post recovery in the amount of expected
loss. If averaging generates perverse litigation incentives, however, regression might be a better
choice.
92. See Robinson and Abraham, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 1509 (cited in note 7). The prevalence of
first-party insurance should reduce the plaintiffs' risk-bearing costs considerably.
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cases, an average over any sample should closely approximate mean
damages for all possible cases. Thus, the sample average distribution
has less variance about the mean than the distribution of trial verdicts.
Because defendants rely on an estimate of this mean figure when mak-
ing ex ante investment choices, sampling will give them more certainty
about their expected liability and in this way help reduce the costs of
risk-averse behavior.
The most serious efficiency objection to sampling is the possibility
of overdeterring socially beneficial activity by making recovery too easy
and encouraging too many plaintiffs to bring suit. Mass tort cases are
difficult to settle in part because defendants fear the effect of massive
liability on cash flow and prefer to stretch out payments by prolonging
litigation.93 Sampling accelerates liability and risks forcing productive
firms into bankruptcy.94 This potential for catastrophic loss is likely to
induce risk-averse behavior and create incentives for firms to shun so-
cially beneficial activity and invest excessively in risk avoidance
measures.
9 5
Although overdeterrence is an important concern, it ought not pre-
vent the use of sampling. There is no indication that sampling, by re-
ducing trial costs, increases enforcement in a way that runs counter to a
decision to deal with underenforcement in other ways, such as by ex-
panding tort liability or enlarging tort damages.9 6 Furthermore, there is
no reason to believe that defendants will create delays through strategic
maneuvering that match the socially optimal payment schedule. If
overdeterrence is a problem, it is more desirable to rely on a court to
work out a sensible remedial scheme in each case or on a legislature or
court to adjust substantive tort rules than to rely on the defendant to
choose a socially desirable delay strategy.97
93. See Mark A. Peterson and Molly Selvin, Mass Justice: The Limited and Unlimited
Power of Courts, 54 L. & Contemp. Probs. 227 (1991); McGovern, 69 B.U. L. Rev. at 659 (cited in
note 39).
94. See Weinstein and Hershenov, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 270, 290 (cited in note 19) (noting
that in mass tort cases, "the defendants' liability exposure is also of an unprecedented magnitude
that frequently threatens companies or even entire industries with bankruptcy"). More than half
of all asbestos defendants have already turned to bankruptcy proceedings in an effort to manage
the liability exposure. See Ad Hoc Committee Report at 30 (cited in note 9).
95. A similar concern has been noted in the class action setting. See Note, Developments in
the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1362-65 (1976).
96. If tort liability had been expanded or damages enhanced in order to compensate for un-
derenforcement, a procedural change, such as sampling, that removed obstacles to suit might result
in overenforcement from an efficiency perspective. For a discussion of this problem in the class
action setting, see id. at 1361-62.
97. There is also some risk that sample averaging will distort plaintiffs' incentives. Use of a
sample average, for example, might encourage plaintiffs to underinvest in damage mitigation mea-
sures. If each plaintiff were certain her co-plaintiffs would invest at a reasonable level, she would
do so as well. But plaintiffs cannot be certain of this because sample averaging gives each an
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Although sampling fits an efficiency framework quite nicely, certain
requirements must be observed in designing the procedure if it is to
achieve efficiency goals.9 8 The case aggregation must be large enough to
justify the use of statistical techniques, and the aggregated cases must
be related to one another closely enough so that the sample average
corresponds to an individual's or firm's expected liability predictions ex
ante."s Furthermore, as discussed in Part III.B., any sampling proce-
dure should ensure a high level of litigation investment on both sides
and rough parity across the party line.100 In most cases this will call for
giving each litigating plaintiff the sample average and spreading her lit-
igation costs over the entire case population.
Finally, under current law sampling is a practical option only at the
damages stage. There is no conceptual obstacle to using sampling to
measure liability, but it would require a major change in tort law. Tort
liability is binary: a defendant is either liable or not, and if liable, the
defendant must compensate the plaintiff in full. At best, sampling ap-
plied to liability can only provide an estimate of the probability that
defendant is liable to any plaintiff in an arbitrarily chosen case. This
estimate equals the number of liability verdicts divided by the total
number of sample cases. Thus, sampling could be used to determine
liability only if the tort law recognized probabilistic liability
measures.
102
Current law prohibits this use of sampling, even in mass tort cases.
The departure from existing practice is more extreme than for damages
incentive to free-ride on others. This risk is not likely to be significant in mass tort cases, however,
because plaintiffs usually suffer from serious physical injuries and are not likely to delay treatment
in order to free-ride at the damages stage.
98. Professors Saks and Blanck discuss a number of useful design guidelines. See Saks and
Blanck, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 841-51 (cited in note 14).
99. The requirement of closely related cases does not refer to statistical properties of the
case aggregation but instead refers to the expectations of those whose behavior is being regulated.
Sampling is most appropriate when the case aggregation belongs to a single planning unit from an
ex ante perspective. To illustrate, suppose that a company manufactured two products-the drug
diethylstilbestrol and the chemical dioxin. Although it would be theoretically possible to determine
average damages by sampling from an aggregation combining both types of cases, to do so would
make little sense because firms are not likely to group drug and chemical projects together when
making decisions about appropriate precautionary measures. Compare Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 24 (1982) (directing courts, when determining whether factual grouping constitutes a
single "claim" for claim preclusion purposes, to consider "whether... treatment [of the facts] as a
unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage").
100. See notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
101. Under a sampling system, for example, one might discount each plaintiff's damages by
the likelihood of a liability finding and award fractional recovery. Thus, if liability were found in
100 of 200 sample cases, each case in the larger population would receive a verdict for only one-
half of its actual damages. In fact, one could achieve exactly the same result simply by averaging




sampling. Liability sampling shares much more in common with pro-
posals to substitute a proportionality rule for the traditional preponder-
ance-of-the-evidence rule in civil cases.10 2 While some commentators
have endorsed this reform, no court has ever accepted it.1 0s
In sum, efficiency values support sampling in a wide range of situa-
tions so long as the total population is large and all cases are closely
enough related. When deciding whether to use the procedure, courts
must consider potential efficiency costs. Even when costs exist, how-
ever, the benefits of sampling are likely to exceed the costs, at least if
the sampling procedure is properly designed to mitigate the more seri-
ous litigation incentive problems.104
2. A Rights-Based Analysis
A rights-based theory assumes that the purpose of adjudication is
to determine each party's legal rights accurately. Because rights trump
social utility, a deprivation of a right cannot be justified by direct ap-
peal to the aggregate social benefits the offending activity makes possi-
ble. Thus, if an erroneous result counts as a deprivation of substantive
right, procedures that increase error cannot be justified simply by citing
the aggregate benefits to all resulting from reduced litigation and delay
costs.
It is not readily apparent, however, why an erroneous result should
count as a deprivation of right when the court finds the facts and ap-
plies the substantive law as accurately as possible within established
procedures and when all parties have the usual opportunities to obtain
appellate review. One possible answer is that a mistaken failure to pro-
vide what a legal right entitles constitutes a violation of that right. On
this view the court need not purposefully or even inadvertently with-
102. See, for example, Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring
Wrongs, 19 J. Legal Stud. 691 (1990); Rosenberg, 97 Harv. L. Rev. at 849 (cited in note 14.) See
also Glen 0. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. Legal
Stud. 779 (1985) (urging liability for risk creation based on probability of harm). Under the pro-
portionality rule, a plaintiff receives a verdict whenever a jury finds that there is some nonzero
chance of liability, but the verdict amount is discounted by the jury's probability judgment.
103. See, for example, Levmore, 19 J. Legal Stud. at 697-98 (cited in note 102); Rosenberg,
97 Harv. L. Rev. at 849 (cited in note 14).
104. The benefits of sampling include reduced litigation and delay costs. One must be care-
ful, however, about estimating the magnitude of such cost reductions. By making litigation more
attractive, sampling is likely to encourage the filing of lawsuits that would not otherwise have been
brought and the litigation of suits that might otherwise have settled. The additional volume of
litigation will generate costs of its own, which will offset some of the cost reduction benefits of
sampling. The magnitude of these offsetting costs will depend on the equilibrium state of the
system after the introduction of sampling. See George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court




hold the right from an entitled party. Assuming that error is symmetri-
cally distributed about the correct result, each party's expected
outcome would equal exactly the amount that his legal right guarantees.
Yet, the mere possibility of error would violate the parties' rights.
To hold this view, one must believe that the substantive legal right
guarantees not only a judicial decision based on substantive norms but
also a perfectly accurate decision. There are obvious reasons to reject
such an extreme position. Our current system tolerates procedural error
even when expensive procedures might reduce it, and we do not believe
that a moral wrong or a rights violation has occurred every time some
procedure marginally increases the error risk. Furthermore, if a sub-
stantive right implied a right to a perfectly accurate outcome, parties
would be entitled to demand that the community invest resources in
procedure at a level that maximized accuracy regardless of cost.105 Any
system that recognized such a right could easily find itself morally com-
mitted to a disastrous level of financing for adjudication.
Even so, substantive rights must constrain procedural choices to
some extent, and parties must have procedural rights to enforce those
constraints in particular cases. Otherwise, courts could undermine sub-
stantive entitlements by limiting the procedures necessary to their en-
forcement.110 To cite an extreme example, a court that ignored the
substantive law completely and decided a case by simply flipping a coin
would surely be held to have violated the parties' rights even if the sav-
ings funded other activities the community valued more.
It is not obvious, however, what procedural rights the substantive
law entails. This Article is not the place to address this question in its
general form.10 7 Rather, this Article focuses on the question in the spe-
cific context of sampling, although even a focused analysis cannot avoid
treating some of the more general points.
Sampling is especially troubling from a rights-based perspective be-
cause of its tendency to create biased error. 08 This effect is much
stronger for sample averaging than for regression. Because the sample
105. At least up to the point where such an investment endangered rights having the same
moral weight.
106. See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 1990) (saying that "changes in
substantive duty can come dressed as a change in procedure").
107. Professor Dworkin has given the most extensive treatment to date, and I rely to some
extent on his analysis. See Ronald Dworkin, Principle, Policy, Procedure, in Ronald Dworkin, ed.,
A Matter of Principle 72 (Harv., 1985). I have discussed Dworkin's arguments elsewhere and ap-
plied them to nonparty preclusion law. See Bone, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 256-64 (cited in note 17).
108. Thus, it is not correct to compare the error created by sampling to the ordinary random
error inherent in any litigation process. Compare Robinson and Abraham, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 1504
(cited in note 7) (making such a comparison). Sampling systematically biases outcomes in high-
damage cases, thereby effecting a transfer from high to low damages plaintiffs.
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average is close to the population mean, it is very likely to be less than
actual damages for cases above the mean and greater than actual dam-
ages for cases below the mean.109 In many situations sampling virtually
guarantees that at least some high damage plaintiffs will receive ver-
dicts substantially lower than the verdicts they would receive from an
individual trial.
Defenders of sampling respond to these concerns in three ways.
First, they argue that any objections are waived whenever plaintiffs
consent to sampling. Second, they argue that an individual trial verdict
is not the appropriate baseline when a trial is not a viable option due to
high litigation and delay costs. And finally, they argue that sampling
generates litigation cost savings that offset a low sampling verdict. Un-
fortunately, none of these arguments satisfactorily responds to rights-
based concerns. I shall examine each in turn and then develop a more
persuasive set of justifications that takes account of the nature of the
rights at stake.
a. The Standard Arguments
i. The Consent Argument
First, consider the argument from consent.110 If procedural rights
are waivable, sampling should pose no normative difficulty when plain-
tiffs consent to the procedure, provided their consent qualifies as a vol-
untary waiver.' Although defendants are likely to object, as the
defendants did in Cimino v. Raymark Industries, they have little cause
for complaint. The sample average when multiplied by the number of
cases in the aggregation produces an aggregate liability very close to
total damages for the whole population, closer in fact than the total of
individual verdicts had all the cases been tried separately." 2 Assuming
that each defendant is liable for all damages in all cases, no defendant
109. See notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
110. Professors Saks and Blanck rely heavily on plaintiffs' consent to address many of the
normative objections to sampling. See Saks and Blanck, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 829 n.102, 829-30, 837
(cited in note 14). Nevertheless, they also recognize the potential problems with relying on consent
in mass tort cases. Id. at 825 n.77.
111. Plaintiffs consented in Cimino, for example. On the other hand, if sampling were anti-
thetical to the fundamental nature of the judicial function, its use by a court might run afoul of
separation-of-powers principles, and the procedure would be unconstitutional notwithstanding
party waivers. See notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
112. This is so because, with a large enough sample, the standard deviation of the sample
average distribution is less than the standard deviation of the error distribution for individual
trials. See Mathematical Appendix, Part A.
[Vol. 46:561
STATISTICAL ADJUDICATION
could claim that sampling distorted its total liability in a significant
way.113
The scarcity condition that triggers recourse to sampling in mass
tort cases, however, also makes a voluntary waiver of procedural rights
highly problematic. For consent to constitute a waiver, plaintiffs must
have had a reasonable opportunity to exercise the procedural rights
they waive; otherwise, consent cannot possibly reflect a deliberate deci-
sion to forego the right. The critical question for consent then is
whether such an opportunity exists even in those mass tort cases in
which anticipated delay costs consume most, if not all, of plaintiff's ex-
pected recovery. The answer depends on the way one views the proce-
dural right and the conditions necessary to its reasonable exercise.
One could, for example, conceive of the right as guaranteeing only
that level of process necessary to produce a reasonably accurate dam-
ages judgment. If one also found the conditions of reasonable exercise
satisfied whenever a party had formal access to the required process,
there would be no reason to be troubled about consent at all. Under
this formal view, a plaintiff could always exercise her procedural rights
simply by waiting long enough to receive a trial, for, by definition, delay
costs could not affect the right or impede its exercise.
One who holds this view, however, has no reason to be troubled by
litigation scarcity or the delay costs it generates. If all a plaintiff is enti-
tled to expect from litigation is a trial at some indefinite future time,
there is no reason to worry about delay and no reason to bother with
sampling at all. The fact that courts and commentators today do worry
about litigation delay and seriously consider sampling means that they
must reject the formal view. If long delays are thought to be unfair to
plaintiffs, it must be because procedure is supposed to guarantee not
only a reasonably accurate judgment but also some minimally fair level
of actual recovery net of litigation and delay costs. 114
113. See Robinson and Abraham, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 1504-05, 1508-09 (cited in note 7). A
defendant might argue that because of the individualized focus of a rights-based theory, aggrega-
tion cannot cancel out violations of defendant's rights in individual cases. For example, the correc-
tive justice theory of tort law endorsed by Professor Weinrib insists on a bipolar liability structure
in which the wrongdoer compensates the person he wronged. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Understand-
ing Tort Law, 23 Valp. U. L. Rev. 485 (1989). It may be inconsistent with Weinrib's theory for the
defendant to pay in an aggregative way. In any event, one thing is clear: the statistical effects of
aggregation make sampling much less troubling for a defendant than for a high-damage plaintiff,
as long as the defendant is a party to all the aggregated cases and owes a duty to compensate for
all the harm in each case.
114. Courts and commentators do not define the conditions for a minimally acceptable recov-
ery, but the assumption that such a minimum exists is implicit in the various expressions of con-
cern about the plight of mass tort plaintiffs. See, for example, Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 651
(expressing concern about the impact of transaction costs on plaintiff's recovery); Ad Hoc Commit-
tee Report at 19 (cited in note 9) (noting that "[i]t is unrealistic to believe that individual trials
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This more pragmatic view makes delay relevant to the exercise of a
procedural right. When delay costs become so large that actual recovery
falls below the minimum floor required by fairness, plaintiffs no longer
have a reasonable opportunity to exercise their procedural rights. And
without such an opportunity, a plaintiff's consent to sampling cannot
support a voluntary waiver.115
There is a second reason to be skeptical about consent. In large-
scale tort litigation, attorneys often conduct lawsuits for their own ben-
efit rather than for the benefit of their clients." 6 Under these circum-
stances consent is more likely to be the attorney's than the client's.
This is important because attorney preferences are not likely to match
client wishes. For example, an attorney who represents a range of high-
and low-damage plaintiffs on contingency often will find sampling quite
attractive because of its cost savings.1 7 On the other hand, a client with
very large damages at stake may prefer an individual trial even in the
face of long delays, provided delay costs do not exceed the reduction in
recovery due to sampling."8
One cannot solve the consent problem by sending notice to plain-
tiffs and giving them an opportunity to opt out of the aggregation."19
can provide relief"). See also Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 707 (9th Cir.
1992) (noting in dictum that there may be a constitutional limit to permissible delay).
115. This argument applies only when delay is so serious that it reduces expected net recov-
ery below the minimally acceptable level. Thus, in the absence of extreme scarcity, delay usually
will not present a problem for inferring a waiver from consent. For example, plaintiff's consent to
settlement could be construed as a waiver of her trial rights even when delay costs reduce her
expected trial recovery well below her legal entitlement.
116. See note 82 and accompanying text.
117. See also notes 189-90 and accompanying text (discussing how attorney preferences for
sampling can differ from those of a high damages client). If an attorney has a diverse portfolio of
cases that includes some with low and some with high damages, the sample average will yield in
the aggregate what she could expect from individual trials. Cost savings then should make sam-
pling seem very attractive.
118. Expressing some doubts about the waivers in Cimino, Professors Saks and Blanck won-
der whether attorneys would ever present the waiver choice to their clients, and they observe that
high-damage plaintiffs might be inclined not to consent if they were fully informed. See Saks and
Blanck, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 825 n.77 (cited in note 14); see also id. at 839-40 (describing agency
costs in mass tort cases). Of course, if the prospects for individual trials are as bleak as proponents
of sampling contend, it may be perfectly rational for all plaintiffs to consent to sampling. But if
the alternatives are really that bleak, the legitimacy of inferring a waiver from consent is in serious
doubt.
119. In a mass tort suit, such as Cimino, that is conducted as a Rule 23(b)(3) class action
during the liability phase, reasonable notice must be sent to all class members informing them of
their right to opt out. See F.R.C.P. 23(c)(2); Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
However, this notice is likely to be sent well before the sampling decision and thus usually will not
inform plaintiffs of the sampling option. See Sherman, 10 Rev. Litig. at 266 n.141 (cited in note
42).
It is not clear whether current due process standards require notice and opt-out for a sampling
procedure. The Supreme Court has never held that notice and opt-out are constitutional require-
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The problem would still exist with notice and opt-out procedures be-
cause the absence of reasonable alternatives precludes inferring a
waiver from a decision not to opt out just as it precludes inferring a
waiver from consent. Furthermore, in mass tort cases, the attorney is
still likely to control the choice. And because incentives to opt out risk
destroying the aggregation essential to sampling, it may be necessary to
prohibit opt-out altogether. 10 Consent therefore offers no easy solution
to rights-based concerns.
ii. The Baseline Argument
The second argument focuses on the choice of baseline. If there is
no economically feasible alternative, the argument goes, then sampling's
outcome should be compared to the zero amount net of litigation and
delay costs a plaintiff can expect to recover under any other procedure.
On this view sampling's bias is irrelevant because even a recovery
skewed lower than actual damages is better than no recovery at all.
The problem with this argument is its assumption that procedural
rights are contingent on economically viable alternatives. Procedural
rights have bite as rights precisely to the extent they make demands on
the public fisc in the face of utilitarian judgments about what is eco-
nomically feasible. Suppose, for example, that procedural rights guaran-
teed an error risk no more serious than that inherent in a normal trial.
It would then be completely irrelevant that sampling offered a positive
net recovery if its tendency to create biased error was foreign to normal
trial process.
My point is not that resource scarcity and budgetary constraints
are irrelevant; in fact, I argue exactly the opposite below.' 2' My point is
ments for all cases in which nonlitigating plaintiffs are affected by a judgment. See Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); compare Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (holding that due process requires notice and opt-out whenever a state
court exercises jurisdiction over out-of-state class members). For a discussion of these issues, see
Sherman, 10 Rev. Litig. at 256-61 (cited in note 42); Resnik and Rowe Letter (cited in note 9). For
a study of representation concepts in modem adjudication, see Bone, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 193
(cited in note 17).
120. Allowing plaintiffs to opt out can create serious collective action problems. A high dam-
ages plaintiff may opt out because she expects that sampling over the rest of the aggregation will
reduce her delay costs enough to make her better off with an individual trial. If she expects this to
happen, however, then so will other high-damage plaintiffs. Furthermore, each such plaintiff will
have to consider the risk that others will opt out, leaving her worse off than if she had exited too.
This combination of expectations creates incentives for many plaintiffs to opt out, thereby destroy-
ing the aggregation essential to sampling. In other words, allowing plaintiffs to opt out produces a
situation similar to a Prisoner's Dilemma. As a result one may have to disallow opt-out altogether
in order to hold the aggregation together. For a discussion of the Prisoner's Dilemma, see Dennis
C. Mueller, Public Choice II 9-15 (Cambridge, 1989).
121. See notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
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that one cannot justify sampling by reference to scarcity and budgetary
constraints without an argument showing why these factors are rele-
vant, and any such argument requires an account of the procedural
rights parties possess and the way those rights depend on resource
limitations.
iii. The Net Recovery Argument
The third argument focuses on net recovery. It attempts to offset
sampling's effect on high-damage plaintiffs by counting the savings in
litigation costs that the procedure makes possible. 12 2 There are a num-
ber of difficulties with this argument. First, sampling might not save
substantially on private litigation costs. Plaintiffs are likely to invest
much more in each sample case than they would in separately tried
cases because of the larger marginal return sample plaintiffs expect to
receive. 123 Moreover, even if there are significant savings, it is not clear
that the contingency fee arrangement will pass those savings on to
plaintiffs. And even if savings are passed on, there is no assurance that
they will be sufficiently large to offset the shift toward the population
mean for all high-damage plaintiffs.
There is a deeper problem, however. The argument assumes that
what counts in the rights analysis is the total actual benefit a party
receives-her damages less attorney's fees and other litigation-related
costs. But this assumption does not hold true for all conceptions of the
party's substantive right. For example, the moral demands of corrective
justice are not always satisfied simply by granting the plaintiff full com-
pensation for her wrongful loss. Some theories hold that the defendant
must pay the full measure of compensation to the plaintiff she has
wronged.12 4 On this view, the amount of the judgment is the relevant
122. See, for example, David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases:
Lessons From A Special Master, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 695, 704 (1989) (stating that "[a]veraging may
undervalue a particular claim, but ... [a]ny such diminution in value will be more than made up
directly by the increase in compensation resources . . . generated by the reduction in litigation
cost"); Weinstein and Hershenov, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 326 (cited in note 19) (noting that a lower
gross award associated with a mass settlement "may be at least partially offset by a higher net to
the plaintiff" due in part to reduced transaction costs).
123. In Part B of the Mathematical Appendix, I show that for a relatively simple model of
litigation investment a rule giving sample plaintiffs the average verdict and spreading costs equally
over the entire population-as Part III.B. recommends in order to equalize investment incen-
tives-encourages litigating parties to invest in the aggregate at a level equal to the total invest-
ment if all cases had been tried individually. The model is highly simplified, however. Parties are
likely to realize some cost savings from sampling, but these savings are not likely to be as large as
one would expect considering the cost allocation rule alone.
124. See, for example, Weinrib, 23 Valp. U. L. Rev. at 485 (cited in note 113); Larry A.
Alexander, Causation and Corrective Justice: Does Tort Law Make Sense?, 6 Law & Phil. 1, 4
(1987).
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factor, and litigation cost savings are completely irrelevant. 125 Thus, the
relevance of cost savings to a rights-based analysis depends on the na-
ture of the right at stake.
126
b. The Argument From Rights
If we are to square sampling's effects with rights-based theory, we
have no choice but to inquire more deeply into the nature of procedural
rights. There are two ways to approach this task. The first, which I shall
call the "moral rights conception," derives procedural rights from the
moral theory underlying the substantive law. The second, which I shall
call the "legal rights conception," derives procedural rights from the le-
gal rights that the positive law creates.
i. The Moral Rights Conception
The moral rights conception treats substance and procedure as a
single mechanism that enforces whatever moral rights the law is meant
to advance. Under this view sampling does not violate anyone's rights if
the outcomes it produces are consistent with the moral theory that sup-
ports the substantive law.
For the following analysis, I focus on sample averaging rather than
regression. 117 I also focus on corrective justice theories of tort law. Al-
though a number of theories have been advanced to explain modern
tort law,"' corrective justice is the principal contender today for a
125. I discuss below whether sampling can ever be consistent with corrective justice. See
notes 127-55 and accompanying text.
126. For this same reason arguments that assume most cases settle and compare the out-
comes from aggregation to those from settlement also miss the mark. See Saks and Blanck, 44
Stan. L. Rev. at 840 (cited in note 14) (suggesting that the reality of settlements in mass tort cases
gives a reason not to use the results of full-fledged trials as the standard for evaluating procedural
reforms); compare Rosenberg, 62 Ind. L. J. at 582-83 (cited in note 14) (suggesting that the preva-
lence of settlements in mass tort cases might square class action treatment with corrective justice
norms). If an outcome based on previous settlements would violate the parties' rights when im-
posed by a court without the parties' consent, then settlement can hardly serve as a normatively
acceptable baseline to evaluate sampling.
127. Regression gives an outcome closer to actual damages, but it is also more costly than
sample averaging. Furthermore, if corrective justice supports an entitlement to compensation for
ex ante risk rather than for actual harm, then averaging should be preferred over regression. See
notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
128. A complete analysis would have to address all of these theories, For example, a compen-
satory justice theory might require that high-damage plaintiffs be compensated in full. See gener-
ally Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 Cornell L. Rev.
313, 328-31 (1990) (describing compensatory justice). To be a sensible interpretation of current
tort law, however, such a theory needs the kind of connection to a wrongful act and causation that
corrective justice supplies. Furthermore, a loss spreading theory based on fairness rather than effi-
ciency might require full compensation for high-damage plaintiffs. On the other hand, the availa-
bility of insurance can make a verdict in the amount of the average loss fair to all. See Rosenberg,
62 Ind. L. J. at 590-93 (cited in note 14).
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moral theory capable of grounding rights. 2 ' Corrective justice conceives
of tort law as a system for correcting wrongs to plaintiffs caused by a
defendant's wrongful conduct or a defendant's invasion of a plaintiff's
rights.' ° Unlike more broadly distributive theories, such as loss spread-
ing, corrective justice requires a wrong and focuses on restoring the
moral equilibrium that existed between wrongdoer and wronged party
before the wrong occurred. 13' Furthermore, unlike efficiency-based the-
ories, corrective justice focuses on correcting a past wrong rather than
deterring future wrongs.
Two questions must be addressed before sampling can be justified
under corrective justice theory: first, whether there is a plausible ver-
sion of corrective justice that can account for the outcomes produced by
sample averaging, and second, if there is such a theory, whether it co-
heres with existing tort doctrine.132 The first question is one that any
sampling advocate bent on implementing corrective justice ideals must
answer. The second question is less obvious. It presupposes an impor-
tant distinction between the power of a court and the power of a legisla-
ture-a distinction that previous commentators have mainly ignored.' s
129. See Catherine P. Wells, Tort Law As Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification For
Jury Adjudication, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2348, 2349-53 (1990) (arguing that the existing tort system
cannot be justified as a device to regulate or compensate and that it best fits a corrective justice
model); Christopher Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 439, 439 (1990) (characterizing corrective justice as the most powerful theory of tort law in
American legal thought today, other than law and economics); Weinrib, 23 Valp. U. L. Rev. at 485
(cited in note 113) (identifying elements of the current tort system that do not promote loss
spreading or deterrence goals but cohere well with corrective justice principles); see also Robinson
and Abraham, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 1507 (cited in note 7) (assuming that any substantive due process
right to tort compensation would be based on a corrective justice theory). Corrective justice may
have trouble accounting for strict liability torts. See Weinrib, 23 Valp. U. L. Rev. at 519-20 (cited
in note 113). Many products liability claims, however, including the warning defect claims that
frequently generate mass tort cases, are strict liability torts in name only; in reality, liability is
based on negligence principles. See Kenneth W. Simons, Corrective Justice and Liability for Risk-
Creation: A Comment, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 113, 136 n.90 (1990).
130. See Simons, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 125-26. It is difficult to give a precise definition of
corrective justice because of the large amount of confusion and disagreement over the concept. See
id. at 125-27.
131. See Schroeder, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 449 (cited in note 129) (stressing the importance
of distinguishing between corrective justice and distributive justice).
132. In addressing corrective justice values, Saks and Blanck are led astray by their assump-
tion that in many cases sampling promises a more accurate estimate of actual damages than an
individual trial. See Saks and Blanck, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 836 (cited in note 14). The analysis is
much more complex and the conclusions more qualified than they realize.
133. Professors Saks and Blanck overlook this distinction when they suggest that judicial use
of statistical methods might be no more "radical" than legislative removal of cases from the tort
system. See id. at 819 n.22. If the judiciary has a more limited power to alter procedure, then it
may be more "radical" for a court to implement sampling than for a legislature to remove cases
from adjudication and assign them to an administrative forum. Professors Abraham and Robinson
also ignore the distinction when they analogize judicially designed statistical approaches to legisla-
tively created compensation systems, such as worker's compensation, and also when they invoke
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Courts must attend to precedent, and this obligation limits judicial
power to alter existing substantive and procedural law. A court can
change features of tort law, of course, but it cannot do so in a way that
runs counter to the law's fundamental character-at least not without
demonstrating a link to more attractive norms operating in closely anal-
ogous legal areas. By contrast, a legislature is not constrained by prece-
dent, and as a result, it has much more freedom to define and alter legal
rights and to create and fund procedural systems in ways that best
serve its vision of good social policy.3 4
This means that the second question-the fit between corrective
justice and tort precedent-is particularly salient for a court designing
a sampling procedure without legislative approval. By the same token,
the question may be much less relevant for a legislature deciding
whether to authorize sampling in general. Nevertheless, even a legisla-
ture may be well-advised to heed existing tort doctrine for pragmatic
reasons, even if it is not obliged to do so as a matter of principle. After
all, tort law reflects the efforts of many over a long period of time to
work out the moral and practical demands of a compensation system,
and for that reason alone, it deserves considerable weight in any legisla-
tively motivated reform effort.
Turning now to the first question, whether sampling's outcomes fit
some plausible theory of corrective justice, it is useful to highlight at
the outset the more obvious points of contact between sampling and
the government's supposedly broad power to modify the goals of tort law without specifying which
branch of government is involved. See Robinson and Abraham, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 1508-09 (cited in
note 7). But see id. at 1510 (recognizing that their examples focus on reforms "outside the common
law").
134. See Dworkin, Matter of Principle at 93-94 (cited in note 107) (noting that a legislature
has much broader power over procedure than a court acting in an adjudicative capacity). But see
Weinstein and Hershenov, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 270-77 (cited in note 19) (noting the power of
Congress to enact major procedural reform, and arguing that courts also have expansive equity
power to innovate, at least in the absence of contrary legislation). Legislatures exercise broad
power whenever they remove claims from the courts and remit them to an administrative forum,
thereby adjusting the package of substantive and procedural entitlements that the parties enjoy.
Worker's compensation is a familiar example. See New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188
(1917) (upholding constitutionality of New York State's worker's compensation law). But there are
others. See, for example, Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1988). In the past, Congress
has considered, but never adopted, bills to deal with the asbestos problem that would have pro-
vided compensation to asbestos victims through an administrative mechanism modelled on the
workmen's compensation system. See, for example, Occupational Disease Compensation Act of
1985, H.R. 3090, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Asbestos Workers' Recovery Act, H.R. 1626 & S.
1265, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). For a general analysis of congressional power to assign adjudica-
tive tasks to administrative agencies and other non-Article III bodies, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 916 (1988); and
Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 Colo. L. Rev. 581 (1985). For a




corrective justice ideals. Under sample averaging, defendants are liable
only if they cause some harm. Furthermore, plaintiffs receive compen-
sation in an amount that bears some relationship to defendant's wrong.
Each plaintiff is in effect awarded damages in the amount of the ex
ante expected loss to all persons who suffer harm from exposure to the
defendant's risk-creating activity. This is not the same as the expected
loss to all those exposed to the risk. It focuses instead on loss to a sub-
set of this larger group: those who are exposed and who actually suffer
some compensable harm from their exposure. If the total number of
cases is large and the plaintiff population is representative of the range
of persons likely to be injured by defendant's activity, mean damages
for the aggregation-which is closely approximated by the sample aver-
age-should roughly equal this expected loss figure.1 5
To illustrate, suppose that defendant creates a risk with a .04
chance of causing a compensable loss of $100,000, a .01 chance of caus-
ing a loss of $500,000, and a .95 chance of causing no loss at all to some-
one exposed to the risk. The expected loss to any exposed person is just
the sum of all the possible losses discounted by their respective
probabilities or (.04 x 100,000) + (.01 x 500,000) + (.95 x 0), which
equals $9000.
The sample average does not correspond to this $9000 figure. In-
stead, it equals the expected loss to the five percent who actually suffer
some harm. In this example, a person who suffers some type of harm
has a .8 probability (in other words, .04/(.04+.01)) of incurring a
$100,000 loss and a .2 probability (.01/(.04+.01)) of incurring a
$500,000 loss.1"" The expected loss to a harmed person, therefore,
135. The two assumptions are crucial. The number of aggregated cases must be large in order
to reflect the proportion of persons with various types of loss existing in the overall population.
The court must also try to form as representative an aggregation as possible in order to assure that
the sample average closely corresponds to expected loss. This may not be an easy task. There are
practical obstacles to achieving a representative collection of cases. For example, adverse selection
can create problems if sampling increases the incentive to bring frivolous suits. See notes 87-88
and accompanying text. When frivolous suits are chosen for the sample, they contribute zero dam-
ages to the sample verdicts, which can skew the sample average lower than the expected loss figure.
Nevertheless, a court should be able to control for this effect to some extent by using summary
judgment and directed verdict to weed out frivolous cases from the sample at the damages stage.
Of course, even if the sample is cleansed of frivolous suits, the defendant will still have to pay
damages to frivolous plaintiffs not selected for the sample. This is also a problem with settlements
in individual litigation, however, and can be controlled to some extent by the techniques discussed
in note 88.
136. In the language of probability theory, these are all "conditional probabilities." They
represent the probability of a person suffering particular losses conditional on the person being
exposed to the risk and suffering some type of compensable harm from the exposure. Technically,
these probabilities are derived from the original set by using Bayes's Formula. See Howard Raiffa,




equals (.8 x 100,000) + (.2 x 500,000), or $180,000, and it is this figure
that the sample average closely estimates.137
Although no corrective justice theorist has yet endorsed an ex-
pected loss approach of this kind, some have proposed measures similar
to it, and their arguments, taken together, provide the elements of a
justification from corrective justice principles. For example, Professor
Christopher Schroeder has recently developed a corrective justice ra-
tionale supporting tort liability based on expected loss rather than ac-
tual harm.""8 He reasons from what he calls the norm of "action-based
responsibility":139 an agent is morally responsible only for the choices
she makes, not for the harm she unintentionally creates. Since no one
can know beforehand the harm that others will suffer as a result of her
activity, the argument goes, moral responsibility and hence legal liabil-
ity should not depend on whether harm actually occurs or how severe it
happens to be. 140 According to Schroeder, the moral wrong inheres in
the actor's choice and arises, if at all, at the moment the actor chooses
to engage in the risk-creating activity. Any resulting harm is purely for-
tuitous and therefore of no moral consequence.1 4 1
Schroeder applies his expected loss argument only to the liability
side of the tort ledger, however. When it comes to compensation, he
retains the traditional approach that measures damages by actual harm.
Under Schroeder's scheme, defendants make expected loss payments
into a fund whenever they create an unreasonable risk, and plaintiffs
who suffer actual harm recover from the fund in an amount sufficient to
compensate for the harm they suffer.
42
137. To see this, suppose that 100,000 persons are exposed to defendant's risk. The loss
probabilities in the text predict that 95% of the 100,000, or 95,000, will suffer no loss at all; 4%, or
4000, will suffer a $100,000 loss; and 1%, or 1000, will suffer a $500,000 loss. Suppose that those
persons who suffer no loss either do not sue or lose on liability. Suppose further that one-half
(randomly distributed) of those who actually suffer loss sue and that all plaintiffs in this group win
on liability. On these assumptions there should be 2000 cases with $100,000 actual damages each
and 500 cases with $500,000 actual damages each that remain to be adjudicated at the damages
stage. The mean damages for this total population of 2500 cases, which is closely estimated by the
sample average, equals $180,000, which is the same as the ex ante expected loss figure.
138. Schroeder, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 439 (cited in note 129).
139. Id. at 450.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 451-60. For a similar argument, see Robinson, 14 J. Legal Stud. at 789-91 (cited in
note 102). See also Schwartz, 75 Cornell L. Rev. at 323-24 (cited in note 128) (urging the moral
irrelevance of actual harm to support the fairness of spreading risks among defendants through
liability insurance). While this argument is a powerful one in the corrective justice literature, it is
also important to note that not everyone agrees with it. See generally Glen 0. Robinson, Risk,
Causation, and Harm, in R.G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris, eds., Liability and Responsibility:
Essays in Law and Morals 317, 331-41 (Cambridge, 1991) (discussing Professor Thompson's views
about moral luck).
142. Schroeder, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 468-69 (cited in note 129).
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In a recent comment on Schroeder's proposal, Professor Kenneth
Simons takes issue with this asymmetry between liability and compen-
sation.143 Simons argues that Schroeder's principle of action-based re-
sponsibility together with the corrective justice requirement of a close
fit between liability and compensation would justify a risk-based ap-
proach to compensation as well as to liability.144 According to Simons,
under a defensible theory of corrective justice, all persons exposed to an
unreasonable risk should be compensated in an amount equal to ex-
pected harm.145
Schroeder's argument, as extended by Simons, justifies the most
important feature of sampling's compensation principle, its reliance on
expected loss rather than actual harm. But there is a difference between
sampling's compensation measure and the one Simons supports. Sam-
pling compensates for expected loss only to those who are actually
harmed, whereas Simons's extension of Schroeder's proposal compen-
sates for expected loss to all those exposed to the risk.
This difference in expected loss measures can be explained by the
different conditions for liability and a right to compensation under the
two approaches. In Simons's proposal, defendant is liable whenever he
creates a risk, and plaintiff receives compensation whenever he is ex-
posed to the risk. It makes sense, therefore, to measure damages by the
expected loss to all persons placed at risk. In a sampling case like
Cimino, on the other hand, defendant is liable only when he causes
harm, and plaintiff receives compensation only when he suffers harm.
Since defendant owes no liability to those he places at risk but does not
harm and they in turn have no compensation right, it makes sense to
exclude this group from any liability and compensation measure based
on ex ante risk. Stated differently, the conditions for liability and com-
pensation imply that defendant commits a wrong only to those he
harms, and on a corrective justice view, the measure of liability and
compensation ought to fit the wrong as so defined. It follows then that
143. Simons, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 122-25, 128-29 (cited in note 129).
144. Id. at 122-25, 129.
145. In reply to Simons, Professor Schroeder defends harm-based compensation by arguing
that a compensation right arises only when plaintiff's autonomy is invaded and that creation of a
risk is not enough to constitute such an invasion. Christopher Schroeder, Corrective Justice, Lia-
bility for Risks, and Tort Law, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 143, 160 (1990). While this argument may
challenge Simons's risk-based approach, it is perfectly consistent with a sampling scheme that
compensates only when a person is harmed and then only in an amount equal to the expected loss
to those harmed. Such a compensation principle respects autonomy at the same time as it recog-
nizes that the specific kind and degree of harm should be irrelevant to moral responsibility and to
compensation. See note 146.
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the expected loss formula in a sampling regime should focus only on
those persons who are actually harmed. 4"
The second issue-whether the corrective justice theory we have
just constructed coheres with current tort doctrine-is more challeng-
ing. Tort law, after all, compensates for actual harm, not expected loss.
How can .a theory that treats the degree of harm as morally irrelevant
146. A more complete normative account should also explain why defendant's liability and
plaintiff's compensation right should depend on harm rather than on risk. In a recent article on
corrective justice, Professor Heidi Hurd offers one possible explanation. Heidi M. Hurd, Correcting
Injustice to Corrective Justice, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 51, 79-84 (1991). Hurd argues that a harm-
based liability requirement can be derived from the principle of liberty: "[s]ince even unreasonable
risks frequently fail to materialize, [a harm-based rule] provides individuals with the liberty to
gamble. . . the freedom to act unreasonably, so long as [they] do not harm others." Id. at 82. By
combining Professor Hurd's principle of liberty with Professor Schroeder's principle of action-
based responsibility, one can account for all elements of the sampling scheme. (One might object
that these two principles are logically incompatible since one principle requires precisely what the
other denies is morally relevant. However, it should be possible to embrace both principles without
risking a logical fallacy-although not without risking a moral conflict-provided the liberty prin-
ciple is justified on grounds independent of corrective justice; for example, by its tendency to max-
imize overall freedom.)
Because it finds liability only when harm is caused, the sampling approach respects the princi-
ple of liberty in a manner consistent with Hurd's argument. All persons are free to act unreasona-
bly provided they cause no harm to others. Furthermore, by requiring the defendant to
compensate in the amount of expected loss rather than actual harm, sampling excludes chance
from the moral calculus in the way demanded by the principle of action-based responsibility. Even
so, some harm dependence remains, since liability turns on the chance event of harm creation. But
this is required by the principle of liberty. The virtue of the sampling scheme is that it gives each
principle some room to operate.
The sampling approach also creates the kind of close fit between liability and compensation
that many corrective justice theorists consider essential to the ideal of a wrongdoer restoring a
moral equilibrium. See Simons, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 122-23 (cited in note 129). Because the
existence of liability depends on causing harm, the existence of an entitlement to compensation
should also depend on harm, as it does in the sampling approach. Moreover, the scope of liability
matches the scope of compensation; the measure of each is the same, the expected loss to those
harmed by exposure to the risk. Finally, because the existence of both defendant's liability and
plaintiff's entitlement to compensation depends on harm, it makes sense to measure the expected
loss by reference to the group of persons harmed rather than the much larger group of persons
exposed.
This analysis can be summarized in matrix form as follows:
LIABILITY COMPENSATION
EXISTENCE Harm Harm Liberty
Principle
SCOPE Risk (to Risk (to **** Action-based
harmed) harmed) Principle
As this matrix shows, the liberty principle is satisfied by the conditions for existence of de-
fendant's liability and plaintiff's compensation right, while the action-based responsibility princi-
ple is satisfied by the scope of liability and compensation. Furthermore, the symmetry between
liability and compensation in each of the existence and scope categories is consistent with correc-
tive justice's aspiration for a close correspondence between liability and compensation. Finally,
limiting scope to the risk created to the class of persons who are harmed is a logical entailment of
the harm-based existence conditions.
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support a tort system that bases compensation on actual harm? 14 7
There may be no satisfactory answer to this question, in which case
sampling's fate will depend on the argument from the legal rights con-
ception presented in the following section. On the other hand, an expla-
nation might be possible if compensation for actual harm is not an
essential element of the current tort system.148
This could be so if the conventional approach to damages devel-
oped as a pragmatic response to practical limitations on measurement
rather than as a principled articulation of the moral requirements of
tort compensation. Computing expected loss in individual cases is
bound to be a costly and difficult enterprise. A court would have to
compile evidence of risks and harms in comparable situations and apply
statistical techniques to infer an expected loss figure. For this reason it
makes practical sense in most cases to focus on actual harm instead of
expected loss. An expected loss formula is likely to be judicially man-
ageable only in those situations, such as mass tort litigation, in which
enough cases can be aggregated to support statistical analysis without a
costly search for exogenous risk information. But mass tort litigation is
a relatively recent phenomenon. Whenever widespread injuries occurred
in the past-and they seldom did-the procedural system did not usu-
ally permit the kind of large-scale case aggregation that is common to-
day. 49 As a result, the existing harm-based compensation scheme may
have developed because of practical difficulties with implementing an
expected loss formula.
Furthermore, the tort system took shape at a time when people did
not view the world in statistical terms and did not have access to the
mathematical tools necessary to implement a statistical approach. 150 In
a world of discrete and nonprobabilistic events, it would have made
147. Of course, the current tort system does not compensate for actual harm in all situations.
For example, the practice of giving a lump-sum recovery for future loss rather than periodic dam-
ages almost certainly compensates imperfectly, and caps on awards also assure a shortfall in some
cases. See Robinson and Abraham, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 1512 (cited in note 7) (noting that "corrective
justice has always been subject to compromise in the service of other goals"). But these examples
do not show that tort compensation is based on some principle other than actual harm. They effect
relatively minor alterations in the overall tort scheme. Furthermore, many of the recovery caps are
statutory, and, as we have seen, legislatures have much more power than courts to change the
common law. See notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
148. For a similar distinction between features that are part of "the basic structure" of tort
law and those that are not, see Weinrib, 23 Valp. U. L. Rev. at 493-95 (cited in note 113).
149. Compare Schroeder, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 470-71 (cited in note 129) (arguing that
traditional bipolar litigation explains the failure of tort law to recognize the advantages of a risk-
based approach).
150. These tools have been developed only in the past 175 years. For a brief summary of the
history of statistical theory, see Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 659-660. For a similar explanation of why




sense to equate wrongful loss with actual harm; in fact, it may have
been impossible to imagine anything else. Thus, the reason actual harm
remains the touchstone of compensation may have less to do with its
strong link to tort principle and much more to do with its close connec-
tion to outdated tort precedent.
If administrative costs and the force of precedent explain the cur-
rent system, then compensating for expected loss would do no violence
to current tort principles. Indeed, whenever costs are manageable and
precedent is clearly out of date, as in mass tort litigation, corrective
justice might require precisely the sort of compensation that sampling
provides.
Assuming that our corrective justice approach fits current tort doc-
trine, one additional piece is needed to complete the argument from
moral rights. The argument so far shows that sampling's apparently bi-
ased effect on outcome is not biased at all, but rather a good estimate of
the correct-expected loss-damages amount within a rights-based the-
ory. It remains to show that ordinary random error is consistent with
corrective justice principles.
If corrective justice required a perfectly accurate result in every
case, none of the outcomes from the current system of individual trials
would be free of condemnation on moral grounds. It is extremely doubt-
ful that any corrective justice theorist would hold a procedural system
to such an impossible accuracy standard. 511 To do so would commit the
theorist to the absurd position that all practical legal systems must be
morally deficient in a pervasive way. But how can corrective justice ac-
count for random error?
Initially, it is important to note that nothing in the structure of
corrective justice itself necessarily requires perfect accuracy. Further-
more, corrective justice theory in most of its contemporary forms treats
background risks as morally legitimate; only "unreasonable" risks qual-
ify as wrongful. 152 Background risks are those risks that all persons can
fairly be required to bear as part of the morally just baseline distribu-
tion of benefits and burdens that corrective justice is meant to preserve.
151. Professor Weinrib has argued that the famous case of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80
(1948), is consistent with a corrective justice commitment to causation, provided the case merely
shifts the burden of proof. Weinrib, 23 Valp. U. L. Rev. at 494-95 n.25 (cited in note 113). Because
burden of proof allocates the risk of error and because shifting the burden makes the consequences
of error fall more heavily on defendants than on plaintiffs, Weinrib must believe that procedural
error, possibly even error that is asymmetrically distributed, is compatible with corrective justice
principles.
152. See, for example, Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits, 1
L. & Phil. 371, 390 (1982); Weinrib, 23 Valp. U. L. Rev. at 518-19 (cited in note 113); George P.
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 550 (1972).
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Thus, background risks are defined by whatever theory of justice allo-
cates initial benefits and burdens.
It is sensible to include as part of the baseline distribution, and
thus within background risk, not only "real world" risks but also ordi-
nary error risks associated with existing systems of procedure. 153 This
Article is not the place to discuss in detail how this might be done, but
it is worth noting that this justification of procedural error is consistent
with the various justifications for tolerating background risk, including
justifications based on regard for the value of individual liberty, respect
for the moral legitimacy of action, and concern for the value of equal
personal security.154
If the error ordinarily associated with individual trials defines the
morally acceptable baseline of procedural risk, the random error cre-
ated by sampling should easily pass muster. As we have seen, with a
large enough set of cases, the sample average gives a more accurate esti-
mate of the population mean than an individual trial verdict gives of
actual damages for a single case.155 Thus, because the population mean
is the ideal liability measure under our corrective justice theory, sam-
pling's error is less than that ordinarily associated with the trial of indi-
vidual tort cases.
To recap the argument of this section, we set out to find a defense
of sample averaging within the moral rights conception of procedural
rights. This conception treats procedural rights as checks on forms of
process that subvert the moral theory underlying the substantive law.
We saw that sampling's outcomes are consistent with a plausible ver-
sion of corrective justice theory and that this theory might cohere with
current tort doctrine. Nevertheless, in view of the entrenched nature of
harm-based compensation, one may well question the closeness of fit
with settled tort principles. The next section considers the fate of sam-
153. Professor Wells has argued for a "pragmatic conception" of corrective justice that justi-
fies tort outcomes in part by reference to the existing practice of tort adjudication. Wells, 88 Mich.
L. Rev. at 2348 (cited in note 129). To the extent her approach vests established modes of proce-
dure with normative weight simply because they are conventional, it can easily square ordinary
random error with corrective justice. See id. at 2361-63, 2382-83, 2393-95. Random error, after all,
stems from procedures conventionally understood to be fair and consistent with minimal require-
ments for practical deliberation.
154. See Hurd, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 81-83 (cited in note 146) (discussing the value of
individual liberty); Weinrib, 23 Valp. U. L. Rev. at 518-19 (cited in note 113) (discussing the legiti-
macy of action); Fletcher, 85 Harv. L. Rev. at 550 (cited in note 152) (discussing the value of equal
personal security). One general principle that might justify both extra-litigative and procedural
risks is that those risks of harm necessarily associated with a morally acceptable social practice are
themselves morally acceptable. So long as the ordinary risk of error is a necessary part of an adju-
dicative system, a court does nothing morally wrong by following normal adjudicative practice in
rendering a judgment that may be erroneous.
155. See notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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pling if the plaintiff has a moral right to compensation for actual harm
or if the plaintiff has a legal right that guarantees this compensation
measure even if her moral right does not.
ii. The Legal Rights Conception
The legal rights conception treats procedural rights as safeguards
against process choices that sacrifice a party's substantive rights in the
name of aggregate utility. Whereas the moral rights conception stresses
procedure's impact on moral rights, the legal rights conception stresses
its impact on legal rights. This distinction reflects different attitudes
toward the constraining force of precedent.
The moral rights conception approves a procedure whenever it is
consistent with the underlying moral theory even if it is inconsistent
with some of the more concrete rules and principles of settled law. The
legal rights conception gives more weight to the extant rules and princi-
ples. It assumes that moral theory and legal precedent play distinct, if
mutually interacting, roles in shaping judicial decisions. In particular,
existing precedent may have such force that a court cannot change a
rule without violating a party's legal rights even if the change imple-
ments an attractive moral theory.1 6 It follows that the force of the legal
rights conception operates most strongly on judicial decisions to inno-
vate with sampling and much less strongly, if at all, on legislative deci-
sions to authorize sampling in general.157 Accordingly, the following
discussion assumes that the legislature has neither authorized sampling
nor done anything else to respond to conditions of severe process scar-
city, and it focuses on a court's obligations in the face of resulting budg-
etary constraints.158
156. One way to make sense of this is to suppose that any area of the law is shaped by a
number of different and possibly inconsistent principles and that uncertainty always exists about
what those principles are. The only way a court can discern the principles is by inferring them
from precedent through a process similar to reflective equilibrium. Under this view strong prece-
dential support for a particular rule is a powerful indication that the rule embodies an important
normative principle. As a result, given the everpresent uncertainty, a court should not radically
change a well-supported rule unless there is strong evidence that the change would better comport
with the general goals the law is supposed to serve. Compare Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Bel-
knap, 1986) (describing a theory of adjudication that supposes judges interpret precedent in a way
that shares many of these features).
157. Moreover, the legal rights conception may impose weaker pragmatic constraints on a
legislature than the moral rights conception does. See notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
158. Even though the legislature enjoys extensive power over procedure, it is conceivable that
a party's procedural rights might prevent a legislature from funding adjudication below a level
necessary for persons with substantial damages to recover minimally acceptable compensation. If
so, plaintiffs in mass tort cases subject to huge litigation and delay costs might be able to invoke
the constitution to force the states to fund better procedures. See generally David Hittner and
Kathleen W. Osman, Federal Civil Trial Delays: A Constitutional Dilemma?, 31 S. Tex. L. J. 341
(1990) (analyzing potential constitutional violations triggered by severe litigation delays, including
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The distinction between a moral rights and a legal rights concep-
tion makes a difference to our sampling problem only if the substantive
tort law gives plaintiffs a legal right to compensation for actual harm
and only if that right is strong enough to prevent a court from shifting
to an expected loss formula in mass tort cases even if the shift would be
more consistent with the plaintiff's moral rights.159 In this situation we
cannot defend sampling by arguing, as we did under the moral rights
conception, that it furthers the moral goals of tort law, for those goals
are not relevant except as they are embodied in legal rights. A more
promising approach treats sampling as a procedural device that yields
as good an estimate of actual harm for each plaintiff as is economically
practical. This approach, however, returns us to the question that began
our discussion of rights-based theories: how can we reconcile a proce-
dure that systematically undercompensates a class of plaintiffs for eco-
nomic reasons with procedural rights that protect the utility-trumping
nature of a substantive right?
Because of the priority of right over utility, procedural rights
should prevent a court from using a more error-prone procedure in
some cases simply in order to save funds for other cases that promise a
greater social gain from improved enforcement. This is not the case
with sampling, however. Sampling seeks to protect rights rather than to
maximize utility: its purpose is to provide meaningful relief to individ-
ual plaintiffs within severe budgetary constraints.
The question then is whether a plaintiff's procedural rights prevent
a court from achieving this compensation goal with a sampling proce-
dure that skews recovery. A court that used sampling in order to pro-
duce skewed outcomes would violate a plaintiff's procedural rights, but
this is not why courts use sampling today. The ideal remains actual
damages for each plaintiff, and sampling is designed to achieve that
ideal as closely as possible.
Sampling also does not single out any special class of persons for
unfavorable treatment, at least not if everyone has a roughly equal
chance over a lifetime of suffering greater than average damages as a
result of exposure to mass tort risks. Procedural rules inevitably draw
distinctions among persons, and those distinctions are fair if the risk of
those based on equal protection, due process, and jury trial rights). But see Los Angeles County
Bar Ass'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 705-08 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that delay in Los Angeles Superior
Court does not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause, but suggesting in dictum that
delay might be unconstitutional in a suitable case). However, if the legislature has no such obliga-
tion or if it chooses not to act, one must then consider a court's duties in the face of severe and
possibly legitimate budgetary constraints.
159. The following analysis also bears on the question of justification within a moral rights




receiving relatively unfavorable treatment is randomly distributed ex
ante and thus falls equally on all."e
Under these conditions, it is difficult to see how the use of sampling
can possibly run afoul of procedural rights. But the conditions are strin-
gent ones. The court must assure itself that budgetary constraints are
severe, that sampling is necessary to provide meaningful relief to high-
damage plaintiffs, and that the particular sampling technique actually
employed minimizes the bias effect. These conditions are not precisely
defined, and courts and parties may disagree about their implications in
particular cases. Nevertheless, they are sufficiently clear to impose sig-
nificant constraints on sampling.
In particular, high-damage plaintiffs should have a procedural right
to the best sampling technique practicable and an opportunity to object
to any sampling procedure that falls short. In many cases this right will
require the use of regression rather than sample averaging. If a regres-
sion model takes account of enough variables, it is likely to come closer
to actual damages than sample averaging for all plaintiffs."6 ' Regression
is more expensive, however, and sample averaging may be preferable if
budgetary constraints permit only a crude regression model.
These conclusions differ from those derived from the moral rights
conception. The moral rights argument defended sample averaging as
the best procedure in all cases because it compensated for ex ante ex-
pected loss and perfectly satisfied plaintiffs' moral entitlement. The ar-
gument from legal rights, on the other hand, defends sampling as a
second-best procedure warranted only because of extreme scarcity. It
makes a difference, therefore, whether one adopts a moral rights or a
legal rights conception; even if both can reconcile sampling with a
rights-based theory of adjudication, they impose different requirements
on its use.
IV. SAMPLING WITHIN A PROCESS-ORIENTED VIEW
The strongest objections to aggregative procedure have nothing to
do with outcome accuracy. They concern instead the extent to which
aggregation departs from the traditional adjudicative paradigm.6 2
Some critics focus on the nature of the proceeding itself, arguing that
aggregation, if taken too far, can strip adjudication of what they con-
sider its most essential attribute-a trial of factual and legal issues in
160. See Dworkin, A Matter of Principle at 84-89 (cited in note 107).
161. See notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
162. See, for example, Robinson and Abraham, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 1507 (cited in note 7) (not-
ing that process-based objections seem to dominate what little discussion of aggregative techniques
appears in the cases).
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the context of an individual dispute.16 These critics fear that mass
processing of claims will turn adjudication into administration and vio-
late separation-of-powers and Article III principles.
Given that class actions and court supervised settlements are ac-
ceptable,' however, it cannot be essential to adjudication that each
individual case receive its own separate trial. On the other hand, a sta-
tistical procedure that based decision only on aggregate information for
all cases and did not actually submit any individual case to a formal
trial might offend separation-of-powers principles.6 5  Sampling lies
somewhere between this extreme and traditional tort adjudication.
Sample cases are actually tried on their own facts and jury verdicts re-
turned.'66 The proceeding does not end in a collective award; rather,
individual judgments are entered in all cases based on the sample ver-
dicts. Furthermore, regression even makes it possible to tailor awards to
some of the unique features of each separate case.
Even so, sampling departs significantly from the traditional adjudi-
cative paradigm, and it is unclear whether the procedure is consistent
with separation-of-powers and Article III principles.6 7 If it is, sampling
163. See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (concluding that "[w]e are
persuaded on reflection that the procedures here called for comprise something other than a trial
within our authority. It is called a trial, but it is not").
164. For a discussion of the similarity between these procedures and sampling, see notes 20-
44 and accompanying text.
165. Judge Parker's original proposal to adjudicate the Cimino cases by lump-sum damages
came close to this aggregative extreme, although the Judge still allowed some individual trials. See
Fibreboard, 893 F.2d at 711-12. Judge Parker had intended to hold full trials of liability and dam-
ages for 11 class representatives and to collect aggregate information about damage-related vari-
ables for the entire class. The jury would never have entered a verdict in any individual case,
however, not even in the 11 cases that were actually tried. Instead, the jury would have relied on
all the information-information from the individual trials, expert testimony comparing the tried
cases with others in the class, and aggregate data on class members-to calculate a lump-sum
damages award for all the plaintiffs in each disease category. The lump-sum awards would then
have been distributed among individual class members without the aid of a trial or a jury. See id.
at 708-09 (describing this procedure).
166. Judge Parker may have been responding to separation-of-powers and Article III con-
cerns when he decided to give each sample case its own jury verdict. See Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at
653. The proceeding more closely resembles ordinary adjudication if at least some cases receive
ordinary jury verdicts. If separation of powers requires this much, however, it might also require
some sacrifice of outcome accuracy, because giving sample cases their own verdicts risks creating
an asymmetry of litigation incentives. This problem can be reduced somewhat by spreading litiga-
tion costs over all plaintiffs. See notes 77-86 (discussing the impact of sampling on the parties'
incentives to invest in the litigation).
167. Institutional reform litigation offers a helpful analogy. Some commentators have argued
that a federal court's active involvement at the remedial stage exceeds the proper scope of judicial
power and offends separation-of-powers principles. See Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of
Public Law Remedies, 79 Georgetown L. J. 1355, 1358-59 & n.9, 1403-06 (1991) (noting this criti-
cism and citing to some of the critics). These critics point to, among other things, the largely
political and administrative nature of the court's role in these suits. Yet, federal courts continue to
engage in this kind of remedial activity despite the separation-of-powers objections. This provides
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faces a second and potentially more troubling process-oriented objec-
tion. Sampling seems to deny most plaintiffs their right to a personal
day in court at the damages stage and does so for individualized issues
that are not suitable for conventional class action treatment.168 The
"day in court" ideal in American adjudication is linked to a process-
oriented view of adjudicative participation that values participation for
its own sake, not just for its impact on outcome quality. Participation is
important because it gives individuals a chance to make their own liti-
gation choices."6 9
Although reasons may exist to doubt the coherence of a process-
oriented participation right in adjudication,1 0 such a right is an impor-
tant part of the American litigation system and continues to survive, at
least on a rhetorical level, despite inroads made by the class action,
large-scale consolidations, and court-supervised settlements. To moti-
vate the following analysis and to address the strongest plausible case
against sampling, I assume that the parties to mass tort cases have pro-
cess-oriented participation rights that can trump utility and that those
rights guarantee a robust form of individual control, including control
over litigation of all significant issues relating to the determination of
individual damages.11 I also assume that the intrinsic value of partici-
some support for an interpretation of separation-of-powers and Article III principles that allows
court adjustment of procedure to the demands of a particular case (at least so long as the resulting
process does not violate any formally promulgated procedural rules). See generally id. at 1427-44
(defending a deliberative model of remedial decisionmaking in public law cases).
168. For recognition of the right to a day in court, see Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762
(1989); and Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979).
169. I have attempted to establish these propositions in earlier articles. See Bone, 67 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. at 193 (cited in note 17); Bone, 70 B.U. L. Rev. at 213 (cited in note 37).
170. For a more detailed discussion, see Bone, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 279-88. While I agree
that participation has intrinsic value that can count in favor of a participation right in some situa-
tions, I am not persuaded by the usual justifications for process-oriented participation because
they ignore the fact that adjudication is an institution designed primarily to produce quality
outcomes.
171. While it is true that most statistical procedures give everyone some opportunity to par-
ticipate, they also deprive parties whose cases are decided by statistical extrapolation of a chance
to litigate important factual and legal issues critical to individual recovery. Under the stratified
sampling procedure used in Cimino, for example, those not selected for the sample can litigate the
propriety of sampling and presumably also the proper classification of their cases. By the same
token, the claim-profile approach advocated by Professors Abraham and Robinson gives at least
some of the parties an opportunity to challenge the statistical methodology used to generate the
profiles, and gives each party a chance to litigate the choice of claim profile for her case. However,
both approaches leave those outside the sample with severely limited litigation opportunities,
since, as we have seen, any statistical approach must average over many damage-related variables
if it is to succeed in cutting back substantially on litigation costs.
There is a possible exception to these process-oriented concerns, however. If each plaintiff's
substantive right guaranteed only the statistically generated outcome, then it might follow that no
plaintiff has a process-oriented right to a trial on individual injury, since individual issues would
be legally irrelevant to her claim. This might be true, for example, of the corrective justice argn-
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pation is historically tied to respect for individual autonomy: allowing a
person to participate before subjecting him to the coercive power of the
state respects his dignity as an autonomous moral agent.17 1
These assumptions pose two problems for sampling. First, sampling
deprives many plaintiffs of a full trial opportunity. But this is an inevi-
table result of scarcity. Judges have no direct control over the legisla-
ture's budget, and they must work with the resources at their disposal.
Thus, the second problem is the more serious for the judiciary-how to
justify the way sampling distributes trial opportunities.
Large-scale mass tort litigation produces conflicts among process-
oriented participation rights because of the scarcity of litigation re-
sources. If there is not enough to go around, the justification for sam-
pling must turn on the answer to a question of distributive justice:
What is a fair way to distribute limited litigation opportunities? This
question is complicated by the fact that each party has an equal claim
of right to the process goods173 being distributed.17 4 Consequently, cer-
tain utilitarian solutions are ruled out. In the absence of party consent,
for example, it would not be proper to distribute litigation opportuni-
ment for the sample average outlined in Part III.C. since that argument defends a substantive
right to compensation only in the amount of expected loss. In any event, it is clear that one must
deal with process-oriented concerns as long as one recognizes a right to compensation for actual
harm and uses sampling as a measuring device.
172. See Bone, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 265 (cited in note 17). I should make clear that I, for
one, do not necessarily endorse all of these assumptions as a prescriptive matter. I believe there are
good reasons to stop short of recognizing an expansive process-oriented participation right in adju-
dication. I make these assumptions because they seem necessary to explain the way current proce-
dural law treats litigative participation. In addition, these assumptions create the most difficulties
for sampling, and it makes sense in defending sampling to deal with the most forceful opposing
arguments that can plausibly be made. If sampling can survive a challenge based on broad process-
oriented participation rights, as I argue it can, then it should pass muster under less expansive
views of individual participation.
173. By the term "process goods," I mean any kind of participation opportunity traditionally
associated with American adjudication. The characterization of participation opportunities as
"goods" is justified by the assumption that participation is a consumption good for the parties to
the litigation. Process goods therefore include individual control over one's own suit as well as
control shared with co-parties in a multi-party suit. Control is, of course, limited by the back-
ground rules that regulate litigation, but the participation right guarantees a level of participation
that constrains the choice of background rules.
174. Professors Abraham and Robinson recognize the underlying equality of participation
right. Robinson and Abraham, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 1503 (cited in note 7) (noting that "if there is a
due process right to individualized adjudication, it must be in recognition of an equal right enjoyed
by other, similarly situated claimants"). They do not recognize its full implications, however. They
use equality to argue that no claimant can insist on individualized adjudication to the detriment of
another claimant with an equal right. I dispute this proposition later in this Article. See notes 253-
56 and accompanying text. For now, it is enough to note that even if the proposition were true, the
question of distribution would still remain, and a court would still have to determine which




ties only to those who are likely to litigate most efficiently because such
a distribution fails to respect the underlying equality of right.
Sampling distributes by random lottery. 7 5 Each party receives the
same chance at a full trial and an expectation equal to the total number
of trials divided by the total number of cases in the sample. A lottery
has much to commend it. Everyone receives the same good-a certain
probability of a full trial opportunity. To be sure, not just any sampling
procedure will do. By using stratified sampling in Cimino, for example,
Judge Parker constructed a lottery that gave different chances to plain-
tiffs with different diseases.7M An unequal distribution of this sort will
offend equality of right if the strength of a participation right remains
the same across disease types.17 7 If all persons with equal rights get
equal chances, however, what could possibly be wrong with a lottery?
The problem is that we do not usually associate lotteries with adju-
dication. If neighbors choose conflicting land uses and each asserts an
abstract right to freedom of use in a nuisance action, we would think it
wrong'for a court to resolve the dispute by flipping a coin, even though
this procedure gives each claimant an equal chance to enjoy her pre-
ferred use. 8 A judge must reason to a decision, and not just any reason
will do. Normally we think that reasons count only if they appeal to
morally relevant considerations and provide moral grounds for the los-
ing party to accept her loss. Unless chance has moral significance, a coin
flip cannot possibly satisfy this requirement. 7 9 If this is true of deci-
175. The claim-profile approach of Professors Abraham and Robinson appears to distribute
on a first-come, first-served basis. However, their approach may actually be equivalent to a lottery
if each plaintiff has an equal ex ante chance of being one of the first to litigate her case.
176. The Cimino sampling procedure gave the following chances to the following disease cat-
egories (the ratios are computed by dividing the sample size by the size of the total population for
each disease category):
Mesothelioma - 15/32 = .47
Lung Cancer - 25/186 = .13
Other Cancer - 20/58 .34
Asbestosis - 50/1050 .05
Pleural Disease - 50/972 = .05
See Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653 (listing sample size and population size for each disease category).
177. For the distribution of chances in Cimino to be justifiable, participation rights would
have to vary in a completely implausible way. For example, participation rights would have to be
much stronger for mesothelioma than for lung cancer victims. See note 176.
178. See generally Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 603, 610-11 (1985)
(describing events in which a judge was censured for flipping a coin to decide whether a criminal
defendant should serve 20 or 30 days in jail).
179. In the hypothetical nuisance suit, for example, the court might reason on the basis of a
social contract theory that absolute property rights must be qualified in order for all to share in
the mutual advantages of organized society. Along these lines a reciprocity norm might justify
enjoining the party who creates an interference substantially in excess of the prevailing level in the
surrounding community. For the different types of argument used in nuisance cases historically,
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sions regarding conflicting substantive rights, however, why is it not
equally true of decisions regarding conflicting procedural rights?
The following discussion first reviews the standard arguments used
to defend aggregation against process-oriented objections and then ex-
amines the distributional problem in the sampling context.
A. The Standard Arguments
Aggregation proponents often respond to the challenge from pro-
cess-oriented participation with three types of argument: an argument
based on consent, an argument that equates process value with psycho-
logical states, and an argument that dismisses the participation right as
having no practical reality in actual litigation practice. None of these
arguments, however, is entirely satisfactory. 180
1. The Consent Argument
If defendants have an opportunity to present evidence and argu-
ment on all the critical issues in the course of adjudicating a representa-
tive sample of cases, they have little reason to object to sampling on
participation grounds.18' Consent, therefore, is significant primarily for
plaintiffs.
With no realistic alternatives available, it is hardly surprising that
plaintiffs consent to sampling. Sampling's defenders then invoke this
consent to justify the impact on participation values.'8 We have al-
ready examined the difficulties with using plaintiffs' consent to justify
sampling's effect on outcome.'83 Similar problems plague its use on the
process side as well.
see Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850-
1920, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1101 (1986).
180. Nor does an argument based on representational adequacy fare any better. As we have
already seen, the idea of interest representation embodied in the modern class action would have
to be stretched quite far to justify the coercive imposition of sampling in large damages suits. See
notes 20-38 and accompanying text. Furthermore, even if courts were willing to expand representa-
tion, the distributional justice question would still remain. So long as parties retain background
process-oriented rights to actual participation even when special circumstances demand that they
settle for representation, there is still a question of how to decide which plaintiffs should serve as
the "representative parties" entitled to litigate their own suits.
181. Unless they have some reason to relitigate these issues in each individual case, defend-
ants have no basis to complain about lack of participation. See Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322 (1979) (holding that defendants can be barred from relitigating issues that they have
already litigated and lost). Defendants may have cause for complaint only if they do not get a
chance to litigate factual or legal issues that are unique to cases outside of the sample. For a
discussion of the due process and jury trial issues involved, see Resnik and Rowe Letter at 16-19
(cited in note 9).
182. See, for example, Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 665-66; Saks and Blanck, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at
825, 829 n.102 (cited in note 14).
183. See notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
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Consent figures in the analysis of sampling's impact on process-ori-
ented participation rights in two ways: it can be used to justify a court's
distribution of less than full participation opportunities to everyone,
and it can be used to justify the particular distribution a court makes of
those limited participation opportunities that are available. The prob-
lem with using consent in the first way is similar to the problem dis-
cussed in the outcome section.8 4 If delay costs force actual recovery
below a fair minimum, plaintiffs have no chance to seek a meaningful
remedy through individual adjudication and thus no reason to choose
this form of participation. 8 5 A plaintiff's consent to sampling under
these circumstances cannot possibly count as a waiver of an individual
trial because the plaintiff has no reasonable opportunity to obtain an
individual trial in the first place.
It is not clear that individual waivers should be required, however,
before a court distributes in some manner the limited process goods
that it has at its disposal. If there are not enough process goods to go
around, it would seem more sensible for the court to distribute what is
available than to leave plaintiffs to endure the consequences of severe
delay and the effective denial of meaningful relief. 86 For the remainder
of Part IV, I shall assume that the court can distribute through an ag-
gregation and need not remit plaintiffs to individual trials.
Nevertheless, the fact that some kind of limited distribution can be
made does not mean that just any kind of distribution is permissible.
The existence of participation rights constrains the court's choice of
distribution scheme. Consent, therefore, enters the analysis in a second
way, as a means of justifying a particular distribution as against alter-
native possibilities.
184. See notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
185. Participation has intrinsic value only if there is something to gain in the way of outcome
from participating, and the state hardly respects the dignity of those it affects through adjudica-
tion when it gives them only an opportunity to participate for its own sake. The notion that pro-
cess-oriented participation depends on outcome to this extent is not inconsistent with the
assumption of process value. It does assume, however, that process value is secondary to outcome
value in the sense that a nonnegative expected outcome is necessary to a plaintiff's deriving intrin-
sic value from participation. This is a reasonable assumption. No rational person is likely to pay
simply to litigate for the sake of litigating. Furthermore, this degree of outcome-dependence is not
unusual in other areas of social life. A person playing a carnival game, for example, may value the
experience of playing the game only if there is some chance that she will win a prize in the end.
186. Requiring waivers can also create a collective action problem similar to the one dis-
cussed in the outcome section. See note 120. Plaintiffs who anticipate that sampling will ease the
congestion problem have an incentive to decline a waiver and insist on an individual trial. If all
plaintiffs in the aggregation act in this way, however, it will not be possible to keep the aggregation
together, and a court will not be able to provide meaningful relief. Under these circumstances, all
plaintiffs would agree to distribute the opportunities that are available if only they could be sure
their co-plaintiffs would agree as well.
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For consent to justify a particular distribution, however, plaintiffs
must have access to a range of distribution schemes, be aware of the
alternatives, and make an informed choice among them. Consent can-
not justify the choice of random sampling over other distribution meth-
ods if, for example, the court allows no other alternative, or the parties
are unaware of the alternatives and thus cannot select among them.187
Under these circumstances random sampling must be justified indepen-
dently of consent.
Mass tort litigation presents special problems in this regard. Attor-
neys rarely communicate with their clients in these cases, and to the
extent the attorney controls the litigation primarily for her own benefit,
there is no guarantee that her decision about random sampling or any
other distribution scheme will reflect her client's wishes.188 Even if a
plaintiff cares deeply about individual participation, the attorney is not
likely to care at all unless her fee depends on participation in some way.
To illustrate, suppose that an attorney receives the same contin-
gency fee whether or not she actually litigates. Suppose further that the
court gives all plaintiffs, including those in the sample group, the sam-
ple average and spreads total litigation costs equally over the entire
plaintiff population.189 Unless the attorney doubts the litigating incen-
tives or wherewithal of other counsel, she will want to minimize the
chance of being selected for trial, since she incurs opportunity costs in
trying a case and gains nothing as a result.190 This means that the attor-
187. For example, it is unlikely that the plaintiffs in Cimino had any opportunity to make an
informed choice among alternatives. Indeed, there is no evidence in the Cimino opinion that Judge
Parker placed any weight on the plaintiffs' participation rights when designing his sampling ap-
proach. The opinion focuses on outcome and assumes that consent vitiates all of the plaintiffs'
concerns.
188. See authorities cited in note 82.
189. This is the approach recommended in Part III.B.
190. Of course, attorney incentives depend on the starting assumptions about fees. But
agency problems are likely to remain under any plausible arrangement. For example, consider a
class action where the judge has power to review fees for class counsel. See Venegas v. Mitchell,
495 U.S. 82 (1990); Dunn v. H. K. Porter Co., 602 F.2d 1105 (3d Cir. 1979); Coffee, 54 U. Chi. L.
Rev. at 881 nn.11-12 (cited in note 82). If the judge scales down the fee for those attorneys who do
not actually litigate, an attorney will have something to gain if her case is chosen for the sample.
On the other hand, trials are costly and the attorney absorbs that cost under a contingency ar-
rangement. Thus, even if the total cost of all trials is spread over the entire plaintiff population,
the attorney may still have an incentive to minimize the size of the sample, although the strength
of her incentive will vary with the magnitude of the contingency factor.
Similarly, changing the verdict and cost-allocation rules is not likely to eliminate agency
problems. In the Cimino case, for example, Judge Parker gave the sample plaintiffs their own
verdicts rather than the sample average. Under these circumstances, an attorney who represents a
high-damage plaintiff receives some benefit from being chosen to try that case. But she also stands
to lose if her clients include plaintiffs with below-average damages who are also chosen for the
sample. If her case portfolio is randomly distributed over all types of cases (or because of uncer-
tainty about other cases, she assumes that it is), she can expect actual damages to average out to
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ney is likely to consent to the smallest possible sample and to the least
expensive distribution scheme, even if there are enough resources for a
larger sample and even if her client would prefer some other distribu-
tion method that gives the client a greater chance at trial. Furthermore,
an overburdened judge is not likely to object if the plaintiffs' attorneys
agree, provided minimum outcome standards are satisfied. Thus, plain-
tiffs may end up with a sampling procedure that distributes an unnec-
essarily small number of trials and does so without regard to how
plaintiffs actually value participation.
Unfortunately, individual notice cannot solve this problem. Even if
notice informs all plaintiffs of the different sampling options, the ulti-
mate choice cannot be left to the plaintiff group because any effective
sampling procedure requires the involvement of all plaintiffs. But, as we
shall see, those procedures on which all plaintiffs can agree include
some distribution methods, such as an auction, that sacrifice outcome
quality to an unreasonable extent. 91 To justify sampling's impact on
participation values, therefore, we must look beyond consent.
2. The Psychological Argument
Some argue that participation's intrinsic value is purely psychologi-
cal: those who participate are likely to be more satisfied with the out-
come and the process that produced it. According to this view, sampling
is justified because it improves overall satisfaction by making meaning-
ful recovery possible. Although the procedural psychology literature
supports a correlation between participation and positive litigation ex-
perience, 9 there is a problem with this argument. A psychological the-
ory of process value cannot possibly account for the historical
commitment to individual participation and control in American adju-
dication. A strong participation right can be justified only by a norma-
tive theory of process value that grounds the value of participation in
the conditions of adjudicative legitimacy, such as respect for a party's
dignity or autonomy. 93
the mean, and as a result, she will gain nothing from a trial. Furthermore, even if the attorney
represents just high-damage plaintiffs, she will make her decision about sampling by considering
only outcome variables and will not consider the process value associated with an opportunity to
participate directly in the litigation, even if her client values that opportunity very highly.
191. See notes 246-52 and accompanying text.
192. See, for example, E. Allan Lind and Tom Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural
Justice, 26-40, 61-127 (Plenum, 1988); John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, Procedural Justice: A
Psychological Analysis (Laurence Erlbaum, 1975); E. Allan Lind, et al., In the Eye of the Be-
holder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 L. &
Soc'y Rev. 953, 967-87 (1990).
193. See Bone, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 233-36 (cited in note 17).
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A concern with litigant satisfaction by itself leads naturally to a
utilitarian approach that is inconsistent with the status of participation
as a utility-trumping right. Satisfaction, after all, is a measure of utility,
and no individual plaintiff has any better claim than anyone else to
have her utility counted. Thus, the best way to decide whether plain-
tiffs should be allowed to participate is to evaluate the consequences for
aggregate utility.
Not surprisingly Professors Saks and Blanck, after equating partic-
ipation value with satisfaction, find it easy to endorse a utilitarian justi-
fication of sampling.19 4 They argue that sampling maximizes plaintiffs'
total satisfaction as compared to individual trials and bilateral settle-
ments.195 What they do not realize, however, is that utilitarianism, once
unleashed, can cut deeply into participation opportunities in a wide ar-
ray of cases.
Saks and Blanck would confine the domain of utility maximization
to the set of plaintiffs belonging to a single mass tort aggregation.' 96
But they offer no justification for stopping at this point. Why not count
the utility that other parties derive from being able to adjudicate their
cases more quickly due to a reduction in mass tort trials? And why not
count the utility that taxpayers and others receive when resources com-
mitted to adjudication are redirected to other productive uses? If utility
is allowed this wide a range, however, it is difficult to defend the strong
preference for individual participation that has been central to Ameri-
can adjudication and difficult to limit sampling to situations of severe
budgetary constraint.'9 7
3. The Practical Argument
The third argument discounts the participation right by denying
the reality of actual participation. 9 8 Saks and Blanck make this argu-
ment when they observe that plaintiffs in individual tort cases rarely
exercise control at all and that most tort cases usually settle before
trial.' 9 The point of these comparisons is to show that there is no ac-
194. See Saks and Blanck, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 838-39 (cited in note 14). But see id. at 832
n.129 (recognizing the moral dimension of participation but giving it short shrift).
195. Id. at 839.
196. Id.
197. Compare Bone, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 238-56 (cited in note 17) (discussing the effect of
an efficiency-based theory on the participation right).
198. See, for example, Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 666; Hensler, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 92-99
(cited in note 39); Rosenberg, 69 B.U. L. Rev. at 702 (cited in note 122). It is worth noting that
evidence suggests that lack of party control is not the result of party choice but of attorney domi-
nation. See Hensler, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 95 (noting that parties who claimed lack of control
attributed it to their attorney's conduct not their own choice).
199. See Saks and Blanck, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 839-41 (cited in note 14).
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tual value in participation because there is no actual participation in
ordinary litigation.
This argument suffers from the same problem as the previous one
to the extent it assumes that participation is about satisfaction and
concludes that aggregative procedures are not likely to reduce satisfac-
tion below its current level. The argument has an even deeper flaw,
however. If parties have rights to participate derived from the moral
requirements of adjudicative legitimacy, procedural arrangements that
deny participation require explanation just as much as sampling, and it
makes no sense to justify sampling by comparing it to procedures that
require justification themselves.
The prevalence of settlement in mass tort cases supports a some-
what different version of this argument. 00 Given the likelihood of set-
tlement, it is reasonable to assume that sampling, by reducing delay
costs and thus defendant's incentive to hold out, will increase the fre-
quency of mass tort settlements rather than clear the way for actual
trials. If trials are not likely to take place, the argument goes, there is
no reason to worry about trial participation at all.20'
There are three problems with this argument. First, even if settle-
ments are inevitable, courts still must consider participation values. If
the prospect of settlement allowed courts to ignore participation alto-
gether, there would be no reason for many of the existing limitations on
nonparty preclusion and the class action.
Second, not all cases settle. Even when both parties desire a settle-
ment, negotiations can break down due to strategic interaction ef-
fects. 202  When settlement efforts fail and sampling must be
implemented, the rules should assure a fair distribution of participation
opportunities.
Finally, even if a case settles, the settlement amount should reflect
the value of going to trial. This value includes two components: the ex-
pected value of the trial outcome and the expected value of trial partici-
pation. But participation value depends on how the sampling procedure
distributes trial opportunities. Thus, the fairness of the settlement de-
pends on the fairness of the distribution scheme even if that scheme is
never actually implemented.
200. See, for example, Saks, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1212-13 (cited in note 53) (collecting data
showing high rates of settlement).
201. For an example of this argument, see Weinstein and Hershenov, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. at
325-26 (cited in note 19).
202. See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 487-92 (Scott, Foresman,
1988) (explaining how the choice between hard and soft bargaining strategies can create an equilib-
rium in which some cases still go to trial).
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B. The Circumstances of Justice
In his monumental work on social justice, David Hume defined cir-
cumstances of justice as those social conditions, like selfishness and
scarcity, that bring distributional fairness concerns into play. 0 3 Two
circumstances of justice frame the fairness analysis for sampling: the
process-oriented participation right and the scarcity of process goods.
1. The Nature of the Process-Oriented Participation Right
Three features of the participation right are critical to the evalua-
tion of distributional schemes: scope, strength, and commensurability.
Scope defines the kind of entitlement the right confers. In an illuminat-
ing treatment of distributional lotteries, Professors Lewis Kornhauser
and Lawrence Sager distinguish three kinds of entitlement: those that
guarantee treatment as an equal, those that guarantee equal treatment,
and those that guarantee access to the good itself.2 04
The participation right obviously guarantees much more than
treatment as an equal. Treatment as an equal requires no particular
level of participation. Indeed, it makes no demand on distributional
outcomes at all. It only requires that each person's interests be fairly
considered in the distribution process. 0 5 So long as this condition is
satisfied, any distributional scheme, even one that distributes only to
those who litigate most efficiently, would be perfectly consistent with
the right.
Furthermore, the participation right entitles its holder to more
than just equal treatment. Equal treatment is a comparative norm; it
gives person A a benefit only if person B receives the benefit as well.2 06
Thus, equal treatment would be perfectly satisfied if no one received
anything at all. The participation right is not contingent in this way; its
guarantee of litigation control does not depend on the participation op-
portunities others receive.0
On the other hand, there is a way in which the right is contingent.
No one could insist on the robust form of control associated with an
adversarial trial, for example, if American adjudication had always been
203. See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 494-95 (Clarendon, 2d ed. 1978).
204. Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, Just Lotteries, 27 Soc. Sci. Information
483, 493-95 (1988). In framing the circumstances of justice I rely to a considerable extent on the
analytical framework outlined in this essay. Kornhauser and Sager also consider situations in
which no one has a moral entitlement at all, but these do not apply to our problem.
205. Id. at 495.
206. See Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 387 (1985).
207. For example, a party could claim a violation of due process if a court denied her all




based on a judge-centered, inquisitorial model.208 Thus, the participa-
tion right confers an entitlement to the process good itself, but the
scope of the right depends to a significant extent on conventionally ac-
cepted procedural norms.
If conventional norms supported a participation right that only
guaranteed an opportunity for input into a lawsuit, the scarcity prob-
lem could be easily solved. For example, a court could litigate sample
cases with a committee of lawyers representing different plaintiffs or
hold a fairness hearing at which plaintiffs could air objections about the
sampling procedure and the appropriateness of their individual ver-
dicts.209 The participation right, however, extends beyond limited input;
the "day in court" ideal has traditionally guaranteed a large measure of
individual control over litigation strategy.
The second question concerns the strength of the participation
right and in particular whether all parties have equally strong rights.
This consideration is important because a lottery that gives all plain-
tiffs equal probabilities might be unfair if some plaintiffs have stronger
rights than others. As used here, the "strength" of a right is a compara-
tive notion. While all participation rights guarantee the same degree of
individual control, stronger rights deserve greater weight when there is
a rights conflict, and they entitle their holders to some form of priority
in a distribution scheme.21 0
Some commentators argue that participation rights are stronger for
personal injury than for property damage cases, but precedent offers
little support for this position.211 One might be tempted to draw a simi-
208. The inquisitorial system currently in operation in Germany and other civil law countries
gives the judge and judicial officers broad power over the investigation and presentation of a case
and leaves parties with only very limited control opportunities. See John H. Langbein, The Ger-
man Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823 (1985); Benjamin Kaplan, Civil Proce-
dure-Reflections on the Comparison of Systems, 9 Buff. L. Rev. 409 (1960).
209. For background on litigation committees, see Manual for Complex Litigation §§ 20.21-
20.225 (West, 1986). Courts hold fairness hearings when reviewing class action settlements. These
hearings involve relatively informal procedures and give class members an opportunity to voice
objections to the settlement. See id. § 30.44 at 159-61; see also Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange on
Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts 173-74 (Belknap, 1986) (describing fairness hearings
conducted by Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation).
210. For example, a lottery might have to allocate chances proportional to relative strength if
participation rights varied in strength. Alternatively, it might be necessary to distribute process
goods in lexical order with the strongest rights receiving full satisfaction before lesser rights re-
ceived anything at all. In either case the resulting distribution may not be sufficiently random to
assure a reasonably accurate sampling procedure from an outcome point of view, forcing a court to
resolve the tension between process and outcome values. I discuss a similar problem later in this
Article. See notes 239-42, 250-52 and accompanying text.
211. See Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 Cornell L.
Rev. 779, 816-31 (1985); Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 69 (1989). For a criticism of this argument, see Bone, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 265 n.245
(cited in note 17)
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lar distinction by focusing on the severity of the injury, arguing, for
example, that cancer victims have stronger participation rights than
those who suffer from less severe forms of injury. Distinctions of this
kind might make sense if the participation right depended on psycho-
logical factors that varied with the degree or kind of harm. But this is
not the case. The right protects autonomy and dignity values that as-
sure fair treatment at the hands of the state, and those values do not
depend on the nature of mass tort injury.212 Thus, I shall assume that
the strength of the right is the same for all cases.
The final dimension that needs clarification is commensurability
and in particular whether the participation right can be valued in terms
of the rightholder's preference for participation. Some rights are valued
independently of preference; either preferences are treated as infinite,
or subjective valuation is thought to be inconsistent with the moral
character of the right.213 For example, someone contemplating suicide
may prefer to die than to continue living, but her preference is irrele-
vant to the value society places on her right not to be killed.1 4
The participation right is not this kind of right. Parties routinely
place a monetary value on the right whenever they settle cases, and the
procedural system, by facilitating settlement, even encourages them to
do so. 215 Furthermore, it is possible in theory to give a finite value to a
preference for participation.216 Suppose, for example, that there is an
212. Under this view, a pleural disease victim would be entitled to the same degree of respect
from the state and thus the same level of participation as a mesothelioma victim. I have argued
elsewhere that American adjudication recognizes some distinctions among participation rights, but
those distinctions do not generally apply to mass tort cases. See Bone, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 264-79
(cited in note 17) (discussing the principles of remedial homogeneity and litigative autonomy).
213. See Guido Calabresi and Phillip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices 39 (Norton, 1978); Kornhauser
and Sager, 27 Soc. Sci. Info. at 508-09 (cited in note 204). See also Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987) (noting how the market tends toward commodifica-
tion and recommending that some choices be excluded from the market in order to preserve their
noncommodified value).
214. This statement should be qualified somewhat given that society routinely tolerates and
even encourages socially beneficial activities, such as industrial employment and mass product
marketing, that are virtually certain to kill or seriously injure someone. Risk is inevitable and with
a large enough group of risk bearers, someone is bound to suffer harm. Most people feel differently,
however, when the activity is certain to cause serious harm to a victim known in advance. Thus, in
a real world version of the Trolley Problem, it would not be morally acceptable to turn the trolley
toward five people on one track just because the switch controller knows that those people wish to
die and that the one person on the other track wishes to live. See generally Judith Jarvis Thomp-
son, The Trolley Problem, 94 Yale L. J. 1395 (1985).
215. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
216. The approach described in the text may elicit a low value for the participation right due
to the influence of the so-called "endowment effect." The endowment effect describes the tendency
of people to value the loss of something they already have more highly than the gain of something
they have yet to receive when loss and gain have the same objective value. The method in the text
elicits a value for a gain because it asks the party how much she would be willing to pay in order to
acquire a participation right. By changing the starting point, it would be possible to elicit a value
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aggregative procedure that gives the same expected outcome as an indi-
vidual trial but no chance to control the litigation. Suppose further that
each plaintiff is given a choice whether to accept the aggregative proce-
dure or hold out for a trial. Depending on the magnitude of the delay
cost and the strength of her preference for individual participation, a
plaintiff should be willing to wait some period of time, and no longer, to
receive an individual trial. The maximum delay cost the party is willing
to incur can be used to measure the value she places on participation.2 17
More importantly, taking account of individual preference fits the
moral character of the participation right. Participation derives intrin-
sic value from an autonomy norm-the individual gets a chance to
make her own choices about litigation strategy. If the right protects in-
dividual autonomy, it makes sense to credit preferences and autono-
mous choice when deciding how to distribute participation
opportunities. It would not promote autonomy in anything but a purely
symbolic way to give a litigation opportunity to someone who placed
zero value on participation or to force a trial on someone who would
rather not control her own suit. Nor would it promote autonomy if a
court were to disregard a mutual agreement among the plaintiffs speci-
fying a distribution scheme, assuming the agreement was consistent
with outcome values. 21 8
2. The Nature of Process Scarcity
As we saw in the discussion of consent, the idea of process scarcity
depends on an assumption about minimally acceptable outcomes.2"9 If
all parties eventually get a chance to litigate their cases, the adjudica-
tion system does not deny anyone a formal opportunity to control her
own suit. Furthermore, complaints about limited resources and litiga-
for a loss by asking the party how much she would be willing to receive in order to give up a
participation right she already had. If the endowment effect literature is correct, the former mea-
sure should be less than the latter. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the En-
dowment Effect, 20 J. Legal Stud. 225 (1991) (discussing the endowment effect).
217. This method works only for those who place a positive or zero value on the participation
right. It is possible that some parties value adversary participation negatively and would be willing
to pay something for the opportunity to receive damages without having to litigate. Of course, if
everyone placed a negative or zero value on participation, it would be difficult to justify a partici-
pation right. One might argue that the right was nonetheless compelled by some natural law of
process, but the fact that no one valued the right should raise serious doubts about its natural law
pedigree.
218. Later in the Article, I present a defense of the random lottery based on a hypothetical
agreement. See notes 260-76 and accompanying text.
219. See notes 114-15, 185 and accompanying text.
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tion delay are chronic features of the litigation system.2 20 If scarcity
triggers special obligations to distribute process goods fairly, there is
sound reason to confine the concept to extraordinary situations. Thus,
to make sense of extreme scarcity, we need some way to set a maximum
limit on permissible delay that separates the extraordinary from the
routine.
One way to do this is to link scarcity to outcome quality.221 As liti-
gation delay increases, a plaintiff's expected recovery net of delay costs
decreases. At some point on the delay continuum, expected recovery
falls below some minimally acceptable level, which depends on one's
view of what is required for individual litigation to be a practical alter-
native. One might set the minimum at zero, for example, by reasoning
that the participation right is eviscerated only when no person can ex-
pect to gain anything from exercising it. Alternatively, someone con-
cerned with fairness could defend a minimum level above zero by
arguing that compensation below that minimum is morally
unacceptable.222
For purposes of the following discussion, I assume that a maximum
limit to lawsuit duration has been set by reference to some minimally
acceptable floor to expected recovery. In order to conclude that process
scarcity exists, we need to clarify two additional items: how to deter-
mine the units used to count available process goods, and how to deter-
mine the number of cases that those goods must service.
In order to compare the number of process goods to the number of
rights claims, process units must correspond to the kind of participation
that the right guarantees. If, as we have assumed, the participation
right guarantees control opportunities associated with conventional
forms of tort litigation, then process units should include the bipolar
suit in which each party exercises broad control over litigation strategy,
220. See Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Law-
suit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3-4 & passim
(1989).
221. Another Way is to set a limit on permissible delay directly. For example, the Civil Jus-
tice Reform Act of f990 suggests that district courts set a target for civil cases of 18 months from
filing to the beginning of trial. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1990). If this target were enforcea-
ble as an absolute limit (which it is not), the sheer volume and complexity of mass tort litigation
would probably make it impossible to comply within existing budgetary constraints, and a condi-
tion of scarcity would surely exist. See Ad Hoc Committee Report at 10-11 (cited in note 9).
222. For an argument that procedures should be designed to take account of unfairness to
third parties affected by serious delay costs, see Jon 0. Newman, Comment, Rethinking Fairness:
Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 Yale L. J. 1643, 1649-52 (1985). Furthermore, a utilita-
rian could argue that the substantive law's deterrent effect would be unacceptably compromised if
expected recovery fell below some positive amount. In fact, although it is more difficult to see,
there is no conceptual obstacle to deriving a delay limit from some ideal view of the institution of
adjudication supporting a norm of reasonably prompt judgments.
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as well as the traditional multiparty suit in which a few parties share
the litigation stage but retain considerable freedom to make their own
strategic decisions.
At the same time, it is important to note that process goods are not
indivisible. ' Control is a continuous variable, and while scarcity must
be evaluated in terms of process units that reflect broad control, it is at
least possible to design procedures that give much less.224
The final issue concerns the proper definition of the domain over
which available process goods must be distributed. For example, the
distribution could take place over a single aggregation of asbestos cases
such as the 2298 cases in Cimino v. Raymark Industries, over all asbes-
tos cases, over all mass tort cases, or even over all cases. The choice is
critical because it specifies the parameters for deciding which cases
have equal claims on a single bundle of process goods and how many
process goods there are in the bundle.
Because of its broad power over procedure, a legislature's choices
should normally control.2 5 If a legislature appropriates funds specifi-
cally for the adjudication of asbestos cases, for example, then courts
ought to treat asbestos cases separately from other types of cases. Simi-
larly, because distinct sovereignties are involved, federal cases ordina-
rily should be treated separately from state cases and cases from
different states separately from one another.2 2
Without more specific legislative direction, however, I see no prin-
cipled way to limit the distributional domain to anything less than all
cases in a particular jurisdiction. This does not mean that a federal
judge has to count all the litigation opportunities available nationwide
and consider the effect on all federal court litigants every time she de-
cides on a fair distribution in a particular case. Distributional fairness
should be addressed by a legislature or other rulemaking body at the
stage of designing general procedural rules, and to the extent an indi-
vidual judge follows those rules, she should be immune from criticism
on distributional grounds. 27
223. On the importance of indivisibility to a lottery distribution, see Kornhauser and Sager,
27 Soc. Sci. Information at 504-05 (cited in note 204).
224. I discuss below whether procedures offering less than the normal range of control oppor-
tunities can partially satisfy the participation right and whether, if they can, it is better to dis-
tribute process goods by giving some form of truncated participation to everyone rather than
giving full trials to some. See notes 231-42 and accompanying text.
225. See notes 133-34, 158 and accompanying text.
226. I will not address the issue of whether similar deference is ever owed to an administra-
tive agency charged with allocating funds pursuant to legislative direction.
227. Relevant rules include those dealing with consolidation, joinder, transfer, and venue.
See, for example, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 1404, 1406 (1988); F.R.C.P. 18-20, 42(a).
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On the other hand, a judge has an obligation to attend to fairness
norms whenever she exercises discretion. In mass tort cases, for exam-
ple, a judge has considerable discretion to affect the size of a case aggre-
gation. The larger the aggregation, the more rights claims will be
included in one distribution and the fairer the resulting distribution
will be. Manageability criteria and outcome standards place limits on
feasible size, of course, just as venue and consolidation rules limit the
number of cases available for aggregation at any one time.228 Yet,
within these limits, a judge should construct as large an aggregation as
possible. The choice of aggregation size and the number of process
goods to be distributed is a matter of judgment and should be left
largely to the discretion of the individual trial judge. But the judge
should be required to assess the relevant factors, including process and
outcome variables, and publicly justify the choices she makes.
With a minimally acceptable floor to expected recovery, a defini-
tion of process units, and a definition of the appropriate distributional
domain, it is possible to determine whether there are enough process
goods to give everyone an individual opportunity to litigate. If there is
not enough to go around, a condition of scarcity exists, and cases must
be aggregated to distribute the available process goods fairly.
C. Distributional Solutions
In this section I assume that the circumstances of justice are satis-
fied: participation rights are as I have defined them, and a condition of
scarcity exists for mass tort cases. Furthermore, I assume that a judge
has assembled the largest aggregation practicable and determined the
proper number of process goods to distribute. To make the problem
more concrete, imagine that Judge Parker, after considering the effects
on other litigation, has decided to aggregate 2298 cases and distribute
160 individual damage trials,229 and imagine that he has justified his
choices publicly.2 30
The problem that we now address is how Judge Parker should dis-
tribute the 160 trials among the 2298 cases. There are two general ap-
proaches to solving this problem. One, which I call the "comprehensive
228. Some cases must be litigated individually in order to assure a proper outcome. For ex-
ample, it would not be proper to aggregate entirely unrelated automobile negligence suits, select a
random sample, and give each plaintiff the average damages figure because there is no legally
relevant relationship between the statistical average and any plaintiff's individual entitlement.
229. In fact, Judge Parker certified a class action in Cimino that aggregated all cases pending
in the Beaumont Division of the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas as of February 1,
1989. See Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass
Tort Litigation, 32 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 475, 493-94 (1991).
230. It appears that Judge Parker made his decision solely on the basis of outcome criteria.
We shall suppose, however, that he also considered participation values.
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approach," distributes process resources comprehensively by giving
some form of limited participation to everyone. The other, which I call
the "selective approach," distributes process goods selectively by giving
full individual trials to only some of the parties.
1. The Comprehensive Approach
If it is possible to divide process goods into smaller units, there are
strong reasons to use a comprehensive rather than a selective distribu-
tion. Comprehensive distribution respects the underlying equality of
right in a way that a selective approach cannot. Giving some parties
nothing and others everything does not treat all equally if each can re-
ceive some satisfaction of her right.31
Several conditions must be met, however. First, in order for com-
prehensive distribution to have any normative payoff at all, the partici-
pation right must be capable of partial satisfaction. This depends on
the nature of the legitimacy norm that supports the right.32 If a form
of adjudication can assume only one of two states-either "legitimate"
or "illegitimate"-then compliance with the requirements of legitimacy
must be complete in order to count at all. Under these circumstances
giving anything less than the full measure of litigant control would con-
tribute nothing toward satisfaction of the participation right.
We usually treat legitimacy, however, not as a two-valued but as a
many-valued norm capable of assuming degrees. Even though we con-
demn governments as politically illegitimate, we also praise or blame
them for being more or less legitimate depending, for example, on how
accountable they are to their citizens. Adjudicative legitimacy works in
a similar way. A procedure that affords no party a chance to say any-
thing is likely to be considered more illegitimate than a procedure that
offers some opportunity for input and control. In addition, the more
participation the procedure allows, the less moral condemnation it is
likely to receive.2 11 If legitimacy is a matter of degree, then it must be
morally preferable to provide some participation than to provide none
at all, and it should be possible to satisfy the participation right in a
partial way.
Assuming that a comprehensive distribution can partially satisfy
the right, it also must be possible to offer roughly equivalent, limited
litigation opportunities to everyone within budgetary constraints, man-
231. See John Broome, Selecting People Randomly, 95 Ethics 38, 47 (1984).
232. Compare Kornhauser and Sager, 27 Soc. Sci. Information at 505 (cited in note 204)
(noting that the divisibility of a good depends on its moral value).
233. This point is consistent with the autonomy and dignity values underlying the participa-
tion right. The limited form of control made possible by even a restricted opportunity to partici-
pate provides at least some measure of autonomy to the party involved.
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ageability requirements, and outcome quality standards. One way to do
this is to give each party an opportunity to litigate her own case indi-
vidually through some kind of truncated process such as a minitrial,
summary jury trial, or administrative-type proceeding.3 4 Although a
legislature has power to implement this approach to some extent, pro-
vided it complies with constitutional requirements," 5 a court does not
have such power in the absence of explicit statutory authority. Sum-
mary forms of process like minitrials and summary jury trials are be-
yond the power of courts to force on parties when later recourse to a
full trial is completely foreclosed. 36
A more promising approach is to select a sample of cases for full
adjudicative treatment, but choose several parties to litigate each case
jointly through a litigation committee.3 7 In this approach, all parties,
through their attorneys, have input into choice of strategy and share
control over a sample case, and all sample cases are litigated with the
full panoply of adjudicative procedures. Because only one of the com-
mittee members litigates her own case and all others assist, this proce-
dure differs from the usual committee approach in which all the lawyers
cooperate in litigating issues relevant to their own cases.238 Neverthe-
less, it should be possible to adapt existing practice to assure roughly
equal participation opportunities for all.
The problem is that adjudication by litigation committee is bound
to be more costly than individual suits. In particular, the trial judge will
have to monitor the procedure to prevent unfair domination by the
party whose case is being litigated.23 9 Furthermore, private litigation
234. On minitrials, see Ronald L. Olson, Dispute Resolution: An Alternative for Large Case
Litigation, 6 Litig. 22 (Winter 1980). On summary jury trials, see Thomas B. Metzloff, Reconfigur-
ing the Summary Jury Trial, 41 Duke L. J. 806 (1992).
235. See note 134 and authorities cited therein.
236. See Kurtz v. Kurtz, 538 So.2d 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (relying on the nonbinding
nature of mediation to hold that compulsory mediation does not violate due process); compare
Richard L. Marcus and E. F. Sherman, Complex Litigation: Cases and Materials on Advanced
Civil Procedure, 1026-30 (2d ed. 1992) (noting case conflict regarding the power of a court to re-
quire alternative dispute resolution as a pre-condition to a trial).
237. See generally Manual For Complex Litigation at §§ 20.221-20.225 (cited in note 209)
(describing litigation committee and lead counsel procedure). For an example of the committee
approach applied to mass tort litigation, see Mullenix, 32 Wi. & Mary L. Rev. at 529-31 (cited in
note 229).
238. See Manual for Complex Litigation at §§ 20.221-20.222 (cited in note 209).
239. In the past lead counsel and committee practice involved a great deal of strategic ma-
neuvering that often resulted in domination by subgroups of attorneys. See Coffee, 54 U. Chi. L.
Rev. at 907-09 (cited in note 82). The most recent edition of the Manual for Complex Litigation
recommends that the court oversee the committee process more actively and in particular that the
judge make her own independent judgment about the fairness of the organizational structure pro-
posed by the parties. See Manual for Complex Litigation at § 20.224 (cited in note 209) (describ-
ing court's responsibilities in a committee system).
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costs will be higher, and the time required to adjudicate a more compli-
cated case will also add to delay costs.
If costs are too high, comprehensive distribution might not be fea-
sible within budgetary constraints, or even if feasible, the court might
have to use a less accurate sampling technique than is possible with a
selective distribution scheme. The more resources the court commits to
managing the litigation of each sample case, the less resources it has for
the sampling itself. Thus, a court might have to use a smaller sample or
include fewer variables in a regression model. In this case participation
for everyone is purchased at the cost of a less accurate outcome. The
fate of comprehensive distribution then hinges on the proper way to
balance process and outcome values.
One way to strike this balance, what I shall call the "strong priority
principle," gives outcome accuracy lexical priority over participation
whenever there is a conflict. According to this principle a court first
must apply scarce resources toward designing the most accurate sam-
pling procedure possible, and only then toward assuring roughly equal
participation opportunities through litigation committees. Under the
strong priority principle, therefore, a court must employ selective rather
than comprehensive distribution whenever use of a committee proce-
dure increases error by even a small amount.240
A second way to strike the balance, what I shall call the "weak
priority principle," allows tradeoffs between outcome accuracy and par-
ticipation, but only to a limited extent. The weak priority principle sets
a threshold that all outcomes must meet before tradeoffs can be made.
Below this threshold outcome quality has absolute priority over partici-
pation, but above the threshold tradeoffs are possible. Although people
will disagree over the proper threshold since it depends on one's norma-
tive view of acceptable outcomes, there are bound to be easy cases. For
instance, a sampling procedure that virtually guaranteed a level of re-
covery for high-damage plaintiffs far below their entitlements would be
unacceptable even if it made committee participation possible for ev-
eryone. On the other hand, the weak priority principle, unlike the
strong principle, can tolerate a somewhat smaller sample or perhaps
fewer regression variables if participation would greatly increase as a
result.
The feasibility of comprehensive distribution depends on which
principle controls. The strong priority principle has much to commend
it. There is little question that achieving quality outcomes is the pri-
240. Subordinating participation to outcome in this way does not collapse the participation
right into utilitarian judgments about desirable social policy. The strong priority principle focuses
on outcome accuracy not aggregate utility.
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mary concern of American adjudication.24' Furthermore, the strong
principle is attractive on fairness grounds. All citizens benefit from an
institution that enforces substantive rights and from procedural rules
that ensure outcome accuracy. Not all persons necessarily benefit from
rules designed to enhance the intrinsic value of participation, however.
Thus, persons in a Rawlsian-style "original position" charged with
adopting general principles for adjudication would be likely to agree on
the strong priority principle and thus favor procedures that maximize
outcome accuracy before satisfying process-oriented participation
rights.242
On the other hand, the strong priority principle leaves little room
for the independent satisfaction of participation -rights. The participa-
tion right acts mainly as a tie-breaker under this view; the right gives a
reason to choose one procedure over another when both assure the same
degree of outcome accuracy. Such a limited role seems hard to square
with the historical commitment to individual participation embodied in
the "day in court" ideal.
It does not seem possible to make a clear choice between these two
principles on the basis of either precedent or theory. As judges grapple
with the suitability of comprehensive distribution in particular cases,
they will have to make their own choices clear, and an approach should
emerge over time. Whatever the approach, there are bound to be cases
in which comprehensive distribution is not desirable, and in any such
case it will be necessary to use a selective distribution scheme.
2. The Selective Approach
In the abstract there are as many ways to distribute undivided trial
opportunities selectively as there are potentially relevant attributes of
the parties or their cases. One might, for example, distribute to those
who are likely to be the best litigators; to those who filed their cases
first and have waited the longest for relief; to those who have the most
241. See Bone, 89 Colum. L. Rev. at 12-26, 88-89, 96-97 (cited in note 220) (noting that the
nineteenth-century code reformers and the twentieth-century federal rule drafters both viewed
procedure as instrumental to substantive law). See also Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity's
Conquest? Reflections On the Future of Trial Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 725, 755-56 (1989) (noting that "[our system] relegates procedural rules to the second-
ary role of Handmaid to Justice, important only insofar as they promote substantively correct
outcomes" and that the system has a "central commitment to promoting accurate decisions").
242. On contractarian theories of fairness and the idea of an original position, see the classic
treatment in John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Belknap, 1971). For a critical yet sympathetic
discussion, see Barry, Theories of Justice at 179-254, 320-53 (cited in note 39). The argument also
can be made without the device of an original position by appealing directly to the norm of fair
reciprocity if benefits are fully reciprocal only with respect to outcomes. For one view of the con-
nection between fair reciprocity and contractarian theory, see Allan Gibbard, Constructing Jus-
tice, 20 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 264 (Summer 1991).
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severe injuries; or to those who value participation the most. Of course,
one also might ignore all these criteria and distribute by lot, giving each
party some chance at a process good.
Not all of these options are permissible. Some, such as distributing
to the best litigators or to those who have waited the longest, are ruled
out because they do not sufficiently respect the equality of right. 43
Others, such as distributing to plaintiffs with the most severe injuries,
are also unacceptable because they skew the sampling outcome to an
undesirable extent.
After eliminating alternatives in this way, two general types of se-
lective distribution remain: distribution by participation preference and
distribution by lot. Preference-based distributions are acceptable be-
cause of the close connection between participation and autonomy, 44
but the underlying equality of right means that any such distribution
must treat all parties equally. Thus, it is impermissible to distribute to
those who have the strongest preferences without also compensating
those who are left out.24 5
Because the participation right is commensurable with money,
however, an auction might be the fairest way to distribute process
goods. 24e Notice could be sent to all parties describing the auction and
243. In particular, the policies supporting these two approaches bear little or no relationship
to the participation right. Distributing to the best litigators is justified by outcome accuracy val-
ues. Distributing to those who have waited the longest can only be justified by some kind of fair-
ness norm unrelated to the values underlying the participation right.
The proposition that extraneous policy factors should not be used to resolve a rights conflict
does require a defense. Kornhauser's and Sager's analysis of lotteries is helpful in this regard. They
distinguish between two different ways of viewing a rights conflict: the "tie-breaker view" and the
"dominant rights view." See Kornhauser and Sager, 27 Soc. Sci. Information at 496-501 (cited in
note 204). The tie-breaker view treats a rights conflict as a tie between equal rights that cancels
each of the rights completely, allowing appeals to social policy to resolve the conflict. By contrast,
the dominant rights view rejects the proposition that rights can cancel each other. This view holds
that a right retains its moral force and utility-trumping character even in situations of conflict, and
as a result, policy factors unrelated to the right cannot be considered in resolving the conflict. The
dominant rights view better fits the problem of accommodating competing participation rights be-
cause the autonomy and dignity values underlying the participation right are not affected by the
existence of a conflict, and themselves call for equal treatment of all rightholders. See id. at 500.
244. See notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
245. Moreover, only a utilitarian principle could justify unequal treatment of this sort, but
utility maximization is not an acceptable reason to deny a claim of right under the dominant rights
view. See note 243.
246. It may seem odd to propose that a court conduct an auction of trial opportunities. But
see In Re Oracle Securities Litigation, 131 F.R.D. 688 (soliciting bids for class counsel), 132 F.R.D.
538 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (discussing standards for selecting class counsel by soliciting bids from inter-
ested lawyers); Macey and Miller, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 105-16 (cited in note 38) (describing a
court-supervised auction procedure in which bidders bid for claims in a small claimant class ac-
tion). But the auction need not include any actual exchange of money among plaintiffs if payments
are deducted from and credited to damage awards. Moreover, auctions are routinely conducted
under court supervision as part of the remedy in some property disputes, and courts sometimes
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inviting bids. Trial opportunities could then be allocated to the highest
bidders and the auction proceeds distributed among those who bid and
lost, with each losing bidder receiving an amount proportional to her
bid.24 7 In order to reduce the 'effects of wealth inequality, the court
could require that bid payments be made out of plaintiff's expected net
recovery. Because no plaintiff is likely to pay more for participation
than she could hope to recover from a trial, an expected-recovery rule
would not artificially depress bid amounts.
An auction respects both autonomy and equality values by repli-
cating the results of market trades from an initial position of equal-
ity.248 Suppose that all parties start with equal chances in a lottery for
the limited process goods, and each is allowed to sell her chance to
other parties. Those who have the most to gain from trying their own
cases would purchase enough chances so that each was assured one trial
opportunity. If no party valued participation negatively, all the other
parties would end up with payments corresponding to their valuations.
The auction achieves the same outcome because bids reflect individual
trial values and payments are linked to bid amounts.24 9
There is a serious problem with an auction, however.250 Auctions
are likely to distribute process goods nonrandomly, thereby interfering
with the outcome efficacy of a sampling procedure. The reason is easy
to see. A plaintiff's gain from having her case tried depends on two vari-
accommodate competing rights by replicating the results of market trades. In nuisance cases, for
example, courts sometimes deny injunctive relief conditioned on the defendant paying the plaintiff
damages to cover her loss. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870
(1970) (denying injunctive relief but granting damages). See also Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E.
Webb Development Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972) (granting injunction but requiring
plaintiffs to compensate the defendant for its loss).
247. Assuming that the class of bidders includes all those and only those who place some
positive value on participation, it makes sense to leave nonbidders out of the distribution. It also
makes sense to distribute auction proceeds in proportion to losing bids because a party's bid is
likely to reflect the value she places on participation. See notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
248. Not all distribution problems lend themselves to market solutions. Many would not con-
sider it appropriate, for example, to use an auction to distribute scarce life-saving medicine. This is
because of a belief that the underlying moral entitlement cannot be compared to money. By con-
trast, parties routinely trade participation rights for monetary recovery whenever they settle cases
and our system of adjudication approves and even encourages this practice.
249. This analysis ignores the effect of strategic behavior on auction results. See generally
Myerson, Game Theory at 132-36 (cited in note 39) (discussing these complexities).
250. Other problems are not likely to be as serious. The administrative costs of running the
auction should be manageable. There might be some difficulty in assuring that bids accurately
reflect plaintiff preferences, since a plaintiff is likely to rely on her attorney to recommend a bid
amount. The attorney has an incentive to persuade her client to enter a bid in line with the attor-
ney's preferences, which, as we have seen, do not necessarily match those of her client. See notes
188-90 and accompanying text. On the other hand, one should not necessarily disregard a plain-
tiff's choice of bid just because she reached it after consultation with her attorney, even if the bid
amount changes in response to the attorney's wishes.
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ables: the value she places on participation and the increase in net dam-
ages she can expect by having her case included in the sample. High
bidders in the auction should be those with the largest totals summed
over these two variables, and high-damage plaintiff are likely to be dis-
proportionately represented in this group.
This is especially true if plaintiffs with extremely severe injuries
place a higher subjective value on controlling their own lawsuits than
those with much less to lose. With this kind of correlation between par-
ticipation value and actual damages, those with very high damages will
have the most process value to gain from participating, and their cases
will also have the largest marginal impact on the sample outcome.251 As
a result, high-damage plaintiffs are much more likely to win the auction
than those with low damages, thereby skewing sampling outcomes to-
ward the high end.
The viability of an auction, therefore, depends on the magnitude of
the skewing effect, which may be quite large in many cases. The
stronger the correlation between damages and participation value, the
closer the auction will resemble a distribution strictly according to
amount at stake, which is unacceptable no matter what view of the bal-
ance between process and outcome one adopts. 5 For weak correlations,
however, the viability of an auction turns on whether the strong or
weak priority principle applies. The strong principle rules out auctions
entirely because any significant correlation is bound to sacrifice out-
come quality to some extent. The weak principle, on the other hand,
could tolerate auctions that have relatively minor effects on outcome,
but given the strong influence damages alone have on bid amounts few
situations are likely to qualify.
Because of the defects with an auction, a court will have to con-
sider distribution by lot in many cases, bringing into full focus the
problem of mixing lotteries with adjudication. How can a judge justify
relying on chance to choose among rights claims with equal weight?
Must she be content with justification by default, there being no other
method that assures a sufficiently accurate outcome, or does a more
compelling argument recommend a lottery? I believe one does.
Nothing can be done about a lottery's randomness, of course, but
randomness in itself is not the major problem. The problem is that the
251. This is clearly the case if sample plaintiffs receive their own verdicts. It also is true if
sample plaintiffs get the sample average. As far as the magnitude of the verdict is concerned, those
with high damages will have most to gain from inclusion in the sample even though the marginal
benefit of inclusion will decrease due to the averaging effect.
252. In such a distribution defendants would end up paying as if all plaintiffs had high dam-




most obvious justification for a lottery-that it respects the equality of
all claimants by giving each an equal chance-does not give a party who
loses the lottery a sufficiently good reason to accept her loss. This justi-
fication respects the equality of all claimants, but it ignores the rights-
based nature of their claims. It requires each rightholder to accept limi-
tations on her right for the good of all. But the fact that a party has an
individual right entitles her to demand satisfaction without regard to
the overall consequences, unless there is some reason she should exer-
cise restraint that is consistent with her status as a rightholder.253
I have in mind here a distinction in moral philosophy between
"agent-relative" and "impersonal" reasons for action.2 54 An agent-rela-
tive reason for action is one that necessarily refers to the person acting.
Thus, it is an agent-relative reason for A to assist B, who is in need of
help, that A is the father of B, or just that A owes B a duty.255 On the
other hand, an impersonal reason for action is a reason that does not
refer to the person acting. For example, it is an impersonal reason for A
to assist B that to do so would maximize aggregate utility or minimize
disregard for moral principles in general.
An impersonal reason for action requires that the person acting
adopt a detached viewpoint, consider not just her own situation but the
situations of all others, and assess the overall consequences of her ac-
tions. My argument is that an impersonal reason, standing alone, can-
not oblige a party to accept less than full satisfaction of her
participation right and that a justification based solely on scarcity and
equal claims offers only an impersonal reason. Thus, it is not enough to
argue that a lottery, by giving everyone an equal share, maximizes
equality overall. What is needed is an argument of principle showing
either that a party's right is itself limited under scarcity conditions or
253. Thus, I disagree with Professors Abraham and Robinson if they mean to argue that
mere equality of participation right by itself makes it improper for a plaintiff to insist on full
participation under conditions of scarcity. See Robinson and Abraham, 78 Va. L. Rev. at 1503(cited in note 7). When a person makes a demand on the state to honor her right, it does not follow
that she must believe that her right has some kind of priority over the rights of others. There is no
logical inconsistency between believing that all participation rights are equal and insisting that
one's own right be satisfied-even when there is not enough to satisfy all. The mere existence of
scarcity, standing alone, does not create duties between rightholders. However, if, as seems more
likely, Abraham and Robinson mean to focus on the state's duty to distribute scarce process goods
fairly, I agree that the state owes such a duty. But I also believe that in discharging that duty, the
state must choose a distribution scheme that is consistent not just with the status of plaintiffs as
equal claimants but also with their status as rightholders.
254. For a discussion of agent-relative and impersonal reasons for action, see Nagel, Mortal
Questions at 128-41 (cited in note 89); Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 138-88 (Oxford,
1986). See also Samuel Scheffler, ed., Consequentialism and Its Critics 1-13 (Oxford, 1988).
255. See, for example, State v. Zobel, 134 N.W.2d 101, 109 (S.D. 1965) (holding that a parent




that the party owes a duty to others that takes priority over her right
and calls for distribution by lot.25 6
It will not do to argue that the losing party had an equal chance.
Although this is an agent-relative reason, it is not an agent-relative rea-
son that explains why the loser must accept her loss. If the participa-
tion right conferred only an entitlement to equal treatment, this reason
would be adequate because an equal lot provides equal treatment. But
the participation right confers an entitlement to the process good itself.
It might be possible to derive an agent-relative reason from the in-
stitution of adjudication itself. The difference between a participation
right and a substantive right is that the former depends completely on
the institution of adjudication to give it meaning and force. Because of
this institutional dependence, one might be justified in requiring that a
party, who benefits from an opportunity to participate in adjudication,
abide by those norms that make adjudication beneficial for all, includ-
ing norms of fair regard for other litigants.5 7
The question is, however, whether fair regard for other litigants im-
poses a duty on a party to accept less process control than she would
otherwise be entitled to receive simply because there is not enough to
go around. There is some evidence to support such a duty. Courts, for
example, sometimes certify mandatory class actions or compel the join-
der of numerous parties to a single lawsuit in order to distribute a lim-
ited fund fairly among competing rightholders.2 58 Because class actions
and multiparty suits offer less control than an individual trial, this
' 256. If courts are supposed to adjudicate rights and if rights-based claims are claims of prin-
ciple, then a court must provide a principled reason for its decision rather than impose a burden
merely to further some impersonal aggregative good. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously at 81-
130 (cited in note 89) (arguing that courts determine parties' rights rather than further general
social goals). One might argue that there is an obvious principle justifying the lottery - the princi-
ple of equal treatment. However, it is not enough to cite a principle. One must also show that the
principle is capable of limiting the participation right. This requires that the principle be recog-
nized within the institution of civil litigation as a valid ground for limiting participation rights. If
this can be established, then one may have an agent-relative reason for imposing the lottery results
on all plaintiffs by virtue of their voluntarily participating in the institution. But it is not obvious
at first glance that the equal treatment principle has the requisite status, and hence the defense of
the lottery requires more argument.
257. This is an argument for reciprocity as fairness. See, for example,. Gibbard, 20 Phil. &
Pub. Aff. at 264 (cited in note 242). It is fair to impose obligations on someone who voluntarily
takes part in an institution when that person derives reciprocal benefits from others' assumption of
the same obligations toward her and the resulting system of mutual obligations makes the institu-
tion as a whole work better for everyone.
258. See In re Bendectin Products Liability Litigation, 749 F.2d 300, 306 (6th Cir. 1984)
(expounding standards for limited fund class action); F.R.C.P. 19(a)(2)(i), 23(b)(1)(A); James W.
Moore and J. E. Kennedy, 3A Moore's Federal Practice, 1 19.07 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing limited
fund in the context of Rule 19 compulsory joinder); Wright, Miller and Kane, Federal Practice at
§§ 1772-74 (cited in note 16) (discussing the limited fund in the context of Rule 23 class actions).
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practice is some evidence of a principle that allows concerns of distribu-
tional equity to limit litigant control.
On the other hand, one must stretch this principle quite far to jus-
tify distribution by lot. Parties forced to join a suit at least have an
opportunity to litigate their own cases, as do the original parties who
share the litigation with the newcomers. Moreover, absent class mem-
bers often have some chance to intervene and participate personally in
a class suit.25 9 In neither case is the interference with litigant autonomy
as severe as it is for the losing parties in a lottery, and the strong histor-
ical tradition of litigant control cautions against extending the principle
very far from the precedent that supports it.
There is another possible source for an agent-relative reason, how-
ever. Although it is impractical and undesirable to expect all plaintiffs
in large-scale mass tort litigation to agree on a distribution formula in
view of transaction costs, agency costs, free-rider problems, and adverse
outcome effects, it is nonetheless possible to construct a hypothetical
agreement under a fair set of initial bargaining conditions. According to
this contractarian argument, the reason a plaintiff must accept the re-
sults of a lottery is because someone representing her participation
preferences would have agreed to do so under bargaining conditions
that are fair to all.
This argument does not depend on what actual plaintiffs in a par-
ticular case would accept in the absence of bargaining obstacles. It re-
sembles an "original position" argument in that it asks how parties
would agree to resolve a rights conflict if they were designing rules for
adjudication under conditions of severe scarcity and had limited knowl-
edge about the actual circumstances of any particular case.26 0
To see how such an agreement might be formed, we must first con-
struct the hypothetical bargaining situation e.26  To make the analysis
concrete, suppose that 1000 persons, all of them risk-neutral, are assem-
bled to bargain over how best to distribute scarce trial opportunities in
future asbestos cases. Each bargainer represents future plaintiffs who
value participation in a particular amount and thus each knows her own
259. See Moore and Kennedy, 3B Moore's Federal Practice at 1 23.90.
260. See authorities cited in note 242.
261. In the language of game theory, the following analysis models the bargaining situation
as a cooperative game with nontransferable utility, and uses the solution concept known as the
"core." See Myerson, Game Theory at 456-77 (cited in note 39). The core is attractive from a
fairness point of view because it includes only those distributions that are strongly Pareto-efficient,
meaning that no party can do any better without another party doing worse, and because it in-
cludes only the distributions that all parties could unanimously accept. For an application of coop-
erative game theory and the solution concept of the core to the fairness of class action settlements,




participation value. However, no bargainer knows the actual damages of
those she represents, although she is aware of the expected damage fig-
ure for asbestos sufferers overall.
The constraint on information about actual damages assures that
bargaining takes place only over participation values. The purpose of
the bargaining is to distribute trial opportunities in a way that fairly
reflects the different values litigants place on participation for its own
sake. From the perspective of this bargaining situation, the amount of
damage a plaintiff suffers is purely fortuitous, without any relevance to
the fairness of the trial distribution scheme. Allowing damages to be
used as bargaining chips would give someone with higher damages an
advantage over someone with lower damages even if the two valued in-
dividual participation identically.
All bargainers are told that whatever distribution formula they ac-
cept will apply to a condition of extreme scarcity and will be used to
distribute 100 damages trials over 1000 plaintiffs with each trial con-
trolled by a single plaintiff. Finally, they are told that any agreement
must be unanimous and that no one can make side payments to obtain
the consent of the other parties. The unanimity condition ensures that
the final agreement will benefit all future asbestos plaintiffs. And the
prohibition on side payments makes it possible to avoid the auction re-
sult, which jeopardizes outcome quality by distributing all trials to
those who value them most.
Of course, 1000 bargainers cannot possibly represent the full range
of possible participation values nor will there always be 100 trials to
distribute. These figures are chosen only for purposes of illustration.
The following argument does not depend on the number of bargainers,
the total number of trial opportunities, or the particular distribution of
participation values. Thus, the conclusion is perfectly general. One
might imagine that a bargaining group is set up for each possible aggre-
gation of mass tort plaintiffs and bargainers decide on a distribution
formula for all future cases of that kind.
Is an agreement possible under these conditions and what distribu-
tion formula would the 1000 plaintiffs adopt? We begin by noting that
a bargainer will not agree to a distribution formula if the future, hypo-
thetical plaintiff she represents would be worse off compared to her
nonagreement alternatives. It follows that the bargainers could agree on
any distribution if the only alternative were an individual trial and
scarcity meant that a plaintiff with average damages expected a nega-
tive net recovery due to high litigation and delay costs. Assuming that
no one would want to litigate just for the sake of litigating without the
possibility of some outcome benefit, a rational bargainer would even
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agree to a formula that gave the future plaintiffs she represented no
chance at all of being included in the sample.
Because any distribution is possible, there is no way to be sure that
bargainers would choose a random lottery.16  From a fairness perspec-
tive it is still significant that rational bargainers could agree on a ran-
dom lottery and that they could do no better by refusing to agree if the
lottery were the only distribution option. Of course, it is not the only
option, and some parties might hold out for an unequal distribution
that is to their advantage.
This scenario, however, is not a realistic model of the hypothetical
bargaining situation. It ignores an alternative that is available to future
plaintiffs aside from individual litigation. A group of plaintiffs could
form a coalition, break away from the large aggregation, and petition
the court to litigate as a smaller unit.2 63 If a rational bargainer believes
that the plaintiff she represents could obtain a better chance at an indi-
vidual trial, and thus a higher expected utility from participation, by
forming a coalition with other plaintiffs, then the bargainer would not
agree to the proposed distribution.
How well plaintiffs can do in coalitions depends on how many trials
a coalition gets to distribute. There are strong reasons to favor a rule
that allows a coalition to appropriate a number of trials proportional to
its size. Thus, a coalition of 200 plaintiffs would be entitled to 200/1000,
or one-fifth, of the 100 trials allotted to the larger aggregation; in other
words, twenty trials.2 4 This rule has attractive properties. It treats all
plaintiffs equally in keeping with the underlying equality of right. Fur-
thermore, it takes account of the practical reality that a judge cannot
know subjective participation values-parties, after all, have incentives
262. In the technical language of cooperative game theory, the core of this simple bargaining
game includes all possible distributions of 100 trials over the set of 1000 players. It is worth noting,
however, that one particularly attractive solution concept, the Nash Bargaining Solution, predicts
that the parties would agree on a random lottery. See generally Myerson, Game Theory at 417-18
(cited in note 39).
263. There are a number of procedural mechanisms that might achieve this result. Plaintiffs
might move for dismissal and either join as co-parties in a refied suit or file individually and seek
consolidation. Alternatively, and much more likely, plaintiffs might bring a motion requesting that
the trial judge exclude them from the larger aggregation and allow them to litigate as a smaller
group through a mutually acceptable sampling procedure.
264. Some additional refinements are needed to work through the model rigorously, but
these are not essential to the textual discussion. For one thing, the rule can generate fractional
trials, which do not make sense in this context. The best way to handle this problem is to round
down to the next lower integer. Rounding down permits agreements with nonrandom distributions,
but it limits the degree of nonrandomness and assures a formula giving everyone almost equal
chances. By contrast, no agreement would be possible if one rounded up because there would al-
ways be some smaller coalition in which all members could do at least as well and one could do
strictly better. Another problem is that coalitions may get too small to apply sampling techniques.
Thus, a more complete analysis would have to specify a minimum coalition size.
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to misrepresent their valuations-and thus could not allocate trial op-
portunities to coalitions on the basis of participation preference even if
she wanted to do so.
Under this allocation rule the only agreement that all 1000 bargain-
ers could unanimously accept is one that distributes all 100 trials by
random lottery, giving each plaintiff a 1/1000 chance at each of the 100
trials or an expectation equal to one-tenth.65 This is easy to see. Any
other agreement must give at least one party greater than one-tenth
and some other party less than one-tenth. The latter party can do bet-
ter by forming a coalition consisting of all plaintiffs who receive at most
one-tenth under the proposed agreement.2 16 A random distribution of
this smaller coalition's share of the total trials will give each coalition
member one-tenth. Thus, the party who organized the coalition will do
better in the coalition than under the proposed agreement, and all
other coalition members will do at least as well. Because this result does
not depend on the actual distribution or the size of the coalition, there
will always be some coalition able to block any formula other than a
random lottery with equal chances.2 67
Furthermore, no coalition can block a random lottery. A random
distribution of a coalition's trial share will leave all coalition members
in the same position as they would have been under the proposed lot-
tery, and any departure from randomness will make at least one coali-
265. In the technical language of cooperative game theory, the core of this game is nonempty,
and it includes only a random distribution.
266. This analysis ignores the effect of transaction costs. The transaction costs of forming
coalitions make more agreements possible by making it more difficult for coalitions to organize. On
the other hand, smaller coalitions are likely to save on the transaction costs of bargaining because
bargaining in a smaller group should be easier than bargaining in a large one. If the costs of coali-
tion formation dominate, the coalition position of those on the low end of the proposed distribu-
tion would have to improve enough to compensate for the costs of forming the coalition. As a
result, transaction costs will limit the range of permissible agreements; the smaller the transaction
costs the easier it will be to form a coalition and the closer a proposed distribution will have to
approximate randomness in order to avoid being blocked. In any event, since transaction costs
vary with individual circumstance, they should probably be excluded from a set of fair bargaining
conditions.
267. It might help to consider a concrete example. Suppose that the proposed agreement
gives 998 plaintiffs each a 1/10 expectation, and gives two plaintiffs, A and B, a 1/8 and a 3/40
expectation, respectively. (Recall that all the expectations have to add up to 100, the total number
of trials available to the aggregation). In this situation B could do better by forming a coalition
consisting of himself and 899 other plaintiffs not including A. The resulting 900-plaintiff coalition
would be entitled to 90 trials, and if it distributed the trials by random lot, each coalition member,
including A, would receive a 1/10 expectation. Because 1/10 is greater than 3/40, A does better in
the coalition, and no other coalition member does worse. In fact, all coalition members can be
made strictly better off by a distribution formula that gives A a little more than 3/40 but less than
1/10, and averages the difference over the other 899 coalition members. For example, the formula
might give A a 7/80 expectation (i.e., 3/40 + 1/80) and average the remaining 1/80 over the other
899 members, so that each receives 1/10 + 1/899 x 1/80, which equals approximately .1000139. As
a result, all coalition members would have an incentive to block the proposed distribution.
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tion member worse off. Thus, assuming all 1000 bargainers are rational,
they should agree on a random lottery and nothing else. 68
To see how this argument provides an agent-relative reason of the
sort we seek, it is necessary to discuss, if only in a limited way, a major
issue in political philosophy - how a hypothetical contract can create
any moral obligation for real individuals.269 Whatever moral obligation
exists, it clearly cannot derive from actual consent or promising. The
bargaining situation is only a "thought experiment" and consent is
purely hypothetical. Moreover, because of the hypothetical nature of
the bargaining, there is no guarantee that everyone will be better off in
the real world. In my contractarian argument, for example, a plaintiff
with large enough damages, a sufficiently high participation value and a
reasonable expectation of a timely trial is likely to be worse off with a
lottery than with an individual trial.
On the other hand, my argument is not simply a disguised form of
average or aggregate utilitarianism, as has been said of some con-
tractarian theoriesY.7 0 Because bargainers know their own participation
values, my bargaining situation escapes the charge made against others,
that depriving bargainers of all information about their own personal
identities guarantees an outcome-maximizing average utility. 7 1 Fur-
thermore, because all bargainers must agree on any distribution rule,
the mere fact that a rule maximizes aggregate utility is not enough to
validate it. To be sure, contractarian arguments assume that individuals
maximize expected utility. But the requirement of unanimity and the
ideal nature of the bargaining situation assure that the argument's
moral force is not based on utilitarianism.
268. This analysis assumes that all bargainers represent plaintiffs with positive participation
values. If some plaintiffs had zero or negative values, the agreement would assign them a zero
chance and randomize over the remaining plaintiffs. However, there is no way for a court to imple-
ment such an agreement, even if the result were consistent with outcome values, because there is
no way to determine the participation preferences of everyone. Nevertheless, it is not unfair to
impose a random lottery on plaintiffs with zero or negative participation values since they filed
suit with an expectation that they might have to litigate.
269. For critical discussions of contractarian theory, see Barry, Theories of Justice at 3-142,
282-92 (cited in note 39); Nagel, Mortal Questions, at 120-27 (cited in note 89); Daniel Brudney,
Hypothetical Consent and Moral Force, 10 L. & Phil. 235 (1991); David Gauthier, Jules and the
Tortist, 15 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 683 (1992); Jean Hampton, Rational Choice and the Law, 15
Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 649 (1992); T. M. Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in Amartya
Sen and Bernard Williams, eds.,, Utilitarianism and Beyond, 103 (Cambridge, 1982); Kim Lane
Scheppele and Jeremy Waldron, Contractarian Methods in Political and Legal Evaluation, 3 Yale
J. L. & Hum. 195 (1991).
270. See Richard Craswell, Efficiency and Rational Bargaining in Contractual Settings, 15
Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 806, 813-15, 820-22 (1992).
271. For a discussion of Harsanyi's argument that average utilitarianism is the outcome of an
original position in which participants know nothing about their own identities, see Barry, Theo-
ries of Justice at 76-77 (cited in note 39).
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Nevertheless, ideas of consent, rational self-interest, and collective
welfare are central to contractarianism's moral force. These ideas are
used to enlist norms of autonomy, equality, rationality, and impartiality
to justify the bargaining outcome. 2 The contractarian argument in ef-
fect says to the loser of the lottery that she must accept her loss despite
her right because it would be rational for a rightholder with her partici-
pation preferences to agree to do so in advance under fair bargaining
conditions. Thus, even though the agreement takes place in a stylized
bargaining situation, it should count in favor of a lottery for any plain-
tiff who finds the specified bargaining conditions morally attractive and
who accepts the autonomy, equality, rationality, and impartiality values
that inform contractarianism.
At best, however, this line of reasoning applies only to a plaintiff
who accepts the premises of the contractarian argument. Why can't a
plaintiff who finds herself on the losing end of the lottery simply reject
the premises out of pure self-interest? The reason is that the plaintiff's
claim of right requires that she provide moral reasons to support her
position. By asserting a right within the institution of adjudication, the
unhappy plaintiff in effect enlists principles of political morality to sup-
port her claim. Having done this, she cannot then refuse to recognize
similar principles opposed to her position just because she does not like
the results they produce. She must offer moral reasons to reject those
principles in her case.
Furthermore, not just any moral reason will do. As we saw in dis-
cussing the limited fund cases, the institution of adjudication recognizes
a general principle of fair regard for other litigantsY.2 7  Although this
principle does not justify the lottery directly, it does constrain the kind
of reasons that can count against the contractarian argument. The un-
happy plaintiff must offer a moral reason that is sensitive to the fact
that satisfaction of her right will have effects on other litigants. This
will not be easy to do, for the contractarian argument has considerable
force in this situation. By requiring unanimity, the argument takes ac-
count of the individual plight of each plaintiff as well as the effects on
other plaintiffs of satisfying any one plaintiffs right. And the centrality
of autonomy and rationality values to contractarianism's morality is
consistent with the pivotal role autonomy plays in justifying the partici-
pation right.
The contractarian argument thus gives specific content to the prin-
ciple of fair regard for other litigants in the context of extreme process
272. See, for example, Hampton, Rational Choice at 673-78 (cited in note 269); Scheppele
and Waldron, 3 Yale J. L. & Hum. at 199-206 (cited in note 269).
273. See notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
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scarcity.2 74 As such, it supplies an argument of principle that takes ac-
count of each plaintiff's participation value and is to that extent agent-
relative. However, the argument also abstracts from actual damages,
the other important variable in any real world bargaining situation, and
is to that extent impersonal. 75 Nevertheless, the contractarian argu-
ment shows why an individual plaintiff should accept the fairness of a
random lottery as a way to satisfy her process-oriented participation
right. This combines with the case for a lottery from an impersonal
point of view to justify its use whenever a comprehensive distribution
cannot be made and an auction is not desirable.
2 76
V. CONCLUSION
Courts operate under significant constraints in designing adjudica-
tive solutions in the face of process good scarcity. Judge Parker in
Cimino observed that "[t]he litigants and the public rightfully expect
the courts to be problem solvers. 2 77 There is truth to this observation,
but there are also limits to what a court can do, limits set by both out-
come and process values.
These limits allow for sampling, but they constrain the design of a
sampling procedure. From an outcome-oriented perspective, the con-
straints depend upon one's theory of adjudication. 8 Sampling is rela-
tively easy to square with an efficiency-based theory under most
circumstances. It can also accommodate a rights-based theory, but
probably only under conditions of severe scarcity. In either case, ver-
dicts should be calculated in the same way for all plaintiffs, including
274. Some readers may insist that there is no need to rely on a contractarian argument to get
to the lottery result once one admits a principle of fair regard for other litigants. I am not con-
vinced. One must do some work to get from the premise of equal rights and a general principle of
fair regard to the conclusion that each plaintiff must settle for an equal chance. There are, after
all, many ways to satisfy equality and fairness conditions. The virtue of the contractarian argu-
ment, it seems to me, is that it provides an analytically useful and normatively defensible way to
argue from equality and fairness to the lottery scheme while respecting the status of each claimant
as a distinct rightholder.
275. In fact, allowing bargainers to take account of actual damages opens up a wide range of
possible distribution mechanisms including many that have unacceptable outcome effects, depend-
ing upon how actual damages are distributed relative to participation values and how individual
verdicts are calculated.
276. The bargaining argument does not require the use of a lottery; it only provides an
agent-relative reason for imposing lottery results on losing parties. One might not be justified in
using a lottery if there were strong impersonal-type reasons against its use, but a lottery's intrinsic
equality properties justify its use from an impersonal point of view.
277. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 652.
278. The appropriate theory could vary with the goals of the substantive law-deterrence
goals being more suitable for an efficiency analysis-but the tension between rights and efficiency




those in the sample group, and costs should be spread equally over the
entire plaintiff population. Furthermore, although use of the sample av-
erage fits efficiency values nicely, a rights-based theory might require
the use of a regression model unless scarcity is especially severe.
Process-oriented constraints are even more demanding. A court
must distribute process goods fairly, and if each party has her own par-
ticipation right, a fair distribution must respect the equal rights claims
of all. This condition requires that the trial judge create as large an
aggregation as possible and distribute the largest number of process
goods consistent with fair treatment of litigants in other cases. It also
imposes a lexical ordering on acceptable distribution schemes. The trial
judge must first consider the possibility of a comprehensive distribution
through use of litigation committees. If that is not possible, the judge
should then consider selective distribution schemes. Only if an auction
is not acceptable should the judge settle on a random lottery that offers
equal chances to all plaintiffs with equal rights.
Furthermore, process and outcome demands may conflict. The
ideal distribution scheme from a process perspective can produce
grossly inaccurate outcomes under a sampling procedure. When these
values conflict, outcome must have priority over process, but the precise
implications depend on how strong a priority principle the trial judge
accepts.
The factors developed in this Article are not only relevant to the
judicial creation of a sampling procedure. They should also guide any
legislative attempt to implement a sampling approach. In particular,
the legislature should consider both the direct and indirect costs of
sampling and legislate restrictions that minimize costs. Furthermore,
any statute will have to leave room for trial judge discretion. In this
regard it should require that judges consider both outcome and process
values and observe the lexical ordering of fair distribution schemes.
Whether sampling is judicially created or authorized by legislation,
the choice of a particular sampling procedure will require case-specific
discretionary judgments. In exercising her discretion, it is vital that a
judge justify the choices she makes. Only in this way will it be possible
to develop a jurisprudence of sampling that respects the integrity of
adjudication at the same time as it provides norms to guide statistical




A. Sample Average Compared to Individual Trial Verdict
The following is a mathematical demonstration of the superiority
of an individual trial verdict to the sample average as an estimate of
actual damages. Let n be the total number of cases in the aggregation,
and let x be a random variable representing actual damages. Suppose
that the n cases are normally distributed with respect to x and that the
distribution has a mean of ji and a standard deviation of a.. Further-
more, suppose that the error associated with an individual damages
trial for any case is normally distributed about actual damages (i.e.,
about x) and that the standard deviation of the error distribution, o, is
the same for all cases.
1. Mean and Standard Deviation of the Sample Average
Distribution
To compare the sample average to an individual trial verdict, we
must first determine the mean and standard deviation of the sample
average distribution. Suppose that a random sample of m cases is
drawn from the aggregation. Each sample case is tried, and the average
of the m verdicts calculated. Suppose further that this procedure is re-
peated over and over again, generating a distribution of sample aver-
ages. According to basic sampling theory, the sample averages will be
normally distributed with a mean of t (the same as the mean of the
actual damages distribution for the entire aggregation). 279
In order to specify the distribution precisely, we must determine its
standard deviation, which I shall denote u,. Because all trial verdicts
that enter into the sample average depend on two variables-actual
damages and trial error-the standard deviation of the sample average
distribution must depend on the standard deviations of these same two
variables. To see how, let y be a random variable representing trial ver-
dicts, and let ay be the standard deviation of the trial verdict distribu-
tion before averaging. Because we assume that actual damages and trial
error are uncorrelated, the variance of the distribution of trial verdicts,
a.2, must equal the sum of the two component variances; that is, the
sum of the damages variance and the trial error variance:
28
279. See Hoel, Mathematical Statistics at 103, 108 (cited in note 49).
280. The variable y can be written as the sum of actual damages and trial error in the follow-
ing way:
y = x + (y - x)
The term x is the actual damages component, and the term, y - x is the trial error component, i.e.,
the difference between the trial verdict and the actual damages. The variance associated with x is
o-., and the variance associated with y - x is ae2. Since y - x and x are uncorrelated, the variance for
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Any sample average is just the average of a randomly drawn set of
m y's. According to sampling theory, the variance of the distribution of
these sample averages, a.2, for fixed m equals a-2/m. Substituting .2 +
a. 
2 for aY2, we get the following for the standard deviation of the sample
average distribution:
as 07X2 + 
Ce 2
2. Comparing the Trial Verdict With the Sample Average
Let x. > ji represent actual damages for some arbitrarily chosen
case above the mean, and consider the following graph showing a sam-
ple average distribution as well as a trial error distribution centered
about xo:
ACTUAL DAMAGES
y, aY2, is the sum of the two component variances. See generally id. at 199-200 (deriving the
formula for combining variances).
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Curve S represents the sample average distribution, which has
mean g and standard deviation a, (as given above), and curve E repre-
sents the trial error distribution, which has a mean of x. and a standard
deviation of r. The graph shows an interval centered about xo:
[x. - ke , x. + kae]. "A" stands for the area over this interval that
lies under curve E, and "B" stands for the area over the same interval
that lies under curve S. Thus, area A represents the probability that an
individual trial verdict will fall within the interval, and area B repre-
sents the probability that the sample average will fall within the same
interval.
For the graph as shown, it appears that area A is larger than area B
over the interval. (This is not always the case; it depends on the values
chosen for xo, A, a,, a., and k). Thus, the probability that an individual
trial verdict will fall within the interval is greater than the probability
that the sample average will do so, and in this sense we can say that an
individual trial verdict is superior to the sample average over the inter-
val, [xo - kao, x0 + kao].
One way to compare the trial verdict with the sample average is to
calculate the ratio of the two probabilities or the ratio of the odds. The
ratio of the two probabilities is equal to area A divided by area B,
which gives a measure of how many times more likely it is that the trial
verdict will fall within the specified interval than that sample average
will. Using the ratio of the odds is almost as straightforward. The odds
that the trial verdict will fall within the specified interval are given by:
area A/(1 - area A). The odds that the sample average will do so are
given by: area B/(1 - area B). The former divided by the latter gives the
ratio of the odds, which measures how many times greater the odds are
that the trial verdict will fall within the interval than that the sample
average will.
However, if the interval is very small (i.e., k is small) and the trial
error distribution has a large standard deviation (i.e., a. is large), this
method of comparison is not terribly helpful because the likelihood that
an individual trial verdict will fall within the interval is itself very
small. I use a second method in the text in order to avoid this short-
coming. This alternative method calculates the joint probability of two
independent events occurring: the trial verdict falling within some spec-
ified range of actual damages for a given case and the sample average
falling outside that range. The maximum value of this joint probability,
subject to the constraint that the probability associated with the trial
verdict be larger than that associated with the sample average (i.e., area
A > area B), represents the greatest confidence with which we can as-
sert that an individual trial verdict will lie closer to actual damages
than the sample average. If this joint probability exceeds .5, for exam-
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ple, we can be confident that it is more likely than not that an individ-
ual trial verdict is superior.
To formalize this second approach, let P(k) be the joint probability
that corresponds to the interval [x. - k-e, x. + kyo]. To obtain an ex-
pression for P(k), consider areas A and B, which are given by the fol-
lowing equations:
1 xo+ k
a e - 2 
-
0 2
AreaA- f e e dxrea e xo-kae
1 xo+kae - 2 
2
AreaB- f e s dx
The joint probability P(k) equals the product of the separate probabili-
ties associated with the two events:
P(k) = Area A x (1 - Area B)
Given any value for the joint probability P(k) one can try to solve the
resulting equation for k. If a solution exists where Area A > Area B, it
means that we can be confident at level P(k) that an individual trial
verdict will be closer to actual damages than the sample average for a
case with actual damages xo. Furthermore, consider the set of all values
of k such that Area A > Area B. Provided the set is nonempty, there
must be some element of the set, ko, for which P(k) achieves a maxi-
mum value over the set. This is so because P(k) is greater than zero for
all k>0, P(O)=0, P(k) approaches zero as k approaches infinity, anal
P(k) is continuous and bounded above by 1. This maximum, P(ko), rep-
resents the highest probability with which we can assert that a trial
verdict is superior for any case located at xo. The examples in the text
illustrate these methods for a hypothetical sampling situation.8 l
B. Strategic Behavior Under Sampling
1. The Basic Analysis
The following analysis proves the propositions about litigation in-
vestment under the alternative rules for determining sample case ver-
dicts and allocating litigation costs discussed in Part III.B. As above, let
n be the number of cases in the case aggregation, and let m be the
number of cases in the sample. Let M be the set of all sample cases. To
281. See notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
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simplify the analysis, suppose each case includes only one plaintiff and
that all the plaintiffs sue one and the same defendant.
Let c' be the amount of investment that the iti sample plaintiff
makes in her case, and let cdi be the amount of investment that defend-
ant makes in the ith sample case. Let Li be the actual damages for the ii"
sample case. Plaintiff and defendant each place some estimate on the
fraction of total damages plaintiff can expect to recover as a function of
the parties' levels of investment. Let p,(ci, caq) represent plaintiff's
function and pd(cfi, Cdi) represent defendant's function, and assume
these functions are the same for all sample cases. Thus, plaintiff's ex-
pected recovery in the it sample case before averaging and before de-
ducting litigation costs equals p(c,,i, cdi)Li, and defendant's expected
loss equals Pd(Ci, Cdi)L.
For the following analysis, assume that the defendant is found lia-
ble in all the aggregated cases. After the liability determination has
been made, the lawsuit enters the damages phase and m cases are ran-
domly sampled. After the sample cases have been selected, the sample
plaintiffs and the defendant make their litigation investment choices.
Furthermore, they choose with knowledge of the verdict and cost allo-
cation rules that will eventually be applied. All m sample cases are liti-
gated and verdicts returned. Sample verdicts are then combined and
litigation costs allocated according to the applicable rules reflected in
the different Arrangements.
a. Arrangement I
Under Arrangement I all cases, including the sample cases, receive
the sample average and each sample plaintiff bears her own litigation
costs. Each sample plaintiff chooses an investment strategy, ci' C R+.
Since the defendant is a party to all the cases, defendant chooses an
investment strategy for all the sample cases. Thus, defendant's strategy
set includes the set of all vectors, cd - (cal, Cd2 . . . cdm), where cd E R+.
Thus, letting ui be the ith sample plaintiff's payoff and ud be the de-
fendant's payoff, we have:
• m




The first order conditions for a maximum are:
= - p- (cricdi Li -1 =O, or
n 0Pd(Clri,cdi)
-- Li -1 =, orIn aCd i
OPr (cr cdi) m
Pd (C7 Cdi
aCdi
In a Nash equilibrium each party's strategy is her best response to
the strategies chosen by all the other parties. Therefore, an equilibrium
set of strategies for all players, c* = (c 11, c 2 . ., c , Cdl, c 2 ... Cdm),
must satisfy the following conditions:
OP7 . (cri*, cdi*) m
Ocz Li
aPd (c~ri, cd) m
acdi nL
For each i these conditions generate two equations in two
unknowns, which can be solved simultaneously to obtain values for c y"
and cdi*. Part B.2. of this Appendix shows the results for a simple ver-
sion of the functions p.(cji, cdi) and Pd(C', Cdi).
b. Arrangement III
Under Arrangement III all sample plaintiffs receive the sample av-
erage, but total litigation costs are averaged over all plaintiffs in the
aggregation. Thus, the payoff functions are:
1i =












2;jfMp7r (c), Cd j) Lj
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And the conditions for a set of strategies c* to be an equilibrium are:
ap kc* _m
a Cr + Cd L
ap -kc* 2m
acj c i* + c 2  nL.
Equilibrium conditions can be generated in the same way for the
other Arrangements.
2. A Simple Model of Litigation Investment
For a simple model of litigation investment, I shall assume that
plaintiffs and defendant all estimate plaintiffs' fractional recovery in
the same way. Thus, p,(c, Cd) = Pd(ci, Cdi) = p(cji, cdi), for all i. Sup-
pose that p(c i Cdi) has the following form, where k is a constant reflect-
ing both parties' estimates of the effectiveness of plaintiffs' litigation
expenditures relative to defendant's (we assume that the two parties
have identical estimates of k):2'1
kc r
p(c-r, Cd) = - - -c d
a. Arrangement I
Applied to Arrangement I, this model yields the following condi-
tions for a set of strategies to be a Nash equilibrium:
ap~r (cr Cd In
apd (c[i*, C*) m
acj nL
282. For a similar but somewhat more complicated model, see Posner, 2 J. Legal Stud. at
456-58 (cited in note 90). Posner's model allows plaintiff and defendant to make different esti-
mates of relative litigating advantage (in other words, the k factor need not be the same for both
parties). Our assumption of the same estimates for k simplifies the analysis while still communicat-
ing the main points.
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Thus, Cdi = ncy. This means that for large n, defendant should
invest at a much higher level than plaintiff, and the absolute amount of
the plaintiff's investment should be quite low. For example, if n=200,
m=10, Li = $1 million, and k=1, then c,' =$495 and Cdi'=$99,000.
b. Arrangement III
Applied to Arrangement III, the model yields the following condi-
tions for a set of strategies to be a Nash equilibrium:
Op kc* _m
c j + Cj*) 2 nL.
ap -kc 2n
ac _cj + C j nL.
Solving these two equations simultaneously, we obtain:
i* i* _knLi
C~r c Cd 4m
Thus, plaintiff and defendant ought to invest the same amount in
equilibrium, and for large n relative to m, all parties ought to invest at
a high level. For example, if n=200, m=10, Li = $1 million, and k=1,
then c* - cdi = $5 million.
3. The Effect of Attorney Control and Multiple Representation
Suppose that all plaintiffs are represented by attorneys on a con-
tingency fee basis and that the attorneys control the litigation for their
own benefit. Suppose also that the attorneys represent more than one
plaintiff in the aggregation. Let r be the contingency factor, so that an
attorney's recovery before deduction of litigation costs must be dis-




Suppose that after random sampling an
senting h sample plaintiffs, and let H be the
Treating this attorney as the actual player in
payoff function, ua, under Arrangement I is:
Ua = rs
2;jMtm (Cy, Cd) Li
attorney ends up repre-
set of all such plaintiffs.
the litigation game, her
- 2jEHc~
And the first order condition for an attorney maximum is:
0c rsLi
Using the simple investment model and recalling that defendant's
payoff function remains the same, the conditions for a set of strategies
to be a Nash equilibrium are:
Op kc i*
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Thus, Cdi'/C~i- = n/rs. If s= 1 and r= , for example, the asymmetry
in litigation investment is worse with a contingency arrangement than
without one. If r= 1/3 and s>3, however, multiple representation
reduces the asymmetry somewhat, although significant asymmetry
remains.
b. Arrangement III
The attorney's payoff function, ua, under Arrangement III is:
ua  rs m s n
Under the simple model, the conditions for a set of strategies to be
a Nash equilibrium are:
Op kcd m
Cr i  (ciri* + Cdi*)2 rnLi
Op -kc i *  m
aCd i (Ci + Cdi) 2nLj
Solving these equations simultaneously, we obtain the following:
kr2nLi
C7i* = (r+ 1)2 m
krnLi
Cdj i (r+ 1) 2m
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Thus, cy" = rcd. This shows that multiple representation does not
affect litigation investment under Arrangement III, but contingency
representation introduces an asymmetry that depends on the contin-
gency factor.
c. Arrangement IV
In Part III.B. of the text, I pointed out that sometimes Arrange-
ment IV might be superior to Arrangement III under contingency fees
and multiple representation.28" To see how, consider the Nash equilib-
rium investments for Arrangement IV under the simple model.
To begin with, since Arrangement IV gives sample plaintiffs their
own verdicts (and all others the sample average) and averages total liti-
gation costs over all plaintiffs, the payoff function (ua) for an attorney
representing s plaintiffs in the aggregation and h plaintiffs in the sam-
ple, all with contingency r and the payoff function for the defendant
(ud) are as follows:
Ua r2.j1qp(c. cc)L. + r (s-h) jEM P(CTjC2)Lj _ __________
m n
Ltd = - n T'jlCM cjiLj - ;62
As we did above, we can determine the conditions for a set of strat-
egies to be a Nash equilibrium under the simple model, with the follow-
ing results:
_p kcj m i (S
dCri* Cr * + Cd i)2 nL r(m +s -h)
Op -kc3 i* m
OCdi C + Cd 9 2 nL
Solving these equations simultaneously and letting w = s/[r(m +
s - h)], we obtain:
283. See note 86 and accompanying text.
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Thus, cy* = wed'. If r=/3, m=315, s=150, and h = 15, for exam-
ple, then cTi = Cd under Arrangement IV. But c" = Cdi'/3 under Ar-
rangement III. Therefore, in this hypothetical, Arrangement IV is
superior to Arrangement III because of the multiple representation and
contingency.

